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Résumé
Entre 1945 et 2008, le nombre de pays reconnus internationalement a augmenté de 74 à 193
(Spolaore, 2008). Plus récemment, plusieurs pays ont vécu une vague croissante de décentrali-
sation. Dans les pays de l’OCDE, par exemple, le nombre de gouvernements infranationaux a
atteint 140 000 en 2014. De plus, ces gouvernements infranationaux ont une influence croissante
dans ces pays (OCDE, 2014).
Compte tenu de ces tendances vers une décentralisation croissante, cette thèse étudie deux
aspects de celle-ci : la concurrence fiscale, et le choix endogène des frontières.
En matière de concurrence fiscale, cette thèse étudie la mise aux enchères de nouveaux
investissements par une firme à plusieurs établissements. Le but de cette analyse est d’étudier
le comportement stratégique de la firme dans ce type de concurrence. En effet, contrairement
à la littérature sur le sujet qui ne considère soit que des firmes à établissement unique, ou un
continuum de firmes, le premier chapitre de thèse montre que la firme peut modifier l’allocation
de ses investissements en les différentiant, pour ainsi attirer des subsides plus élevés. Dans le
deuxième chapitre, la thèse étudie comment l’ajout de coûts en infrastructure par les régions
avant la mise aux enchères affecte la concurrence entre les régions ainsi que le comportement de
la firme. En effet, ces coûts ajoutent un nouveau compromis pour la firme. Elle peut augmenter
les subsides espérés en différentiant ses établissements, mais en augmentant la taille d’une des
usines, elle peut aussi inciter les régions à renoncer à participer à la mise aux enchères, ce qui
peut finalement réduire les subsides.
En matière de choix endogène des frontières, cette thèse fournit deux analyses: une em-
pirique, et une expérimentale. Dans le troisième chapitre, la thèse étudie empiriquement la
décision d’électeurs dans 213 villes du Québec de quitter une fusion municipale qui leur fût
imposée quelques années auparavant. L’analyse révèle que les électeurs choisissent de faire sé-
cession d’autant plus quand les différences de revenus et de langue entre leur ville et les autres
villes de la même fusion sont plus élevées. L’analyse révèle aussi que ces deux facteurs ne sont
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pas indépendants. En effet, les différences de revenus ont un effet plus prononcé sur le vote
sécessionniste lorsque les différences de langue sont aussi élevées. Etant donné l’importance de
la langue comme facteur déterminant de l’appartenance ethnique au Québec, les résultats de
ce chapitre suggèrent que le choix des électeurs est sensible aux différences ethniques, et non
seulement à des différences de goût pour les biens publics, comme suggéré par Alesina, Baqir
et Hoxby (2004).
Finalement, le dernier chapitre présente les résultats d’un expérience en laboratoire sur le
lien entre décentralisation et sécession. La littérature sur le sujet suggère l’existence de deux
effets contradictoires. La décentralisation pourrait permettre de contrer les mouvements de
sécession en permettant aux régions de prendre plus de décisions à un niveau local, mais pourrait
aussi fournir des ressources supplémentaires aux mouvements sécessionnistes, ce qui renforcerait
les tendances vers la séparation. Nous construisons donc une expérience en laboratoire dans
laquelle les sujets sont chacun membre de deux groupes: un local comportant 3 sujets, et un
global comportant 9 sujets. Les sujets contribuent à un total de trois biens publics, soit avec les
membres de leur groupe local, ou avec les membres de leur groupe global. En variant le nombre
de biens de chaque type, l’expérience simule différent niveaux de décentralisation. Les résultats
de l’expérience montre que l’effet total de la décentralisation est de diminuer la probabilité de
votes pour la sécession.
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Introduction
Between 1945 and 2008, the number of internationally recognised countries increased from 74 to
193 (Spolaore, 2008). Concurrently, in the last two decades, many countries experienced a wave
of decentralisation. For example, in OECD countries, the number of sub-national governments
reached 140,000 in 2014. Moreover, in these countries, the trend in the past twenty years is
towards more influence and decision power for sub-national jurisdictions (OECD, 2014). This
trend is also spreading to developing countries (Daﬄon and Madiès, 2012).
Against this background of increased decentralisation, this thesis will investigate two issues
pertaining to it: fiscal competition, and the choice of jurisdiction borders. Regarding fiscal com-
petition, the OECD (2014) points out that increased autonomy for sub-national governments is
likely to induce more tax competition. Most of the literature on tax competition considers com-
petition for a continuum of firms, investigating, for example, whether fiscal competition leads
to a race to the bottom and a lower provision of public goods (for a review, see Wilson (1999)
and Keen and Konrad (2014)). In the first part of this thesis, I will focus on a different type of
fiscal competition: bidding wars between regional governments to attract new investment from
firms. Moreover, I analyse how these bidding wars affect the firm’s structure, thus putting the
spotlight on the strategic choices of the firm, instead of the governments’. These bidding wars
represent an appreciable amount of public spending. In fact, in the United States alone, state
and local governments award approximately $80 billion in tax incentives each year to compa-
nies.1 In the first two chapters, I build theoretical models to study such bidding wars when
the firm decides to build multiple new plants. Since firms usually make multiple investment
decisions in short amounts of time, the location decisions may not be independent, a feature
ignored by most of the literature that either considers a single mono-plant firm or an infinite
number of mobile firms.
1The New York Times, “As Companies Seek Tax Deals, Governments Pay High Price," available at the
following address: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/us/how-local-taxpayers-bankroll-corporations.html.
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Another important aspect of fiscal decentralisation is the design of borders and how to
delegate political power. Oates (1972), for example, proposed that there was an optimal split
of responsibilities between local and central governments. Later, Alesina and Spolaore (1997)
studied how borders are decided endogenously, based on a trade-off between economies of scale
and heterogeneity of preferences. In the second part of the thesis, I look at the endogenous
formation of borders, first empirically using a set of municipal referendums on secession in
Canada, and then with experimental methods, investigating how decentralisation affects votes
for secession.
In the remainder of this general introduction, I summarise the main points of each chapter
and explain how they contribute to their respective literatures.
Chapter 1 analyses bidding wars for plants of a multi-establishment firm. The main question
is whether the firm can allocate investment across its production sites strategically, in order to
increase the subsidies she receives from regional governments. The focus is thus mostly on the
firm’s strategic behaviour, instead of the governments’. To analyse this question, Chapter 1
presents a model of a bidding war between regions to attract one of two new plants from a firm.
The firm chooses how much to invest in each establishment, and then uses a multi-unit auction
to “sell” them to regional governments. The latter have private benefits from hosting the firm
on their territory. These benefits are private knowledge and represent, for example, spillovers
to domestic firms, a reduction in unvoluntary unemployment, or more intangible benefits to
the local politicians making the decision.2 The assumption that regions have private benefits
is similar to those made by Martin (1999, 2000), as well as Ferrett and Wooton (2013). An
important aspect of this assumption is that the regions have private knowledge, and reflects the
idea that the firm does not know beforehand which region values the plant the highest.
In contrast to these papers and to most of the literature, however, I consider a bidding war
where a single firm makes multiple plants available to the regions. A notable exception in the
literature is the anaylsis of Haaparanta (1996), who also studies a multi-unit bidding war, but
under perfect information. Since information asymmetry is an important justification to use
an auction (or a similar mechanism) in the first place, the model of Chapter 1 provides an
original and significant improvement over Haaparanta’s (1996) model. The fact that the firm
can install more than one new plant has additional implications. Indeed, her behaviour is more
2Buts, Jegers, and Jottier (2012) find that subsidies to firms increase support for incumbent local politicians
in Belgium.
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complex; she has to decide how much to invest in each location. Finally, note that since this
chapter discusses the allocation by a firm of production across many plants, it also contributes
to the literature on the decision of firms to produce in multiple establishment. Examples include
Hanink (1984) and Behrens and Picard (2008).
I model the auction process as a simultaneous open ascending auction for multiple units.
The firm runs an ascending clock that determines the current price for the smallest plant still
available. Regions quit the auction when the clock price reaches a certain level depending on
their benefits. Once only two regions remain in the bidding war, the subsidy for the smallest
establishment is set at the amount on the clock when the third-to-last region left the auction.
If the two plants were of equal size, the auction stops there, and the last two regions each win
one of the plants at that price. If the two plants are of unequal size, the remaining two regions
continue bidding for the larger establishment. The subsidy is then set at the amount of the
clock when the second-to-last region leaves the bidding war.
The model is a three-stage game. First, the firm chooses and commits to amounts of capital
to invest, based on her expectations of subsidies and last-period operating profits. Then, she
runs the auction, which determines the equilibrium subsidies. In the last period, the firm invests
the capital in the winning regions, produces, and receives operating profits.
The main results of Chapter 1 are as follows. First, I find that equilibrium subsidies will
depend on the firm’s choice of capital amounts to invest. In particular, when she chooses
asymmetric plants, total subsidies are larger, due to the infra-marginal competition between
the last two remaining bidders for the larger plant. Indeed, when only two regions remain, they
are both guaranteed to win at least the small plant, and continue bidding until one is indifferent
between winning either plant and withdraws. Cowie et al. (2007) previously considered infra-
marginal competition in the context of an auction. They analyse how a seller can divide the
units for sale in multiple lots in order to receive higher offers from the bidders. They find that
differentiating the lots can lead to higher bids due to the infra-marginal competition for the
largest lot. I have a similar reasoning in the auction stage of the model.
Second, I show that this bidding behaviour affects the optimal investment amounts of the
firm. More specifically, I find that she always chooses to differentiate her establishments. In
particular, the subsidies can be interpreted as “adjustments” to the marginal cost of labour.
Essentially, since the regions’ benefits depend on the amount of labour employed, so do the
subsidies offered by the regions. When the firm invests more, she hires more workers and pays
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higher total wages, but this increase is mitigated by larger subsidies.
I then compare this result to a situation without a bidding war, in which the firm simply
chooses two locations for the plants randomly.3 First, I look at how the bidding war changes
investment in each plant individually. I find that the bidding war increases the size of the
first establishment for any distribution function of the private benefits and for any production
function. The modification to the second establishment, however, is ambiguous and depends
on the shape of the distribution of private benefits. For a simple uniform distribution, the
bidding war always increases the size of the second plant, but with very skewed distributions,
it is possible to find cases where bidding war reduces the size of the investment. Second, I
investigate how the bidding war affects total investment. The modification is ambiguous in
general, but when using a Cobbs-Douglas form for the production function, I find that total
investment increases. Notably, this result is true for any distribution function.
In the final section of the chapter, I discuss the optimal mechanism to allocate the establish-
ments under three different sets of assumptions: first from the point of view of the firm, second
from the point of view of a social planner, and finally under more relaxed assumptions on the
firm’s commitment.
First, I consider the choice of the open ascending auction as the formal procedure to “sell”
the plants. More specifically, I find the optimal mechanism from the point of view of the firm,
to maximise her total profits. I find that this optimal mechanism, defined by an allocation
and a payment rules, can be implemented by the open ascending auction. Since the optimal
mechanism also describes reserve subsidies, I also characterise conditions under which these
reserve subsidies are non-binding.4
Second, I solve a similar problem, but from the point of view of a social planner. I find that
an uninformed social planner would choose identical allocation and payment rules as the firm.
Therefore, the optimal mechanism implemented by the firm is socially efficient. However, as in
typical mechanism design problems, the firm can choose not to allocate if the revealed signals
are under a certain threshold (i.e., reserve subsidies). In the firm’s optimisation problem,
I described conditions under which these reserve prices don’t come into play. In the social
planner’s problem, I do the same, showing that these conditions are more relaxed under the
social planner. In effect, the social planner allocates the plants more often. In other words,
3In the model, I deliberately assume that the firm has identical productivity in every region.
4These reserve subsidies are equivalent to reserve prices in an auction. It’s the level of subsidies under which
the firm decides not to allocate the plants.
15
the social planner puts less importance on the firm’s capture of the informational rent of the
regions.
Finally, I also find the optimal mechanism under the assumption that the firm can choose
how much to invest endogenously through the mechanism. I find that this unconstrained optimal
mechanism without prior commitment to amounts of investment leads to the same allocation
and payments, in expected value, as the constrained optimal mechanism (with commitment).
Therefore, while in the auction model, the firm could choose, ex post, to renege on her commit-
ment and change the amounts of investment once the information is revealed, this commitment
doesn’t change the outcome of the model in expected values. However, the correspondence be-
tween the ex ante and ex post profits of the firm obviously depend on the revealed information
of the regions. In the model, I choose to keep the obligation of the firm to commit to invest-
ments to keep the model tractable and focused on the question of how the firm’s production
split affects, and is affected by, the bidding war.5
To conclude, the first chapter contributes to the literature on fiscal competition, and more
specifically to the branch that considers competition for a specific firm. To summarise, this
chapter can be interpreted as two successive additions to the usual literature on bidding wars
for firms. First, instead of considering a fixed investment, this chapter allows the firm to choose
the amount to invest and make available in a bidding war. This addition changes the strategy of
the firm, inciting her to over-invest in comparison to a situation without a bidding war. Second,
we add a multi-location component: the firm can allocate the total investment across two sites.
This addition modifies the firm’s behaviour further, by inciting her to differentiate the amounts
of investment between the production sites. In doing so, she continues to over-invest in total.
Put simply, Chapter 1 shows that the strategic behaviour of firms has important implications
on the bidding wars for plants between regions.
In terms of social welfare, the chapter shows that while the allocation of investment is
distorted versus a situation without a bidding war, the positive effect on allocative efficiency
resulting from bidding wars is preserved in a multi-plant bidding war. More specifically, the
regions that value the investment the most win it. Moreover, not only is total investment
increased (which may have positive or negative implications), but it is increased (under some
5Such a modification to the model would most likely necessitate a dynamic model, since once the firm changes
the investment amounts, the regions can also modify their subsidies, so that the firm may prefer to cancel the
bidding war and start over with the information gained in the previous auction. I leave that possibility for future
research.
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conditions) for both hosts of the plants. Therefore, the increase in investment is not skewed
only towards one of the winners at the expense of the other.
In Chapter 2, I present a second analysis of bidding wars for multi-plant firms. I depart from
the first chapter by considering a second tool often used by regional governments: improvements
in productive infrastructure. For example, Davies (2005) lists a number of cases of subsidies
to large plants where local governments also offered road, sewer, and rail improvements as
part of the incentives. Since the firm will only choose a subset of all regions in the bidding
war, it is possible that some of that infrastructure spending is “wasted.” Taylor (1992) makes
the theoretical argument that this spending is indeed wasted, but Jayet and Paty (2006) and
Justman et al. (2002) instead argue that such investment spending can be welfare-improving.
These authors, however, consider either a competition for a single mono-plant firm or for a
continuum of many firms. In light of Chapter 1’s result, we might suspect that the multi-plant
nature of most firms conducting these bidding wars could have consequences on the competi-
tion for these plants. The goal of this chapter is to determine how such infrastructure costs
can affect the outcome of the bidding war, as well as the behaviour of the firm. Indeed, when
the firm conducts multiple bidding wars simultaneously, she also chooses the size of each estab-
lishment. Choosing a larger establishment (e.g., by choosing asymmetrical establishments) has
consequences for the needs in infrastructure. For example, bigger plants may use more electric-
ity, need better roads, etc. While all regions may have a level of public infrastructure sufficient
to host a plant up to some threshold size, larger plants may require additional infrastructure.
This additional infrastructure is modelled in Chapter 2 similarly to an entry cost in an auction:
a sunk cost that is necessary in order to participate in the auction.
The argument in Chapter 2 is therefore the following. When allocating plants through a
bidding war, the firm differentiates her establishments, thus concentrating more production in
one plant than without a bidding war. In turn, this concentration increases the size of one plant,
and thus the infrastructure needed to host it. Consequently, some regions decide not to invest
in the necessary infrastructure, and do not take part in the bidding war. Finally, this lower
competition for the firm’s investment potentially reduces the subsidies she hopes to receive. At
one extreme, only one region enters the bidding war, completely differentiating itself from the
others, and wins the firm’s investment without paying subsidies.
To analyse this question, I build a modified version of the model in Chapter 1. To focus on
the production split of the firm, I set total investment to an exogenous amount, thus limiting
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the choice of the firm to a single variable representing the share of investment in each plant.
The timing is similar, but before the auction takes place, the regional governments must decide
whether they want to pay an infrastructure cost to take part in the bidding war for the largest
plant. This cost depends on the share of production previously chosen by the firm, and makes
the region fit to host the plant (i.e., it corresponds to the level of infrastructure needed to the
level required by the larger plant).
I also choose a simplified, reduced-form function for the firm’s profits. To show that this
reduced-form profit function captures the important features of the multi-plant bidding war, I
first solve the model without entry costs, finding the same results as in Chapter 1 for certain
parameters of the profit function (namely, the parameters that ensure the firm has incentives
to split production without a bidding war).
In the following section of the chapter, I consider the full model, including the endogenous
entry of regions. The main results are as follows. First, I show that by choosing a high
differentiation (a large share of production in one plant), the firm risks driving all regions out
of the bidding war. Indeed, since the infrastructure cost is sunk, when it is too large, regions
are better off only participating in the bidding for the small establishment.
Second, I show that this feature of the competition has implications on the firm’s choice of
differentiation. Indeed, when infrastructure costs are important enough, even a firm that would
usually be better off concentrating all production in a single plant would choose to split in two
establishments. More generally, these infrastructure costs mitigate the tendency of the firm to
put more production in one of the establishments, thus moving closer to identical plants.
To conclude, Chapter 2 expands on the first chapter, and shows that when the regional
governments can make investment in public infrastructure before the bidding war, the firm
modifies her allocation of production. In brief, this public investment reduces the incentives for
the firm to differentiate her plants.
In Chapter 3, I turn to the study of endogenous borders and secessions. This question has
had a relatively high profile in recent years at a national level, especially following the vote of
the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, but also due to the debates in Scotland and
Catalonia, for example. However, similar issues were raised at a more local level, when central
governments in recent decades have modified borders of municipalities, promising cost savings
and higher efficiency. Examples include municipal mergers in Finland, Japan, and Canada, as
well as the push towards more collaboration amongst French municipalities.
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However, as evidenced by the Canadian case, voters often have priorities diverging from
local governments when it comes to the borders of local jurisdictions. In fact, the economic
literature on endogenous borders often emphasises a trade-off between economies of scale and
heterogeneity of preferences (see, e.g., Alesina and Spolaore, 1997). Larger jurisdictions can
more efficiently provide public goods, but there might be a better match between the preferences
of voters and the public good in smaller jurisdictions. Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2004) put
forth another reason for the disapproval of large jurisdictions by voters: voters inherently dislike
living in a jurisdiction with people different from them. This reason is closely linked to the
literature on the provision of public goods in diverse communities. For example, Alesina et
al. (1999) as well as Algan et al. (2016) show that the co-existence of different ethnic groups
in municipalities or communities can lead to public goods of lower quality (e.g., vandalism in
Algan et al. (2016)).
The objective of this chapter is to investigate whether preferences, ethnic identity, or both
arguments explain the voters’ disapproval of large jurisdictions. To do so, I use data from a set
of municipal referendums in the Canadian province of Quebec. After the provincial government
unilaterally enforced a wave of municipal mergers in 2001, public opposition led to a change
of government in the following elections. Having campaigned on the idea of reversing these
mergers, the new government organized, in 2004, simultaneous public consultations in the 213
cities that were part of the merger wave. In this consultation process, voters were asked whether
they wanted their pre-merger town to secede from the consolidated municipality or not. In the
analysis, I use the consultation results as the dependent variable, and look at the effect of a
number of socio-economic factors on whether a town decides to secede or not, using Probit
estimations.
These referendums are unique and allow for an original and interesting analysis. Indeed,
while many authors studied the determinants of municipal or local mergers before, they usually
had to rely on the decisions of public officials (e.g., Austin, 1999; Brasington, 2003, Hanes
et al. 2009; Saarimaa and Tukiainen, 2014). However, Hyytinen, Saarimaa, and Tukiainen
(2014) show that government officials can choose mergers based on other priorities, such as
career concerns. For example, a merger might increase competition for their council seat. Some
authors used referendums before, but their dataset or their analysis was limited. Brink (2004),
for example, uses data from only a few referendums over 20 years, and these referendums
were requested by the cities themselves. Tanguay and Wihry (2008) also use data from the
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referendums in Quebec, but while they find that differences in income and language separately
affect the secession decision, they do not attempt to explain why. In this chapter, I shed light
on whether preferences for an ethnically homogeneous community are important in addition
to simple preferences for the public good, using the full sample of 213 cities6 and including
important additional variables such as differences in house values.
Since municipalities in Quebec have different language compositions, the mergers often
mixed mostly English-speaking towns with French-speaking ones. Since in Quebec, language
is at the foundation of a strong ethno-lingustic identity, I can investigate whether greater dif-
ferences in language composition resulted in more secessions. Moreover, since income and
language are not perfectly correlated, I can refine the analysis, by analysing, using interaction
terms, whether differences in language affected how voters were swayed by income differences.
My main results are as follows. First, differences in income and language between a town
and the other towns in the merger are important drivers of the secession decision. Second, while
greater income differences does lead to more secessions, I find that this effect is not identical at
different levels of language differences. In particular, when voters are mixed mostly with others
of the same ethnic group (i.e., low language differences), they tolerate differences in income:
income differences have no, or only a small effect on the probability of a secession. However,
when the language differences are larger, differences in income greatly affect the probability of
a secession. These results suggest that when deciding to secede, voters do not only care about
the match between their preferences for the public goods and the public goods provided, but
also directly care about the ethnic identity of the voters in their jurisdiction. In other words,
voters prefer ethnically homogenous municipalities. This result is robust to many specifications,
including accounting for turnout at the referendum, as well as to the inclusion of a spatial lag.
In addition, I find that while the size of income differences affect the probability of seces-
sion, they only do so in absolute value; the direction of that difference has no effect. Simply
put, it is not richer or poorer towns that secede, only those that are more different in either
direction. Moreover, I find that while income differences are important, differences in house
values (which are correlated with income differences, and define the tax base) have no robust
effect on secession. The analysis also accounts for differences in political preferences. However,
due to the nature of political parties in Quebec (i.e., federalist vs. secessionist), this variable is
closely correlated with language and captures much of the same effect.
6Tanguay and Wihry use a different dependent variable that limits the sample.
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Chapter 3 has two main conclusions. First, it shows that questions of ethnic identity are
important in the voters’ preferences over jurisdiction borders. This finding contrasts with much
of the economic literature on municipal mergers, but also secessions in general, which focuses on
the the match of preferences between voters and the public goods provided. Second, and more
concretely, the chapter shows that if governments care about the potential long-term benefits of
ethnic diversity in local jurisdictions (as suggested by Putnam (2007) and Ottaviano and Peri
(2005)), they should impose mergers and commit to a policy of not allowing further changes.
The last chapter of this thesis, Chapter 4, also studies secessions. It investigates, using
experimental methods, the link between decentralisation within a country and the presence of
secessionist groups. In particular, the objective of this chapter is to find whether decentrali-
sation increases or decreases the probability votes for regional secession. Indeed, when central
governments are confronted with a secessionist threat in one or more regions, they might de-
volve some power or competences to the regional entity, in the hope that the decentralization of
power will accommodate regional demands and thereby quell the separatist movement. How-
ever, while decentralisation might allow an overall mix of public goods closer to the voters’
preferences, it might also provide more resources to the secessionist movement, thus making
them more organised and possibly stronger. This double-edged sword argument was brought
forward by Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson (2004), and Spolaore (2008), for example.
Spolaore (2008) cites a few empirical studies that tackle this question, highlighting, however,
that such empirical studies are bound to face measurement and endogeneity issues. Moreover,
while secessions occur in the real world, they are still relatively rare and can be difficult to
compare using data. Nevertheless, authors such as Bakke and Wibbels (2006) find that ethnic
conflicts are more common in federations, when regions have different incomes. Brancati (2006),
in her analysis, finds that decentralisation reduces the likelihood of conflict, but that this effect
can be counteracted by the increasing support for regional parties.
Given the difficulty to find causal estimates with observed data, Chapter 4 instead ap-
proaches the question with experimental methods. To this purpose, I build an original experi-
mental design based on a multiple public good game using the voluntary contribution mechanism
(Isaac and Walker, 1988). The experimental design is as follows. When subjects arrived at the
lab, they were placed in groups of 9 (hereafter, global groups). At the same time, these global
groups were split into 3 smaller groups, called local groups (of 3 subjects each). Therefore,
subjects played public goods game at two levels: local and global. All 9 subjects in a global
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group contribute to the global public goods. At the local level, subjects can only contribute to
the local public goods corresponding to their local group. Additionally, the marginal per capita
returns (MPCR) of these two types of public goods are different. Namely, the MPCR is 0.5 for
the local public goods and 0.2 for the global public goods.
In all treatments, the subjects contribute to three public goods for 24 periods. The config-
uration of the three public goods (i.e., the number of local and global goods) differ according
to the treatment. After the 24 periods, subjects vote on whether they want their local group to
“secede” from the global group. After the vote, subjects play an additional 12 periods, under
the institutional arrangement decided by the votes. When a local group successfully votes to
secede, they only contribute to local public goods in the last 12 periods.7
The experiment uses a 2× 2 design. Treatments vary on the two dimensions of decentrali-
sation and local group identity. First, for the decentralisation dimension, we vary the number
of each type of public goods. In the Centralisation treatments, subjects are faced with two
global public goods and one local public good, while in the Decentralisation treatments they
are faced with the opposite: one global public good and two local public goods. Second, for the
identity dimension, we introduce variation in how we create local groups. In the No identity
treatments, subjects are randomly assigned to local groups. In the Identity treatments, groups
were constituted based on the proximity of subjects’ opinions in a preliminary questionnaire.
Each local group is formed with subjects that share the closest opinions.8
The implementation of decentralisation in this experiment is obviously very simplified, and
does not consider, for example, how local goods differ from national ones. However, the experi-
mental design still captures some of the real-world features of decentralisation for three reasons.
First, since there are more subjects in the global groups, monitoring is more difficult, and a
greater level of free-riding might be expected. In fact, Fellner and Lünser (2008), in a similar
experiment with local and global public goods, find that contributions fall more rapidly in the
global good. Consequently, the setup captures at least part of the rationale for decentralisation:
the provision of public goods at the local level is more easily monitored, being “closer” to the
voters. Second, provision at the global level is more efficient in the experiment than at the
local level. While the MPCR for the global good is lower, there are more participants, and
7In the first 24 periods, subjects are familiarised with that institutional arrangement. Specifically, they play
12 periods under a mixed environment and 12 periods in an environment that only includes local public goods.
8When local groups are formed using the questionnaire, subjects are aware that the assignment method will
place them with like-minded people. Like others in the literature, the idea is that such a treatment reinforces
the shared identity among local groups.
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thus the potential payoff is higher. Third, since public goods of the same type (local or global)
are identical experimentally, we might fear that subjects put the whole amount they decided
to contribute to that type in a single good. In that case, our experiment would be essentially
equivalent to a experiment with only two public goods. However, Bernasconi et al. (2009) show
that subjects contribute more to public goods when there are many identical goods. If our
subjects first consider the two categories of goods as distinct, and then how much to contribute
to each good individually, then the multiple identical local goods actually capture the fact that
“more spending” is being done at that level. In fact, the subjects in the experiment of Chapter
4 actually contribute more to goods that are duplicated, thus alleviating potential concerns that
subjects would consider two identical goods as a single good.
The second treatment dimension is related to the the findings of Chapter 3 on the link
between ethnic identity and the probability of a secession. Given the importance of ethnicity
in many secessionist movements around the world, and the role of identity in experimental
results (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Chen and Li, 2009; Chakravarty and Fonseca, 2012), the
experiment introduces the same concept to investigate whether the creation of a local shared
identity modifies the outcome of the vote. In addition, I consider whether this identity creation
modifies the effect of the Decentralisation treatment. Indeed, in the real world, decentralisation
might be more or less efficient at stopping secessionist movements depending on the strength of
the ethnic identity of the region.
The results of Chapter 4 concern both the results of the vote and the level of contributions by
subjects. First, it finds that the Decentralization treatment strongly decreases the probability
that subjects vote for secession, although reinforced local identities have no effect on the votes.
Second, the results also show that the Decentralization treatment increases contributions to
the local public goods. However, the Identity treatment does not affect the level of individual
contributions. To conclude, the results suggest that central governments could actually weaken
secessionist movements by devolving some responsibilities to regional governments.
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Chapter 1
The Impact of Bidding Wars on the
Optimal Investment Decisions of
Multi-Establishment Firms1
1This chapter was prepared in collaboration with Pierre-Henri Morand. I acknowledge the help of Thierry
Madiès, who provided useful comments on this chapter, as well as Nicolas Gravel and Tanguy van Yppersele for
helpful discussions and suggestions. This chapter was presented at the Annual Meetings of the Association for
Public Economic Theory (Luxembourg, 2015).
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1.1 Introduction
Tax incentives offered to firms in exchange for new investments represent an appreciable amount
of government spending each year. In the United States alone, state and local governments
award approximately $80 billion in tax incentives each year to companies.2 These subsidies are
often the result of bidding wars between many local or regional governments. Owing to their
prominence, economists investigated the behaviour of firms and governments participating in
these location contests. However, they have generally considered a single firm opening a single
establishment. In fact, the firms running these bidding wars are frequently multinationals, or
at least multi-establishment companies. For example, between 2007 and 2012, Boeing received
at least $327 million in incentives from 11 US states. In the same period, Procter & Gamble
received at least $128 million from 10 states.3 These examples illustrate how firms make multiple
investments in short periods of time. Consequently, these bidding wars are not necessarily
independent.
In this chapter, the objective is to investigate the strategic behaviour of a firm that is
conducting a bidding war for multiple establishments. The main question is whether the firm can
allocate investment across its production sites strategically, in order to increase the subsidies she
receives from regional governments. The focus is thus mostly on the firm’s strategic behaviour,
instead of the governments’. To do so, we propose a model in which regional governments are
competing against each other to attract one of a firm’s investments. The main originality is
twofold. First, the firm endogenously decides how much to invest, and her decision can affect the
bidding behaviour of the regions. Second, we allow the firm to invest in more than one location,
essentially making multiple plants available for bidding. Formally, we model this competition
as a multi-unit auction. We find that such a bidding war affects the firm’s structure. Indeed,
the firm invests more in one of the plants, creating differentiation between them. In doing
so, she creates incentives for the regional governments to offer larger tax breaks, through infra-
marginal competition between the last two remaining bidding regions for the largest plant in the
auction. Cowie et al. (2007) previously considered infra-marginal competition in the context of
an auction. They analyse how a seller can divide the units for sale in multiple lots in order to
receive higher offers from the bidders. They find that differentiating the lots can lead to higher
2The New York Times, “As Companies Seek Tax Deals, Governments Pay High Price," available at the
following address: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/us/how-local-taxpayers-bankroll-corporations.html.
3Other examples are available from the New York Times, at the following URL:
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/12/01/us/government-incentives.html
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bids due to the infra-marginal competition for the largest lot. We have a similar reasoning in
the auction stage of our model.
This chapter contributes mainly to the literature on fiscal competition, but also to the
analysis of the location decision of multinationals. To the literature on fiscal competition, this
chapter is particularly related to the subset of papers that consider competition for a single
large firm. Keen and Konrad (2014) offer a short overview of this literature, which includes
early contributions by, e.g., Black and Hoyt, (1989), Doyle and van Wijnbergen, (1994), and
King et al., (1993). This is in contrast to the larger stream of that literature that considers the
competition between regions or countries to attract units of homogeneous and perfectly divisible
capital. Wilson (1999) and Keen and Konrad (2014) offer extensive surveys of these models.
Moreover, in contrast to many of these papers, we are primarily interested in how bidding wars
affect the strategy and the behaviour of the firm, instead of governments.
As in this chapter, many papers that investigate these bidding wars for a single large firm
use models from, or similar to, auctions. Indeed, auctions are a useful tool for sellers who do
not know the value potential buyers place on the product sold. Moreover, as suggested by
Klemperer (2004, Chapter 2), auction theory can also provide a rich set of tools to study a
number of problems in economics and social sciences. Location contests are a good example
of a context in which auctions are a useful theoretical tool; many bidders (governments) place
some private value on a good (investment), and a seller (the firm) does not know how to price
it, thus choosing to accept bids (subsidies).
Our model is particularly related to the analysis of Haaparanta (1996), who uses a menu
auction model. This author considers two regions competing for investment from a firm, under
the assumption that this investment is divisible. However, while Haaparanta (1996) considers
a model under perfect information, we assume that the regions’ private benefits from hosting
the firm are private knowledge. In fact, such information asymmetry is a justification to use a
mechanism similar to an auction in the first place.
As the model will show formally, analysing the question under an open ascending auction
instead of a menu auction (as in Haaparanta’s paper) will reveal new insights about the bidding
war and the allocation of investment. First, when establishments are asymmetric, infra-marginal
competition takes place between the last two remaining bidders, increasing the subsidy on
the large plant, and allowing the firm to benefit from higher total subsidies. Consequently,
at the equilibrium, the firm modifies her allocation of production to take advantage of this
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phenomenon. Cowie et al. (2007) previously considered infra-marginal competition in the
context of an auction. They analyse how a seller can divide the units for sale in multiple lots
in order to receive higher offers from the bidders. They find that differentiating the lots can
lead to higher bids due to the infra-marginal competition for the largest lot. I have a similar
reasoning in the auction stage of the model. The second new insight results from the presence of
information asymmetry. Under a menu auction, Haaparanta (1996) finds that the firm captures
the whole rent from the regions. In this chapter, the information asymmetry curbs the firm’s
ability to extract rents from the regions.
Another closely related paper is that of Martin (1999). This author studies two firms in
the same industry who use bidding wars sequentially to decide where to locate. Martin (1999)
shows that agglomeration effects incite regions to overbid in the first auction, expecting it will
increase their probability of winning in the second period. Indeed, winning the investment in
the first period from the first firm increases the attractiveness of the region to other firms in the
same industry. In this chapter, we also find that regions offer greater subsidies for one plant.
However, we consider how a single firm can entice greater subsidies by modifying her allocation
of production between two plants. In addition, we do so without considering agglomeration
economies.
Other related papers include Black and Hoyt (1989) who were, to our knowledge, the first
to explicitly model the firm’s location choice as an auction. They highlight the fact that this
competition need not be a zero-sum game; the bids offered by government can promote the
efficient location of production. In their model, they also consider that smaller, already estab-
lished firms may move once a new firm is opened in one of the regions. Indeed, small firms will
relocate to the winning region, thus increasing its potential gains. This multiplier effect can
explain why regions may seem to “overbid” for the large firm.
Before Black and Hoyt (1989), Doyle and van Wijnbergen (1994), in a paper first published
in 1984, considered a bargaining game between one firm and a government over taxation. Doyle
and van Wijnbergen (1994) assumed that firms negotiate with a single government at a time.
In their solution, the host government initially sets a low tax rate, but gradually increases it
until it reaches a limit. The government has some bargaining power due to the fact that the
multinational must incur a positive cost if it relocates to a new location. However, firms have
no reason not to negotiate simultaneously with multiple governments. Recognising this fact,
Bond and Samuelson (1986) investigate a situation in which a firm has to decide between two
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locations. In their model, tax holidays are used as a signal of productivity by the governments.
An important feature of their model is information asymmetry. It allows for the presence of
tax holidays even if there are no fixed costs, in contrast to Doyle and Van Wijnbergen (1984).
Similarly to Bond and Samuelson (1986), information asymmetry is an important of our model,
although our results are derived without productivity differences between the regions.
Black and Hoyt (1989) had highlighted some caveats to their analysis. One caveat was the
lack of dynamic considerations. King and Welling (1992) explore the consequences of allowing
the firm to relocate in later periods. They consider a two-period model, in which the firm
conducts an auction to decide on its location in each period. They find that when players
cannot commit to second-period actions, the firm can re-locate to the region that lost in the
first period. This possibility modifies the first-period bids, thus changing the outcome even if
the relocation threat is not materialised. The authors also show that the firm would prefer a
world with commitment, but that without commitment, total social welfare is higher.
King, McAfee and Welling (1993) generalise the model of King and Welling (1992), but with
a continuum of local productivities. They also consider an extension in which regions can invest
in infrastructure in a previous stage, thus increasing their productivity potential. They find
that in equilibrium, regions tend to choose different levels of infrastructure, thus endogenously
creating the productivity continuum described in their main model. King et al. (1993) assume
some information asymmetry, but it is the firm who does not know its productivity in each
region. In this chapter, we instead assume (like Martin, 1999) that the regions hold some
private information, while productivity is the same everywhere. This modelling choice reflect
the fact that not all regions value the firm’s presence identically.
In this chapter, we also do not consider a two-period model. The firm installs new pro-
duction facilities in one period, but we do not model the interactions in the following periods.
We do so deliberately, to focus instead on how the firm decides to allocate across regions in
multiple establishments in a single period. If we did consider many periods, our results could
be related to those of Janeba (2000), for example, who considers a firm that installs excess
production capacity in multiple regions in order to avoid the problem of hold-up by the regions.
Indeed, in subsequent periods, regions could increase taxes or renege on their commitment to
tax breaks (i.e., subsidies). By having excess capacity, the firm could credibly threaten to de-
crease production, and thus employment in the region that increased taxes, to increase it in the
other.
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Furusawa, Hori and Wooton (2010) show that the bidding mechanism can affect the results
of the model. In their paper, they show that English auctions lead to more aggressive bidding,
or to a “race beyond the bottom,” compared to bidding in sealed bid auctions. Martin (2000),
however, cites case studies that claim bidding wars resemble more closely open ascending auc-
tions, as in our model. Menezes (2003) describes the basic competition for investment under
several auction mechanisms, and shows that the expected amount paid to the firm is the same,
which is not surprising given the Revenue Equivalence theorem. In this chapter, we show that
the open ascending auction we use implements the optimal mechanism (under some conditions).
Other examples of papers on bidding wars for a specific firm include Ferrett and Wooton
(2010), who analyse the question of firm ownership, showing that tax or subsidy offers are
independent of the ownership country of the firm. In another paper, Martin (2000) applies
auctions with favouritism to study these contests when firms have explicit preferences for a
region. Finally, Scoones (2001) studies bidding wars for firms when the value of the investment
has two components: common and private. In other words, part of the investment’s value is
the same in every region, while another is specific to producing in a given region. He shows
that if the common share increases, then the subsidies increase as well, eventually transferring
all value to the firm.
Some may see these bidding wars as wasteful, but they can also play an important role
in eliciting private information and improving allocation efficiency (Menezes, 2003). In fact,
despite paying subsidies to the firm, the winning region may actually benefit from the presence
of the new plant. Greenstone and Moretti (2003) compare the outcomes for winning and losing
counties in contests for “million dollar plants”, and find that winning counties experience greater
increases in land value as well as in the total wage bill of other firms in the industry of the
new plant. In our model, we show that this bidding war ensures that regions that value the
investment the most are those receiving it, a favourable outcome in terms of social welfare. We
also show that the differentiation between the plants is optimal from the point of view of a
social planner.
In addition to the literature on fiscal competition, this chapter is related to the analysis
of the multinational. Indeed, one of our contribution over most papers cited above is to allow
the firm to have multiple establishments, and investigate how a bidding war affects the firm’s
choice of production locations. Ekholm and Forslid (2001) explain how Core-Periphery models
argued that firms prefer to concentrate in a single location, as long as trade costs are low
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enough. These two authors then depart from the usual Core-Periphery models and investigate
firms that have multi-plant economies of scale, and thus produce in many regions. They cite
the example of soft drink and beer manufacturers, who usually operate in numerous locations.
Their model points to less agglomeration than previous models did. Hanink (1984) offers another
potential justification for multi-plant firms: risk diversification. He does so by comparing firms
to investors. In the same way that investors prefer holding a diverse portfolio, firms can hold a
diverse “geographical” portfolio to increase their overall profits. These papers show that firms
can have incentives to operate in many plants. In this chapter, we take as given the existence of
multi-plant firms, focusing instead of the location decision of these firms, and how it is affected
by a bidding war.
More closely related to this paper, Behrens and Picard (2008) study the choice of firms to
become multinationals, in a model that includes subsidies to location. They find that bidding
wars and subsidies affect the choice of firms to become multinationals, in effect increasing the
number of multinationals. In their model, they consider a continuum of firms deciding to locate
in one or two countries. In this chapter, we instead study the choice of a single firm, taking its
decision to be a multinational as a given. However, their result underlines the importance to
study bidding wars in the context of multinationals.
Our main results are as follows. First, we show that when a firm conducts a bidding war
for multiple establishments, she can increase her total profits (operating profits plus subsidies)
by differentiating her establishments. Second, we show that under certain assumptions on the
production function, the firm invests more in total and receives larger subsidies under such a
bidding war than she would if she allocated production without relying on a bidding war. Third,
we show that total investment and subsidies would be over-estimated if we did not consider the
linkages between the bidding wars between the multiple establishments of a single firm. Fourth,
we show that the multi-unit auction under which we derive our main results is equivalent to the
optimal mechanism from the firm’s viewpoint. Similarly, we show that a social planner would
also choose the same allocation and payment rules, although the conditions under which the
social planner chooses not to impose reserve prices are looser than the conditions from the firm’s
viewpoint. Finally, although our model is derived with a commitment to investment amounts
by the firm in the first period, we show that in expected value, our model is equivalent ex ante
to a more general model without commitment.
The next section presents the framework of the model, including the timing of the game.
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Section 3 solves the three stages of the game, while Section 4 compares the results with those
of an alternative model with only one plant, but with an endogenous amount of investment.
This model shows how both endogenous investment and multiple investments affect the firm’s
behaviour. Section 5 derives the optimal mechanism, first from the viewpoint of the firm, and
then from that of a social planner. Then, it derives the optimal mechanism without prior
commitment to investment amounts, showing that it is ex ante equivalent in expected value to
the constrained optimal mechanism. The last section concludes.
1.2 The Model
Consider a firm that plans to build new production facilities in two of n regions, indexed by
i ∈ 1, ..., n. To decide the location of these plants, the firm puts the n regional governments in
competition against each other. The governments submit offers of subsidies to attract the firm
to their territory. In contrast to most of the previous literature, however, the firm can divide
her production in multiple locations, either in symmetric or asymmetric establishments. For
simplicity and tractability, we limit the model to the case of two establishments, indexed by
j ∈ 1, 2. Without loss of generality, we label the largest plant by j = 1, so that K1 ≥ K2.
1.2.1 The Firm
We consider a multinational firm that already produces elsewhere, and wants to increase pro-
duction by installing new establishments among the n regions. Once she decided where to install
the new plants, the firm produces, in each establishment, according to the production function
f(Kj , Lj), with Kj the capital invested in location j, and Lj the labour employed in that es-
tablishment. We make the usual assumptions that the production function exhibits decreasing
returns to scale in both inputs (∂f(Kj ,Lj)∂Ki > 0,
∂f(Kj ,Lj)
∂Li
> 0 and ∂f
2(Kj ,Lj)
∂K2i
< 0, ∂f
2(Kj ,Lj)
∂L2i
< 0).4
The firm sells the product on a global market for a price p, acting as a price-taker. We deliber-
ately do not model the goods market explicitly, to instead focus on the firm’s location decision
and the bidding war between regions. The production costs are identical in every region (w, r).
Therefore, the firm’s operating profits in each establishment j = 1, 2 are equal to
pij = pf(Kj , Lj)− wLj − rKj (1.2.1)
4This assumption implies, in the model, that the firm has incentives to produce in more than one establish-
ment.
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In addition to the profits from production, the firm also receives subsidies from the regions
(resulting from the bidding war), so that her total ex post profits are equal to:
Π = s∗1 + s∗2 + pi1 + pi2 (1.2.2)
where s∗j is the equilibrium subsidy for establishment j.
1.2.2 The Regions
These subsidies depend on the regions’ valuation of the firm’s investments. In particular, if
regional government i wins establishment j, it receives a payoff equal to
Vij = Lj · bi − sij (1.2.3)
where Lj is the number of persons employed by the firm in establishment j, bi is the level of
private benefits from hosting the firm for region i’s government, and sij is the subsidy (bid)
offered to the firm by region i when winning establishment j. The subsidy can be interpreted
as a total “fiscal package" offered to the firm.5
A region’s private benefits bi are private knowledge, and they capture, for example,6 an
increase in labour taxation from workers who will be employed by the firm, as well as spillovers
to domestic firms, but also the compatibility of the firm for the region. Indeed, if the industry
of the firm has a bad reputation in one region, the regional government would put only a small
value on the firm’s investment (due to, for example, re-election concerns).7 The private benefits
are identically and independently distributed according to a distribution g(·) on some interval[
b, b
]
(with b ≥ 0).
1.2.3 The Auction Process
The equilibrium subsidies are then determined by an auction in which the firm takes the role
of the auctioneer, and the regional governments submit their bids to host the firm’s plants.
5In effect, our model assumes that all regional governments have the same basic tax rate, but differentiate
themselves with targeted tax holidays that may differ. This assumption may not be unreasonable in the case of
sub-national jurisdictions. Even when considering countries, we are mostly interested in the competition taking
place in subsidies, and abstracting from tax competition allows us to focus on our variables of interest.
6Ferrett and Wooton (2013) use a similar justification for private benefits, while Martin (2000:6) provides a
more thorough list of potential explanation for these benefits.
7For example, Buts, Jegers, and Jottier (2012) find that subsidies to firms increase support for incumbent
politicians.
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Since there are two establishments available, the firm conducts a multi-unit auction, with both
establishments available simultaneously.
The formal mechanism is an open ascending auction. More specifically, the firm runs an
ascending clock, representing the current price for the lowest-value establishment still available
(the one with the lowest investment). Regional governments still in the running are ready to
offer a bid equal to the current price. The winning bid is determined from the price on the clock
when the previous bidder withdrew from the auction. In particular, if the two establishments
are still available, then when there are only two regions left bidding, the price for the lowest-
valued establishment will be determined from the clock price at which the third-to-last region
withdrew from the auction.8 These two remaining regions will then continue bidding until one
of them exits. The clock price at which the second-to-last region withdrew will be the price for
the highest-valued establishment. Formally, this mechanism is a type of second-price auction.
1.2.4 Timing
We can summarize the timing of the whole game as follows.
Stage 0: Nature picks the set of {bi}i=1,...,n. Regional governments learn their bi.
Stage 1: The firm chooses and commits to an allocation of capital (K1,K2), anticipating
the subsidies offered by governments resulting from the auction in Stage 2, and the firm’s
own profit maximization in the last stage.
Stage 2: The multi-unit auction takes place. Winning regions offer s∗1 and s∗2, based on
their expectation of the labor that will be employed by the firm (from profit maximzation
in the last stage).
Stage 3: The firm invests capital K1 and K2, as determined in Stage 1, in the winning
regions. She then maximizes her profits, taking capital fixed, choosing L1 and L2.
In the first stage, the firm commits to a certain allocation of capital. One could reasonably
argue that the firm has incentives to deviate from that allocation once she receives the subsidies
from the region. However, in that case, regions would anticipate these deviations and bid
accordingly. To facilitate the analysis, we make the assumption that the firm can credibly
commit to her allocation.
8Note that regions who withdraw from the auction without winning one establishment do not pay anything.
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1.3 Equilibrium Subsidies and Firm Location Choice
We will solve the game described in the previous section by backwards induction.
1.3.1 Stage 3: Production
We first solve the last stage of the game, to find the firm’s optimal labour input demand in
each firm for each level of capital invested. At this stage of the game, the firm already knows
the identity of the winning regions, and invests the capital in these two regions as determined
in the first stage. She also knows how the amount of the subsidies conditional on the amount
of labour she will employ.
The firm thus maximizes her profits in each plant, choosing L. At this last stage of the game,
the firm already decided on (K1,K2), so it is fixed. Her maximization problem in each plant is
thus as follows.
max
Lj
pf(K∗j , Lj)− wLj − rK∗j (1.3.1)
The first-order condition is
pf ′(K∗j , Lj)− w = 0
implying that the firm chooses Lj to equalize the marginal product that input, f ′(K∗j , Lj), with
the ratio of w and p. Therefore, the optimal Lj will depend on the amount of capital invested,
K∗j . We define the function L(Kj), determining the amount of labour employed for each possible
equilibrium level of capital invested in the first stage.
Since the regions’ valuation depends on the amount of labour employed, we want to know
how L varies with K. By totally differentiating the first-order condition, we can obtain the sign
of dLdK :
dL
dK
= −
∂2f(K∗,L∗)
∂K2
∂2f(K∗,L∗)
∂K∂L
> 0
This derivative is greater than zero as long as the cross partial derivatives inK and L are positive
(e.g., increasing capital increases the marginal product of labour). Therefore, a greater invest-
ment by the firm in an establishment translates into a greater valuation of that establishment
by the regions.
As an example, take a simple Cobb-Douglas production function f(K,L) = KαLβ with
α + β < 1. At that stage, K is fixed in each establishment and the firm already received the
subsidies. Therefore, the firm chooses L in each plant to maximise her operating profits. In
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that case, for each level of K, she chooses an optimal amount of labour L equal to
L(K) =
(
pβ
w
) 1
1−β
Kα/(1−β) (1.3.2)
In this example, larger investments by the firm translate in more labour employed (L′(K) > 0),
but at a decreasing rate (L′′(K) < 0).
1.3.2 Stage 2: Auction and Equilibrium Subsidies
In the auction stage, the firm puts up two plants for sale of sizes K1 and K2. The regional
governments expect the firm to employ L(K1) and L(K2), respectively, and bid according to
their valuation functions Vij . The following lemma describes the equilibrium subsidies resulting
from the auction.
Lemma 1.1. The equilibrium bids for the two establishments will be equal to
s∗2(K1,K2) = L∗(K2) · b(3) (1.3.3)
s∗1(K1,K2) = (L∗(K1)− L∗(K2))b(2) + L∗(K2)b(3) (1.3.4)
where b(z) is the zth-highest signal among the n regions.
Proof. To see why these two bids are optimal, take a region i with private benefits bi and
assume that everyone else bids according to the following strategy: continue bidding until the
clock reaches my private valuation. In that case, if the clock reaches L2bi and there are still
3 or more regions in the auction, then region i has no incentive to continue bidding. Indeed,
if she does, whatever the stop price, she will need to pay more than her valuation if she wins.
Therefore, at price L2bi, she prefers to leave the auction. Now consider prices lower than L2bi,
for example L2bl. At that clock price, region i has a positive valuation and would like to win.
Therefore, she has no incentive to leave the auction. Therefore, the equilibrium bid for the
small establishment will be equal to
s∗2(K1,K2) = L(K2) · b(3)
where b(3) is the third-highest signal among the n regions.
If the two plants are of symmetric sizes (i.e., K1 = K2), then the two remaining regions each
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pay s∗2(K1,K2) and each receive the same investment.
However, if the two plants are asymmetric (i.e., K1 6= K2), we still have to determine
which region receives the largest investment. Both regions know that their possibilities are
now to pay s∗2(K1,K2) and receive the small establishment, or to pay more and receive the
large establishment. The bid for the largest establishment will thus be determined by the infra-
marginal competition between the two remaining bidders. Since at that point, the auction
becomes a simple second-price auction between two bidders, it is optimal for both regions to
simply withdraw once the clock price reaches their valuation of the large plant. If they continue
past that price, they either win and pay a price higher than their valuation, or they lose and
pay the price for the second establishment, which was already determined.
Take the decision problem of the region with the second-highest private benefits.9 It will be
indifferent between the two establishments when
L(K1)b(2) − s∗1(K1,K2) = L(K2)b(2) − s∗2(K1,K2)
By rearranging this equation and substituting the value of s∗2(K2) found earlier, we obtain the
value of the highest bid
s∗1(K1,K2) = (L(K1)− L(K2))b(2) + L(K2)b(3)

Note that, as expected, if K1 = K2, this equation is equal to s∗2(K1,K2). In the more
interesting case of asymmetric investments, however, the two last remaining regions continue
to compete for the large establishment. We see, from equation 2.6, that an increase in K1 for
a given value of K2 raises, through the infra-marginal competition, the subsidy offered for the
most valuable establishment. A reduction in K2 has a similar effect, while also reducing the bid
received for the small investment.
9Given the monotonicity of the valuation function of the regions, for any level of private benefits, regions
prefer the largest establishment to the small one.
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1.3.3 Stage 1: The Firm’s Optimal Location Choice
In the first stage, the firm’s optimisation problem is the following:
max
K1,K2
E(s∗1 + s∗2 + pi1 + pi2) (1.3.5)
where pij = pf(Kj , Lj) − wLj − rKj and s∗j are, respectively, the operating profits in each
establishment and the equilibrium subsidies as determined in Lemma 2.1. The firm thus chooses
K1 and K2 to maximise her total expected profits, anticipating the bids of the regions, as well
as her profit maximisation in the last stage. The solution to this optimisation problem leads to
the following proposition.
Proposition 1.1. When the firm allocates her production units through a multi-unit auction,
she always chooses to differentiate the two establishments (K1 6= K2).
Proof. The firm does not know the private benefits of the regions in the competition, but knows
that they are distributed according to g(·) on the interval [b, b]. Her objective function can thus
be expressed as
E(Π) =
∫ b
b
∫ b(2)
b
[
(L(K1)− L(K2))b(2) + 2L(K2)b(3)
+ pf(K1, L(K1))− wL(K1)− rK1 + pf(K2, L(K2))− wL(K2)− rK2
]
·
h(b(2), b(3), n)db(3)db(2) (1.3.6)
where the last part h(b(2), b(3), n) = n(n− 1)(n− 2) ·
[
1−G(b(2))
] [
G(b(3))
]n−3
g(b(2))g(b(3)) is
the joint distribution of b(2) and b(3), and L(Kj) is the equilibrium amount of labour for a level
of capital Kj . We obtain the following first-order conditions:
∂E(Π)
∂K1
= L′(K1)E(b(2))
+ p(∂f(K1, L(K1))
∂K1
+ ∂f(K1, L(K1))
∂L(K1)
· L′(K1))− wL′(K1)− r = 0
∂E(Π)
∂K2
= −L′(K2)E(b(2)) + 2L′(K2)E(b(3))
+ p(∂f(K2, L(K2))
∂K2
+ ∂f(K2, L(K2))
∂L(K2)
· L′(K2))− wL′(K2)− r = 0
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Since L(K) represents equilibrium values, the FOCs can be simplified using the Envelope The-
orem.We then obtain:
∂E(Π)
∂K1
= L′(K1)E(b(2)) + p
∂f(K1, L(K1))
∂K1
− wL′(K1)− r = 0 (1.3.7)
∂E(Π)
∂K2
= −L′(K2)E(b(2)) + 2L′(K2)E(b(3)) + p
∂f(K2, L(K2))
∂K2
− wL′(K2)− r = 0 (1.3.8)
Combining the two FOCs, we see that
p
(
∂f(K2, L(K2))
∂K2
− ∂f(K1, L(K1))
∂K1
)
= L′(K2)
(
w + E(b(2))− 2E(b(3))
)
− L′(K1)
(
w + E(b(2))
)
We want to show that K1 6= K2. Let’s first assume that E(b(2)) 6= E(b(3)) (i.e., we focus on the
interesting cases where the firm expects regions to have different valuations). To prove that the
firm has to optimally split in asymmetric establishments, we first assume that she does not, and
show that it leads to an inconsistency. Indeed, if K1 = K2 = K, the previous equation reduces
to
0 = 2L′(K)
(
E(b(2))− E(b(3))
)
Since the regions have different expected private benefits, this equation is true only if L′(K) = 0.
However, that derivative is always positive. Therefore, we conclude that K1 6= K2.

Note that we can rearrange the first-order conditions as such:
p
∂f(K1, L(K1))
∂K1
= L′(K1)(w − E(b(2))) + r (1.3.9)
p
∂f(K2, L(K2))
∂K2
= L′(K2)(w + E(b(2))− 2E(b(3))) + r (1.3.10)
This formulation is informative of the trade-offs at play. In each establishment, the firm’s
choice of Kj reflects the usual trade-off of marginal revenues and marginal costs. However,
the marginal cost of labour is not simply equal to the wages paid. In fact, the firm receives
subsidies that depend on the level of employment, effectively lowering the firm’s marginal labour
costs. Denoting total equilibrium subsidies by s∗t , we find that
∂s∗t
∂K1
= E(b(2)) and
∂s∗t
∂K2
=
−E(b(2)) + 2E(b(3)). Therefore, when the firm increases Kj , her labour costs increase not
simply by L′(Kj) · w, but by an amount with wages “adjusted” by the marginal subsidies.
Having solved all the stages of the game, we can describe the sub-game perfect Nash equilib-
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rium. In it, the firm commits in Stage 1 to (K∗1 ,K∗2 ), defined by the first-order conditions (1.3.9)
and (1.3.10). In Stage 2, the regions bid until the price on the clock passes their valuation. The
region with the highest private benefits wins the largest establishment and offers subsidies of
s∗1(K1,K2) = (L∗(K1)− L∗(K2))b(2) + L∗(K2)b(3). The region with the second-highest private
benefits wins the smaller establishment, paying subsidies equal to s∗2(K1,K2) = L∗(K2) · b(3).
In Stage 3, the firm invests the amounts (K∗1 ,K∗2 ), employs labour L(Kj) in each establishment
j, and produces according to f(·).
1.3.4 Equilibrium Amount of Investment: Bidding War vs. No Bidding War
For comparison purposes, without a bidding war, the firm chooses to invest an equal amount of
capital in two random regions. Indeed, the firm’s revenues are then simply equal to pi1(K1) +
pi2(K2). The first-order conditions are
p · ∂f(K1, L(K1))
∂K1
= wL′(K1) + r
p · ∂f(K2, L(K2))
∂K2
= wL′(K2) + r
Put differently, the firm’s optimal allocation in this case simply results from equating marginal
revenues and marginal costs in each establishment. The assumptions on the production function
imply that the firm chooses an identical investment in both plants: Knbw.
Since the firm has no information about the private benefits of the regions, and since regions
are identical in terms of productive capacity, the firm chooses to invest an equal amount Knbw in
two regions. She can just choose two regions at random, since her production costs and profits
will be identical with any set of two regions.
This comparison begs the question whether the firm invests more in total when allocating
through a bidding war than when she randomly chooses two regions to invest in. Intuitively,
one might suspect that the firm always chooses a larger K1 when using a bidding war, since
“adjusted wages” are lower than w. We prove this intermediary result in the following lemma.
Lemma 1.2. The capital investment in the first establishment (K1) is always greater under a
bidding war than without a bidding war.
Proof. As long as E(b(2)) > 0, adjusted wages (the firm pays wages w, but the subsidy effectively
lowers them) are lower than w. Indeed, w > w − E(b(2)). Therefore, K∗1 > Knbw. 
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The intuition is less clear in the case of the second establishment. Indeed, E(b(2))−2E(b(3))
could be greater or smaller than zero, depending on the distribution of the private benefits.
In turn, investment could be lower or higher than without a bidding war. With a uniform
distribution, it is easy to see that K∗2 will be greater than (with n > 3) or equal to (with n = 3)
Knbw. In the following lemma, we prove that the opposite is possible.
Lemma 1.3. There exists some distribution of private benefits for which the firm invests less
in the second establishment under a bidding war than under a situation without a bidding war.
Proof. We prove this lemma by constructing an example. Take the following cumulative distri-
bution function: G(b) = b1/3 on the interval [0, 1]. With such a function, E(b(2)) = n(n−1)(n+2)(n+3)
and E(b(3)) = n(n−1)(n−2)n!(n+3)! . Consequently, E(b(2))− 2E(b(3)) > 0 if and only if:
n+ 1
n− 2 > 2
n < 5
For this distribution function, if n < 5, we have w + E(b(2)) − 2E(b(3)) > w, and the firm
has larger effective marginal labour costs in the second establishment than she would under
a situation with no bidding war. Consequently, she chooses a level of K∗2 lower than the no-
bidding-war amount (K∗2 < Knbw). 
This distribution function is strongly skewed to the right, giving more weight to values closer
to zero. Therefore, for low values of n, b(3) is sufficiently close to the lower bound, and thus
smaller than b(2), for the wage adjustment to be positive. In economic terms, such a distribution
would translate in a situation where one or few regions put a great value on the firm’s presence,
while the great majority of regions put little to no value. In such a case, the firm might be
able to extract a large subsidy from one government, but the differentiation comes at the cost
of lower production in the second plant.
We are ultimately interested in the comparison of K∗1 + K∗2 and 2 · Knbw. From Lemma
1.2, we know that K∗1 > Knbw, so for total investment to be lower under a bidding war, it is
necessary that K∗2 < Knbw by an amount large enough to counter-balance the increase in the
first establishment. Lemma 1.3 shows that it is possible that K∗2 < Knbw.
We are unable to provide a general proof for a comparison of K∗1 +K∗2 and 2·Knbw. However,
we follow Haaparanta (1996) and prove it here for a specific functional form, namely a Cobbs-
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Douglas production function. We show that in this case, the decrease in K2 is never large
enough to counter-balance the increase in K1. In other words, total investment is always larger
when using a bidding war than under the benchmark without a bidding war.
Proposition 1.2. Assuming a Cobbs-Douglas production function with decreasing returns to
scale (α + β < 1), the total amount invested by the firm under a bidding war is always larger
than the amount she would invest without a bidding war.
Proof. The first-order condition for profit maximisation in one arbitrary establishment is:
p
∂f(K,L(K))
∂K
= L′(K)(w − x) + r (1.3.11)
where x can be zero or the adjustment on marginal labour costs arising from subsidies. If
f(K,L) = KαLβ, and using the function L(K) as in equation (1.3.2), we find that:
p(pβw )
β
1−β ( α1−β ) ·K
α
1−β−1 − r
(pβw )
1
1−β ( α1−β )K
α
1−β−1
= w − x
This equation can be expressed as (with A > 0 and B > 0):
A−B ·K 1−α−β1−β = w − x (1.3.12)
Since 0 < 1−α−β1−β < 1, Figure 1.1 illustrates a stylised version of the left-hand side of Equation
(1.3.12).
In particular, since the second derivative is positive, a decrease in the right-hand side of a
given amount (e) increases K by more than an identical increase in the right-hand side would
decrease K. Since we know that
∣∣∣E(b(2))− 2E(b(3))∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣−E(b(2))∣∣∣, the possible increase in the
left-hand side (in the case of K2) is always lower than the decrease in the left-hand side (in
the case of K1),10 Therefore, we can conclude that the increase in K1 due to a bidding war is
always larger than the decrease in K2. Consequently, the total amount invested is always larger
in a bidding war, under specific assumptions on the production function. 
This proposition implies that bidding wars actually increase the firm’s total investment.
Note that in the proof above, we made no assumption on the distribution of the regions’ private
benefits, other than they are always non-negative. While the proof was for a Cobbs-Douglas
10Or they are both decreases, in which case total investment is certainly increased
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Figure 1.1: A stylised illustration comparing an upwards adjustment of wages to a downwards
adjustment and their effects on the amount of capital invested.
function, the result should hold in many situations. In fact, Proposition 1.2 would be reversed
only when two conditions are met: the distribution of private benefits respects Lemma 1.3 (so
that K∗2 < Knbw), and the production function has to be of a different shape than described in
Proposition 1.2. Moreover, Proposition 1.2 does provide a general condition on the production
function for which total investment increases. In particular, any function with a similar shape
(first derivative negative, second derivative positive) for the left-hand side should provide the
same result:
∂
∂K
(
p∂f(K,L(K))∂K − r
L′(K) ) < 0
∂2
∂K2
(
p∂f(K,L(K))∂K − r
L′(K) ) > 0
Are Regional Governments Better Off with a Bidding War?
Given the results above, one may wonder if it’s in the regions’ best interests that such a bidding
war takes place. Without a bidding war, region i has the following expected utility:
E(Wnbw,i) =
2
n
L(K∗nbw) · bi (1.3.13)
where K∗nbw is the investment from the firm in one establishment, without a bidding war.
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With a bidding war, the same region has the following expected utility
E(Wbw,i) =
∫ bi
b
∫ b(1),−i
b
(L(K∗1 )bi − s∗1)h(b(1),−i, b(2),−i, n− 1)db(2),−idb(1)
+
∫ b
bi
∫ bi
b
(L(K∗2 )bi − s∗2)h(b(1),−i, b(2),−i, n− 1)db(2),−idb(1),−i (1.3.14)
where for region i, db(k),−i is the k − th highest benefit among the n − 1 other regions. The
expression E(Wnbw,i) = E(Wbw,i) defines a level of bi over which a region prefers a bidding war.
Conversely, it also defines a level of bi under which regional governments are made worse off by
a bidding war.
This preference results from 2 factors. First, with a bidding war, regions with large private
benefits expect to win more often. Second, under a bidding war, the regions expect the firm to
choose a higher level of capital K1, and, as seen in the discussion on Proposition 1.2, a higher
level of capital K2 as well, at least in some cases.
To illustrate, with a Cobb-Douglas production function of parameters α = β = 1/3, a
uniform distribution of benefits on [0, 1], and p = w = r = 1, to illustrate, we find that a given
region i prefers that the firm uses a bidding war as long as
bi > 0.227
1.3.5 A Numerical Example
To illustrate the results of the model, let’s continue with the simple Cobbs-Douglas production
function introduced previously: f(K,L) = KαLβ, with α + β < 1. With specific functional
forms, we can find the optimal investment allocation given a set of parameters {α, β, p, w, r, n}
The analytical solutions are omitted here, as they are not informative. Instead, we describe
graphically how the firm behaves facing different conditions.
One interesting question is whether the number of regions in the bidding war affects the
firm’s investment choices. In the more general model, note that when E(b(2)) and E(b(3)) are
closer together, the differentiation between K1 and K2 diminishes. In the extreme case of
E(b(2)) = E(b(3)), we have that K∗1 = K∗2 . In turn, the number of regions n participating in the
bidding war affects the difference between E(b(2)) and E(b(3)). For example, if the distribution
of private benefits is uniform on [0, 1], then a low number of regions (e.g., 3 regions) will
translate in a large difference between the expected private benefits of the regions, while a
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larger number of regions will translate in lower differences. For that reason, we should see
decreasing differentiation with an increasing number of competitors. Figure 1.2 illustrates this
relationship for specific values of the parameters and a uniform distribution. It also shows how
both K∗1 and K∗2 are larger than K∗nbw.
5 10 15 20 25
n
50
100
150
200
K
K1
K2
Knbw
Figure 1.2: K1 vs K2, with a uniform distribution
Lemma 1.3 showed that for some distributions of the private benefits, the value of K2 may
behave differently. Figure 1.3 shows how K1 and K2 vary with n for the distribution b
1
3 on
the interval [0, 1], along with the value of Knbw as reference. It shows how investment in the
second establishment may actually be lower than without a bidding war, but that even in this
example, total investment is higher.
5 10 15 20 25
n
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100
150
K
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K2
Knbw
Figure 1.3: K1 vs K2, with distribution of private benefits respecting Lemma 1.3
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1.4 Endogenous Plant Size: Comparison to a Single Plant Bid-
ding War
The previous sections makes two additions to the usual discussion on bidding wars. First, the
firm can choose the amount of capital to invest endogenously. Second, we consider the possibility
for the firm to make multiple new investments. In this section, we aim to disentangle these two
effects, investigating the endogenous investment decision of the firm when she is restricted to
one plant. To that end, we consider the model, but restricted to only one new establishment.
The set-up of the model is identical, except that the firm only decides on K1 = Ks.
In this restricted model, the solution in Stage 3 is simple. The firm maximizes profits in her
plant by choosing L, with a fixed K since it is chosen in Stage 1. Her maximization problem in
the plant is as follows.
max
L
pf(K∗, L)− wL− rK∗ (1.4.1)
The first-order condition is
pf ′(K∗, L)− w = 0
This condition is standard, and defines the optimal choice of L given the amount of capital
invested in the earlier stages. We define the function L(K), determining the amount of labour
employed for each possible equilibrium level of capital invested in the first stage.
At the auction stage, the equilibrium winning bid will be
s∗(K) = L(Ks) · b(2) (1.4.2)
where b(2) is the second-highest private benefits among the n competing regions.
In the first stage, then, the firm’s optimisation problem is the following:
max
K
Π = E(pi(K) + s∗) = E
[
pf(K,L(K))− wL(K)− rK + L(K) · b(2)
]
(1.4.3)
where pi and s∗ are, respectively, the operating profits of the firm’s plant and the equilibrium
subsidy. The result of that problem leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 1.4. A single bidding war for a new plant increases the firm’s investment compared to
a situation without a bidding war.
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Proof. The first-order condition is:
∂E(Π)
∂K
= L′(K)E(b(2)) + p(
∂f(K,L(K))
∂K
+ ∂f(K,L(K))
∂L(K) · L
′(K))− wL′(K)− r = 0
∂E(Π)
∂K
= L′(K)E(b(2)) + p
∂f(K,L(K))
∂K
− wL′(K)− r = 0
It simplifies to
p
∂f(K,L(K))
∂K
= r + L′(K)(w − E(b(2))) (1.4.4)
The first-order condition is similar to the one for the largest establishment in the two-plant
model. In particular, it implies that when using a bidding war, the firm chooses to invest
an amount of capital Ks greater than would be invested without a bidding war. Indeed, the
subsidies received effectively reduce the cost for the firm’s labour (w − E(b(2)) < w). 
Therefore, even simply allowing the firm to choose the amount to invest already affects her
investment decision. In fact, the first-order condition (equation 1.4.4) is exactly the same as
that for the largest establishment in the two-plant model. In turn, the amount invested in
the single plant is the same as that invested in that largest establishment. Note that in the
two-plant problem, we had s∗1(K1,K2) = (L(K1)− L(K2))b(2) + L(K2)b(3). Assuming K2 = 0,
the equilibrium subsidy for the first establishment reduces to s∗1(K1, 0) = L(K1)b(2), which is
exactly the value of subsidies found in the one-plant problem.
We thus find that a single bidding war already increases the firm’s investment (when it is
endogenous to the model) compared to a situation without a bidding war. Another question is
whether the assumption that the firm conducts two simultaneous bidding wars further modifies
the allocation of investment.
To see this, we compare our results of the multi-establishment bidding war to a firm investing
in multiple plants, but with unrelated bidding wars. Instead of a multi-unit auction as in the
previous model, the firm would essentially conduct one auction, then a second one, with regions
acting as though the contests are independent of each other. Comparing the investment and
subsidies in this set-up with the findings of the multi-establishment bidding war, we find that:
Proposition 1.3. Total investment and subsidies are larger when a single-establishment bidding
war is repeated than in a two-plant bidding war.
Proof. Define Kˇ1 and Kˇ2 as the amounts of investment chosen by the firm in these two bidding
wars. From Lemma 1.4, we already know the investment in the first establishment, Kˇ1 = Ks.
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The related bid is thus s∗(Kˇ1) = L(Kˇ1) · b(2). To keep a similar environment in both models,
we assume that the second bidding war will take place among the n − 1 remaining regions.
The region with the largest private benefits among the n − 1 remaining regions is b(2), so
s∗(Kˇ2) = L(Kˇ2) · b(3). The firm will decide to invest Kˇ2 according to the following condition:
p
∂f(K,L(K))
∂K
= r + L′(K)(w − E(b(3))) (1.4.5)
Since b(3) < b(2), Kˇ2 < Kˇ1. As in the multi-unit auction model, the plants are differentiated.
We start by comparing Kˇ1 + Kˇ2 and K∗1 + K∗2 . First, we know that K∗1 = Kˇ1. For the
second establishments, we can compare the respective first-order conditions:
p
∂f(K∗2 , L(K∗2 ))
∂K∗2
= r + L′(K∗2 )(w + E(b(2))− 2E(b(3)))
p
∂f(Kˇ2, L(Kˇ2))
∂Kˇ2
= r + L′(Kˇ2)(w − E(b(3)))
Since E(b(2)) − 2E(b(3) > −E(b(3), the second establishment is larger with unrelated bidding
wars (Kˇ2 > K∗2 ), so total capital invested is larger (Kˇ1 + Kˇ2 > K∗1 +K∗2 ).
Subsidies are also larger. From equations 1.3.3, 1.3.4, and 1.4.2:
L(Kˇ1) · E(b(2)) + L(Kˇ2) · E(b(3)) > 2L(K∗2 ) · E(b(3)) + E(b(2))(L(K∗1 )− L(K∗2 ))
E(b(3))
[
L(Kˇ2)− 2L(K∗2 )
]
> E(b(2))
[
(L(K∗1 )− L(K∗2 ))− L(Kˇ1)
]
2L(K∗2 )− L(Kˇ2)
L(K∗2 )
<
E(b(2))
E(b(3))
L(Kˇ2)
L(K∗2 )
> 2− E(b(2))
E(b(3))
Since L(Kˇ2) > L(K∗2 ), the left-hand side is greater than 1, and since E(b(2)) > E(b(3)), the
right-hand side is smaller than 1. The last line in the previous calculation is thus always true.
Therefore, subsidies are larger when the firm conducts two unrelated bidding wars. 
The assumptions in Proposition 1.3 may be unrealistic. When participating in the repeated
bidding war of Proposition 1.3, regional governments may in fact expect that the firm will
have multiple plants available, as we argued earlier. For that reason, a repeated bidding war
is unreasonable in practice. However, it offers a good benchmark to compare the main model
of this chapter, namely the multi-establishment bidding war, to previous contributions in the
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literature. Indeed, previous papers implicitly assumed that bidding wars are unrelated. What
Proposition 1.3 suggests is that single-plant models may overestimate the size of subsidies over
many bidding wars.
This setup is essentially equivalent to two firms running separate bidding wars, under the
assumption of single-unit demand from the regions.11 In previous papers in this literature,
authors consider a firm auctioning a single plant. In effect, in these models, if a second firm ran
a bidding war, that second bidding war would be unrelated to the first. A notable exception
is Martin (1999). He assumes that firms in the same industry benefit from agglomeration
economies. In a model of sequential auctions for establishments from 2 different firms, he finds
that regions overbid in the first auction, expecting to have an advantage in the second period
auction.
In our multi-establishment bidding war, we consider a different case, where there are no
agglomeration economies, but where the bidding wars are related since they are conducted by
the same firm. Like Martin (1999), we find that bids are higher for one of the establishments, but
the reason for this phenomenon in our model is different. Instead of being due to agglomeration
economies, it results from the differentiation by the firm of the two establishment available who
expects it will increase subsidies.
Finally, note that the simultaneous vs. sequential nature of our multi-establishment bidding
war is not important for our results. Indeed, in a sequential auction for two establishments,
but where the regions know that both auctions are conducted by the same firm and are thus
related, the regional governments would bid differently in the first auction. Indeed, they would
take into account that they can also participate in the second auction.
To see how the bids are equivalent, note that the optimal bid in the first auction is derived
from the indifference between winning K1, and losing K1 but winning K2.
L(K1)bi − β1 = L(K2)bi − s∗2(K1,K2)
with β1 the bid from region for K1 that makes it indifferent between the 2. We find β1 =
(L1 − L2)bi + E(s∗2(K1,K2)), with E(s∗2) = L(K2)E(b(3)). The equilibrium subsidy is thus
s∗1(K1,K2) = (L1 − L2)b(2) + E(s∗2(K1,K2)) since the bids are monotonically increasing in bi.
The expected value of total subsidies for the firm are therefore equal to (L(K1)−L(K2))E(b(2))+
11This assumption ensures some continuity with the previous sections.
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2L(K2)E(b(3)), which is exactly the same as in the open ascending auction.
1.5 Optimal Mechanism
So far, this chapter considered that the firm allocated the plants using an open ascending
auction. However, there could be other options available to the firm. Is the one in the model
optimal? This section determines the optimal mechanism, comparing it to the open ascending
auction.
1.5.1 Constrained Problem: Pre-Determined Investment Choices
First, we find the optimal mechanism when making the assumption that the firm previously
chooses the values of K1 and K2, committing to them as in the model of previous sections. We
have n regional governments, each willing to buy up to 1 unit of production from a firm. Each
regional government i has a private valuation for each job created by the firm of bi. The bi
are identically and independently distributed according to g(·) on the interval [b, b]. Define b =
(b1, ..., bn), Bi = [b, b], and B = ΠiBi = [b, b]n. The firm has two units of production available,
j = 1, 2. We define xi(b) = (xi,1(b), xi,2(b)) as the allocation function vector, with xi,j(b) ∈
[0, 1]. Then, the expected payoff to a regional government is equal to Vi = xi,1(b)L(K1)bi +
xi,2(b)L(K2)bi, and the expected utility is:
EUi(xi, b, si) =
∫
B−i
(xi,1(bi, b−i)L(K1)bi+xi,2(bi, b−i)L(K2)bi−si(bi, b−i))g−i(b−i)db−i (1.5.1)
The firm wants to maximise
E(Π) = pi1(K1) + pi2(K2) +
n∑
i=1
∫
B
si(b)g(b)db (1.5.2)
She chooses (K1,K2) in a previous step, and then implements a mechanism to allocate these
two plants while receiving subsidies (si(b)) from regional governments.
The firm’s objective is to choose a mechanism to maximise her profits. By the revelation
principle, we can restrict our attention to direct mechanism characterised by a set of functions
{xi(b), si(b)}i=1,...n where the xi’s reflect the allocation rule, the si’s reflect the payment rule
when b is the vector of types reported by the regions. Formally, the firm then solves the following
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problem:
max
x(b),s(b)
∫
B
 n∑
i=1
si(b) +
2∑
j=1
(
pi(Kj)
n∑
i=1
xij
) g(b)db
s.t. EUi(xi, bi, si) ≥ EUi(xi, b˜i, b−i, si) ∀i ICC
EUi(xi, bi, si) ≥ 0 ∀i∀j IRC
n∑
i=1
xij ≤ 1 ∀j = 1, 2 FC1
xij(b) ≥ 0 FC2
xi1(b) + xi2(b) ≤ 1 FC3
The Incentive Compatibility Constraint (ICC) states that it must be optimal for each region to
report its true private benefits (bi). The Individual Rationality Constraint (IRC) states that it
must be optimal for each region to participate in the mechanism. The other three constraints
are feasibility constraints. FC1 states that for each plant, the allocation probabilities for all
regions must sum to one or less. FC2 states that these probabilities must be non-negative.
FC3 states that regions can, at the equilibrium, receive only one plant. The solution to this
optimisation problem leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1.4. Assume the firm first commits to the sale of (K1,K2), and subsequently
chooses a mechanism to allocate these two plants. The optimal mechanism results in the same
allocation (x∗(b)) and subsidies (s∗(b)) as the multi-unit open ascending auction.
Proof. The solution to this problem in general is due to Myerson (1981). The solution here will
follow Morand (2000), constrained to unit demand.
The incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) states that regional governments must have
incentives to state their true private benefits. It has to be satisfied locally. Using the envelope
theorem, it must be that
dEUi(xi, bi, si)
dbi
= ∂EUi(xi, b˜i, si, bi)
∂bi
∣∣∣
b˜i=bi
=
∫
B−i
(xi1(b)L(K1) + xi2(b)L(K2))g−i(b−i)db−i (1.5.3)
50
Define the marginal probabilities as:
pi1(xi, bi) =
∫
B−i
xi1(b)g−i(b−i)db−i
pi2(xi, bi) =
∫
B−i
xi2(b)g−i(b−i)db−i
pi = (pi1, pi2)
With these, we can rewrite Equation 1.5.3 as
dEUi(xi, bi, si)
dbi
= pi1(xi, bi)L(K1)bi + pi2(xi, bi)L(K2)bi ∀i (1.5.4)
From Equation 1.5.4, we can find the expected utility of a regional government such that the
incentive compatibility constraint is respected:
∫ bi
b
dEUi(xi, t, si)
dt
dt =
∫ bi
b
(pi1(xi, t)L(K1)t+ pi2(xi, t)L(K2)t)dt
EUi(xi, bi, si)− EUi(xi, b, si) =
∫ bi
b
(pi1(xi, t)L(K1)t+ pi2(xi, t)L(K2)t)dt
EUi(xi, bi, si) =
∫ bi
b
(pi1(xi, t)L(K1)t+ pi2(xi, t)L(K2)t)dt+ EUi(xi, b, si)
(1.5.5)
This expected utility is thus expressed in two terms. The first term depends on the marginal
probabilities to win one of the production sites, while the second one is the expected utility of
a regional government with the lowest private benefits (b).
With the incentive compatibility constraint, we can also show that pij(xi, bi) is non-decreasing
∀i, j. First, we can rewrite the expected utility of a region that announces private benefits b˜i
when he actually has private benefits bi, and conversely, as
EUi(xi, bi, b˜i, si) = EUi(xi, b˜i, si)− (bi − b˜i)
[
L(K1)pi1(xi, b˜i) + L(K2)pi2(xi, b˜i)
]
EUi(xi, b˜i, bi, si) = EUi(xi, bi, si)− (b˜i − bi) [L(K1)pi1(xi, bi) + L(K2)pi2(xi, bi)]
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From the incentive compatibility constraint, we thus have that
EUi(xi, bi, si) ≥ EUi(xi, b˜i, si)− (bi − b˜i)
[
L(K1)pi1(xi, b˜i) + L(K2)pi2(xi, b˜i)
]
EUi(xi, b˜i, si) ≥ EUi(xi, bi, si)− (b˜i − bi) [L(K1)pi1(xi, bi) + L(K2)pi2(xi, bi)]
A few manipulations show that
EUi(xi, bi, si)− EUi(xi, b˜i, si) ≥ (b˜i − bi)
[
L(K1)pi1(xi, b˜i) + L(K2)pi2(xi, b˜i)
]
EUi(xi, bi, si)− EUi(xi, b˜i, si) ≤ (b˜i − bi) [L(K1)pi1(xi, bi) + L(K2)pi2(xi, bi)]
(b˜i − bi) [L(K1)pi1(xi, bi) + L(K2)pi2(xi, bi)] ≥ (b˜i − bi)
[
L(K1)pi1(xi, b˜i) + L(K2)pi2(xi, b˜i)
]
Therefore, if b˜i > bi, L(K1)pi1(xi, bi) + L(K2)pi2(xi, bi) is non-decreasing in bi. Defining L =
(L(K1), L(K2)), we can express this equation as L · pi(xi, bi). With this property, we can also
simplify the individual rationality constraint to a single one:
EU(x, b, s) ≥ 0 (1.5.6)
The problem of the firm can now be simplified. From Equations (1.5.1) and (1.5.5), we know
that
∫ bi
b
(pi(xi, t)L)dt+ EUi(xi, b, si) =
∫
B−i
(xi(bi, b−i)Lbi − si(bi, b−i))g−i(b−i)db−i
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Therefore,
EΠ =
∫
B
n∑
i=1
si(b)g(b)db
=
n∑
i=1
[∫
B
bixi(b)Lg(b)db−
∫
Bi
∫ bi
b
∫
B−i
(xi(t, b−i)Lg−i(b−i)db−i · dt · g(bi)dbi − EUi(xi, b, si)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[∫
B
bixi(b)Lg(b)db− EUi(xi, b, si)
]
−
n∑
i=1
[∫ b
b
∫ b
t
∫
B−i
(xi(t, b−i)Lg−i(b−i)db−i · g(bi)dbi · dt
]
=
n∑
i=1
[∫
B
bixi(b)Lg(b)db− EUi(xi, b, si)
]
−
n∑
i=1
[∫ b
b
∫
B−i
(xi(t, b−i)Lg−i(b−i)db−i · (1−G(t)) · dt
]
=
n∑
i=1
[∫
B
bixi(b)Lg(b)db− EUi(xi, b, si)
]
−
n∑
i=1
[∫ b
b
∫
B−i
(xi(bi, b−i)Lg−i(b−i)db−i · (1−G(bi)) · dbi
]
=
n∑
i=1
[∫
B
bixi(b)Lg(b)db−
∫
B
(xi(b)Lg(b)db
(1−G(bi))
gi(bi)
]
−
n∑
i=1
[EUi(xi, b, si)]
=
n∑
i=1
[∫
B
(bi − (1−G(bi))
gi(bi)
) · xi(b)Lg(b)db− EUi(xi, b, si)
]
Define the virtual benefits of region i as βi(bi) = bi− 1−G(bi)g(bi) . We make the usual assumption
that the distribution function is regular: βi(bi) is increasing in bi. We can write the firm’s
expected revenues as ∑
i
∫
B
βi(bi)xi(b)Lg(b)db (1.5.7)
In doing so, we assume that at the optimum, EUi(xi, b, si) = 0. From this assumption, and
Equations (1.5.1) and (1.5.5), we then find:
EUi(xi, bi, si) =
∫ bi
b
pi(xi, t)Ldt
=
∫
B−i
∫ bi
b
xi(t, b−idtg−i(b−i)db−i
=
∫
B−i
[bi(xi(bi, b−i))L− si(bi, b−i)] g−i(b−i)db−i
With this equation, we can express the equilibrium payments s∗i (b):
∫
B
[bi(xi(b))L− si(b)] g(b)db =
∫
B
∫ bi
b
xi(t, b−i)dtg(b)db∫
B
si(b)g(b)db =
∫
B
bi(xi(b))Lg(b)db−
∫
B
∫ bi
b
xi(t, b−i)dtg(b)db
s∗i (b) = bi(x∗i (b))L−
∫ bi
b
x∗i (t, b−i)dt
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Assuming x∗(b) is the allocation function that solves the firm’s problem, we can then find
the optimal payment function s∗i (b):
s∗i (b) = bix∗i (b) · L−
∫ bi
b
x∗i (t, b−i)Ldt (1.5.8)
The optimisation problem can therefore be expressed as follows. Let x∗(b) be the solution to
the following problem:
max
x(b)
∑
i
∫
B
βi(bi)xi(b)L+ 2∑
j=1
pi(Kj)xij(b)
 g(b)db
s.t. EUi(xi, b, si) = 0 ∀i
(b˜i − bi) [pi(xi, bi) · L] ≥ (b˜i − bi)
[
pi(xi, b˜i) · L
]
∀bi < b˜i
n∑
i=1
xij ≤ 1 ∀j = 1, 2
xij(b) ≥ 0 ∀i, j
xi1(b) + xi2(b) ≤ 1 ∀i
Let s∗i (b) be given by:
s∗i (b) = bi(x∗i (b))L−
∫ bi
b
x∗i (t, b−i)dt
Then, (x∗, t∗) is the optimal mechanism.
Similarly to standard problems in mechanism design, the optimal allocation function is
deterministic: x∗(b) takes value of 0 or 1. In particular, the firm will allocate the first production
unit (L(K1)) to the region with the highest virtual valuation (equivalently, to the one with
highest private benefits), and the second one (L(K2)) to the region with second-highest virtual
valuation. Defining b(k) as the k-th highest private benefits, we thus have
x∗(b) = (x∗1(b), x∗2(b)) =

(1, 0) if b = b(1)
(0, 1) if b = b(2)
(0, 0) otherwise
(1.5.9)
The optimal payment rule depends on this allocation function. First note that the first term
in s∗i (b) is simply the value to the region of hosting the firm. For the region hosting K1, it is
equal to b(1)L(K1), while for the region hosting K2 it is equal to b(2)L(K2). The second term
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can be interpreted as the informational rent going to the regions. Define zij(b−i) as the lowest
value of private benefits that a region i can announce and still win establishment j. The integral
in the second term then takes the following values:
∫ bi
b
x∗i (t, b−i)Ldt =

L(K1)bi − L(K1)b(2) + L(K2)b(2) − L(K2)b(3) if bi > zi1(b−i)
L(K2)bi − L(K2)b(3) if zi1(b−i) > bi > zi2(b−i)
0 otherwise
The first case warrants some discussion. If a region’s private benefits are greater than zi1(b−i),
such that they win the first establishment, we also need to take into account the fact that
by winning the first establishment, that region also renounces to the smaller establishment.
We can see this more clearly when developing the expression to integrate:
∫ bi
b x
∗
i (t, b−i)Ldt =∫ bi
b (x∗i1(t, b−i)L(K1)+x∗i2(t, b−i)L(K2))dt. When calculating the integral over the interval [b, bi],
we have to take into account that x(b) takes non-null values not only over the interval in which
the region wins the first establishment, but also over the interval over which the regions wins
the second establishment. These results lead to the following payments
s∗i (b) =

(L(K1)− L(K2))b(2) + L(K2)b(3) if bi > zi1(b−i)
L(K2)b(3) if zi1(b−i) > bi > zi2(b−i)
0 otherwise
(1.5.10)
These are exactly the same payments found in the auction in the previous sections. Since that
auction led to the same allocation and the same payments, we can conclude that the auction
implemented the optimal mechanism (albeit without reserve prices), from the point of view of
the firm. Moreover, we can see that the ex ante choice of K1 and K2 will be identical.

This proposition indicates that the open ascending auction chosen in the first part of the
chapter is actually optimal from the firm’s point of view. In other words, she can do no better,
when committing to K1 and K2 beforehand, than the open ascending auction.
In the solution to the problem, we saw that the firm allocated the plants to the regions
with the highest virtual valuations. In our model, the regions have information on their own
benefits while the firm does not. In turn, they receive some informational rents (as seen by the
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payments). In setting the optimal mechanism, the firm tries to extract some of that rent. In
fact, the firm could decide not to allocate the plant at all even if it is efficient to do so. Indeed,
at some positive level of bi, βi(bi) can be negative. If all signals are such that βi(bi) is negative,
the firm maximises her objective function by not allocating the plants.
In fact, the optimal mechanism should also define reserve prices: threshold values of the
regions’ private benefits under which the firm would not allocate her plants. In a simpler
model, the reserve prices would simply be defined by the level of private benefits under which
the virtual valuation is negative, br = β−1(0). Indeed, if the revealed bi’s are all lower, then the
objective function would also be negative, thus choosing not to allocate the units at all.
In our model, however, the reserve prices must take the technological profits into account.
Indeed, by not allocating the plants, the firm actually reduces her own profits. The intuition is
similar. The firm selects the regions to allocate the plant by choosing x(b), and her payoff must
be positive: pi(K1) + β(br1)L(K1) > 0 and pi(K2) + β(br2)L(K2) > 0.
With reserve prices, the optimal mechanism would differ from the open ascending auction
of the previous sections. Therefore, we find the conditions under which the reserve prices are
non-binding.
Lemma 1.5. For Kj ∈ [0,K] ∀j and p > p, the reserve prices in the optimal mechanism are
non-binding.
Proof. If the private benefits revealed through the mechanism are equal to b, the lowest possible
level, the payoff to the firm must respect the following condition:
pi(Kj) + β(b)L(Kj) = pf(Kj , L(Kj))− L(Kj)(w − β(b))− rKj ≥ 0
Notably, Kj = 0 respects this condition. Moreover, given the assumptions on the production
function, we know that the slopes of pf(Kj , L(Kj)) and L(Kj)(w − β(b)) + rKj are positive.
Therefore, two cases are possible at Kj =  (i.e., an arbitrary small level of investment):
• The firm makes positive profits: pf(Kj , L(Kj))− L(Kj)(w − β(b))− rKj > 0
• The firm does not make profit: pf(Kj , L(Kj))− L(Kj)(w − β(b))− rKj < 0
In the second case, we can conclude that for any Kj > , she never makes profits if the winning
region has private benefits b. In the first case, we can conclude that the firm will make positive
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profits up to a certain point K (where pf(K,L(K)) = L(K)(w − β(b)) + rK). Assuming that
p is large enough, we are always in the first situation.
Under these assumptions, the firm always makes profits at b. If the private benefits revealed
in the mechanism are higher, she also necessarily makes profits. Indeed, a larger b implies a
lower w − β(b), and thus higher profits at the same level of capital invested and prices.
Therefore, even if the firm sets reserve prices, they would never affect the decision if the
pre-determined Kj are always in the interval [0,K]. 
1.5.2 The Social Planner Problem
The previous discussion shows that the optimal mechanism (at least under some conditions on
the price p and with the pre-determined Kj ∈ [0,K] ∀j) is equivalent to the open ascending
auction of the previous sections. An interesting question, then, is whether this mechanism is
optimal in terms of social welfare. To investigate the social welfare question, we can replace
the firm as the decision-maker by a social planner trying to find a mechanism to allocate K1
and K2 (decided ex ante) to maximise a social welfare function. Would the allocations and
payments be the same? The set-up is similar to the one of Proposition 1.4. The differences is
that the objective function considers not only the firm’s welfare, but also that of the regions.
It also considers the marginal cost or public funds (λ). We also assume that the social planner
is uninformed about the regions’ signals.12
max
x(b),s(b)
E(W ) =
∫
B
[
αE(Π) + γ
n∑
i=1
EUi − λ
n∑
i=1
si(b)
]
g(b)db
s.t. EUi(xi, bi, si) ≥ EUi(xi, b˜i, b−i, si) ∀i ICC
EUi(xi, bi, si) ≥ 0 ∀i∀j IRC
n∑
i=1
xij ≤ 1 ∀j = 1, 2 FC1
xij(b) ≥ 0 FC2
xi1(b) + xi2(b) ≤ 1 FC3
The values for α and γ are the social weights placed on the welfare of the firm and the regions,
respectively, and they sum to one (α + γ = 1). In this section, we assume that the firm
12If the social planner has perfect information, the problem is trivial. It allocates the plants to the regions
that value them the most, with no payment.
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chooses the amounts of capital to invest in a previous step, and that the mechanism is used to
allocate these amounts. Therefore, E(Π) = pi(K1)
∑n
i=1 xi1(b) +pi(K2)
∑n
i=1 xi2(b) +
∑n
i=1 si(b).
Since the firm has no information to reveal, she does not appear in the incentive compatibility
constraints.
Lemma 1.6. For a given K1 and K2, an uninformed social planner would locate the plants in
the same regions as the firm.
Proof. We can simplify the objective function as such:
E(W ) =
∫
B
γ n∑
i=1
(xi(b)biL) + (α− γ − λ)
n∑
i=1
si(b) + α
2∑
j=1
xij(b) · pi(Kj)
 g(b)db (1.5.11)
By using the same manipulations on the constraints as in the previous problem, we find that
E(W ) =
n∑
i=1
∫
B
(α− λ)(xi(b)biL)− (α− γ − λ)(xi(b)L1−Gi(bi)
gi(bi)
) + α
2∑
j=1
xij(b) · pi(Kj)
 g(b)db
E(W ) =
n∑
i=1
∫
B
(bi − α− γ − λ
α− λ ·
1−Gi(bi)
gi(bi)
)
(α− λ)xi(b)L+ α
2∑
j=1
xij(b) · pi(Kj)
 g(b)db
E(W ) =
n∑
i=1
∫
B
β′i(bi)(α− λ)xi(b)L+ α 2∑
j=1
xij(b) · pi(Kj)
 g(b)db
The function β′i(bi) differs from βi(bi) by the multiplication of the inverse of the hazard func-
tion by a combination of the model parameters. We make the assumption that α − γ ≥ λ,
implying also that α ≥ λ, so that welfare is non-negative. Intuitively, from Equation 1.5.11,
this assumption implies that for the transfers from the regions to the firm, the additional social
weight placed on the firm versus the regions (i.e., α− γ) is large enough to cover the marginal
cost of public funds (λ).13
Notably, with these assumptions, the social planner chooses the same deterministic x∗(b):
x∗(b) = (x∗1(b), x∗2(b)) =

(1, 0) if b = b(1)
(0, 1) if b = b(2)
(0, 0) otherwise
(1.5.12)
13The assumption α− γ ≥ λ has additional implications for the marginal cost of public funds. Indeed, if the
weight placed on the firm and regions is the same (α = γ), then if λ > 0, social welfare is negative. Conversely,
if we allow α − γ < λ, then the shape of β′i(bi) is uncertain. For a uniform distribution, it is merely necessary
that
∣∣α−γ−λ
α−λ
∣∣ ≤ 1, but this is not true in the general case.
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While the allocation function may be the same as the firm, the social planner’s optimal
mechanism is not entirely identical to the firm’s. Since α−γ−λα−λ ≤ 1, then β′i(bi) ≥ βi(bi) ∀i.
We can see that this has implications for the reserve prices. In particular, the social planner
allocates the plants more often.
As in the discussion on the optimal mechanism from the firm’s viewpoint, we do not discuss
reserve prices but the conditions under which the reserve prices are not binding. However, to
illustrate how the reserve prices would change, we first look at an example. Abstracting from
the technological profits, we would find the following br:
0 = β′i(b′∗r )
0 = α− γ − λ
α− λ ·
1−Gi(b′∗r )
gi(b′∗r )
0 = βi(b∗r)
0 = 1−Gi(b
∗
r)
gi(b∗r)
With a uniform distribution on [0, 1], for example,
b′∗r =
α− γ − λ
α− λ · (1− b
′∗
r )
b′∗r =
α−γ−λ
α−λ
1 + α−γ−λα−λ
<
1
2
b∗r = 1− b∗r
b∗r =
1
2
Therefore, although the allocations under a social planner and the firm are the same, the
social planner would allocate more often. We show now that this result translates in a looser
condition on the possible investment interval ([0,K ′]).
Proposition 1.5. For any distribution such that β(b) < 0, K ′ > K. In other words, the social
planner allocates the plants more often.
Proof. Similar to the firm’s problem, we have that
αpi(Kj) + β′(b)(α− λ)L(Kj) = αpf(Kj , L(Kj))− L(Kj)(αw − (α− λ)β′(b))− αrKj ≥ 0
Like in the firm’s problem, if K = 0, then αpi(Kj) +β′(b)(α−λ)L(Kj) = 0. Assuming that p is
high enough so that with an arbitrary small amount of capital , αpi(Kj)+β′(b)(α−λ)L(Kj) > 0,
we want to find the maximum amount of investment such that profits are positive at the lowest
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level of private benefits b.
αpf(K ′, L(K ′))− L(K ′)(αw − (α− λ)β′(b))− αrK ′ = 0
α
[
pf(K ′, L(K ′))− L(K ′)(w − α− λ
α
β′(b))− rK ′
]
= 0
α
[
pf(K ′, L(K ′))− L(K ′)(w − (1− γ + λ
α
β(b))− rK ′
]
= 0
In the third line, we used the definitions of β′(·) and β(·). This equation defines a level K ′. How
does that amount differ from K? The difference between the two conditions is in the multiplier
in front of L′(·) (essentially the effective marginal cost of labour). We therefore compare these
costs. K ′ > K if and only if:
w − β(b) > w − (1− γ + λ
α
β(b))
β(b) < 1− γ + λ
α
β(b)
b
(
λ
α
)
− 1−G(b)
g(b)
(
γ + λ
α
)
< 0
b− γ + λ
λ
1−G(b)
g(b) < 0
This last expression will be true for low levels of b. Notably, it is always true for b = 0. However,
more generally, we can prove that for any distribution f(·),
b− 1−G(b)
g(b) < 0 =⇒ b−
γ + λ
λ
1−G(b)
g(b) < 0
Therefore, if the virtual valuation, from the firm’s point of view, of a region with private benefits
b is negative, then the social planner’s condition is looser: K ′ > K. 
The condition (β(b) < 0) for this result is not very restrictive. Indeed, if from the firm’s
point of view, virtual valuations are all positive, the firm allocates all the time, so a discussion
on welfare is not as interesting. Since it is inefficient socially to not allocate the plants, the looser
conditions set by the social planner actually increases welfare. The intuition for this result is
that the social planner puts less importance on the firm capturing the regions’ informational
rent.
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1.5.3 Unconstrained Problem: Investment Choices Endogenous to the Mech-
anism
In the auction model and in the derivation of the optimal mechanism thus far, we have assumed
that the firm commits to levels of capital investment (K1,K2). After the reveal of the private
benefits, however, it is possible that the firm would like to modify her allocation of capital.
In this section, we investigate how the allocation and payments would differ under an uncon-
strained optimal mechanism, where the firm chooses the amounts to invest simultaneously with
the allocation and payments. Also, we show that at least in expected values, the constrained
optimal mechanism derived above leads to the same allocations as a more general, unconstrained
mechanism.
To do so, we will modify the problem above slightly. Instead of only choosing a vector of
probabilities xi(b), the firm chooses, in addition, a vector of investments ki(b) = (ki1(b), ki2(b)).
The firm’s problem becomes:
max
x(b),k(b),s(b)
E(Π) =
n∑
i=1
∫
B
[xi1(b)pi(ki1(b)) + xi2(b)pi(ki2(b)) + si(b)] g(b)db
s.t. EUi(ki, bi, si) ≥ EUi(ki, b˜i, b−i, si) ∀i ICC
EUi(ki, bi, si) ≥ 0 ∀i∀j IRC
n∑
i=1
xij ≤ 1 ∀j = 1, 2 FC1
xij(b) ≥ 0 FC2
xi1(b) + xi2(b) ≤ 1 FC3
kij(b) ≥ 0 FC4
By using similar manipulations on the constraints as in the constrained mechanism problem,
we can transform the firm’s objective function as such
E(Π) =
n∑
i=1
∫
B
[xi1(b)pi(ki1(b)) + xi2(b)pi(ki2(b)) + βi(bi) (xi1(b)L(ki1(b)) + xi2(b)L(ki2(b)))] g(b)db
(1.5.13)
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As in the previous sections, the solution for x(b) is deterministic:
x∗(b) = (x∗i1(b), x∗i2(b)) =

(1, 0) if b = b(1)
(0, 1) if b = b(2)
(0, 0) otherwise
(1.5.14)
What are the values of k∗1(b) and k∗2(b)? The firm will choose these investment amounts after
observing the signals. She only commits to a function k(b). From the objective function, we
can find the first-order condition, assuming the bi’s are observed, and the plants are assigned
to the respective winners.
p
∂f(k∗1, L(k∗1))
∂k∗1
= L′(k∗1)(w − β(b(1))) + r
p
∂f(k∗2, L(k∗2))
∂k∗2
= L′(k∗2)(w − β(b(2))) + r
These conditions define functions k ∗ (b).14 The actual values of capital investment are not
decided until the end of the mechanism. However, as long as b(1) 6= b(2), β(b(1)) 6= β(b(2)). In
turn, we can conclude that k∗1 6= k∗2, just as in the constrained problem and in the auction model
of the previous sections.
Obviously, since the firm does not commit to ex ante optimal values of investment, but
chooses the amount only when observing the private benefits of the regions, the firm does
better ex post in this unconstrained problem. However, on average, the constrained problem
may lead, ex ante to the same solution.
Proposition 1.6. If the regions’ private benefits are uniformly distributed, then the constrained
problem, on average, leads to the same amounts of investment from the firm.
Proof. Assume that the bi’s are distributed uniformly on the interval [0, b]. Then,
E(β(b(1)) = E
[
b(1) − (b− (b(1)))
]
= E[2b(1) − b] =
n− 1
n+ 1b = E(b(2))
14For this optimal mechanism, a discussion on reserve prices is unnecessary. Indeed, reserve prices will be
endogenously determined in the k∗(b) functions. The firm can simply set k∗(b) = 0 for some values of b, which
is equivalent to a reserve price.
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Similarly,
E(β(b(2)) = E
[
b(2) − (b− (b(2))
]
= E[2b(2) − b] =
n− 3
n+ 1b
We also know that E(b(3)) = n−2n+1b. Therefore,
−E(b(2)) + 2E(b(3)) =
n− 3
n+ 1b
Consequently,
E(β(b(2)) = −E(b(2)) + 2E(b(3))
Recall the first-order conditions from the auction model:
p
∂f(K1, L(K1))
∂K1
= L′(K1)(w − E(b(2))) + r
p
∂f(K2, L(K2))
∂K2
= L′(K2)(w + E(b(2))− 2E(b(3))) + r
On average, we thus have the exact same first-order conditions, leading to the same investment
decisions from the firm. 
The previous result holds for other distributions as well. This finding is not surprising.
Indeed, virtual valuations can be interpreted as the marginal revenues on the sale for the
seller. In the auction model, the “adjustments” on the marginal cost of labour, E(b(2)) and
−E(b(2)) + 2E(b(3)), are simply the marginal revenues from the subsidies. Similarly, β(b(1))
and β(b(2)) are the marginal revenues from the sale of the 2 investments to the seller in the
unconstrained optimal mechanism.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates how a firm can allocate investment across multiple sites strategically
to attract larger subsidies from regions who participate in a bidding war for these investments.
It proposes a model in which a firm wishes to install new production facilities and puts regional
governments in competition against each other to decide the location of those facilities. Regional
governments submit bids, in the form of tax holidays or other financial packages, and the firm
invests in the winning region(s). In contrast to previous models, the firm can split her production
in two establishments. This split introduces new strategic choices for the firm, and modifies the
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bidding behaviour of the regional governments.
First, I find that equilibrium subsidies will depend on the firm’s choice of capital amounts
to invest. In particular, when she chooses asymmetric plants, total subsidies are larger. Second,
I show that this bidding behaviour affects the optimal amounts of investment of the firm. More
specifically, I find that she always chooses to differentiate her establishments. Therefore, the
firm manipulates the bidding war, in order to attract larger subsidies. I then compare this result
to a situation without a bidding war. I find that the effect of the bidding war is ambiguous in
general, but when using a Cobbs-Douglas form for the production function, I find that total
investment increases. Notably, this result is true for any distribution function. Moreover, total
subsidies also increase.
I also discuss the optimal mechanism to allocate the establishments under three different
sets of assumptions: first from the point of view of the firm, second from the point of view
of a social planner, and finally under more relaxed assumptions on the firm’s commitment. I
find that the open ascending auction used in the model implements the optimal auction, under
certain conditions. Moreover, I find that a social planner would optimally choose the same
allocation and payment rules as the firm. Finally, I describe the optimal mechanism under the
more general assumption that the firm chooses amounts to invest endogenously through the
mechanism. I show that in expected value, this optimal mechanism without prior commitment
from the firm results in the same ex ante allocation and payments.
To summarise, this chapter can be interpreted as two successive additions to the usual
literature on bidding wars for firms. First, instead of considering a fixed investment amount, this
chapter allows the firm to choose the amount of capital to invest and make available in a bidding
war. This addition changes the strategy of the firm, inciting her to over-invest in comparison
to a situation without a bidding war. Second, we add a multi-location component: the firm
can allocate the total investment across two sites. This addition modifies the firm’s behaviour
further, by inciting her to differentiate the amounts of investment between the production sites.
In doing so, she continues to over-invest in total.
In terms of social welfare, the chapter shows that while the allocation of investment is
distorted versus a situation without a bidding war, the positive effect on allocative efficiency
resulting from bidding wars is preserved in a multi-plant bidding war. More specifically, the
regions that value the investment the most win it. However, while total investment is increased,
which may have positive or negative implications, the increase is (under some conditions) for
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both hosts of the plants. Therefore, the increase in investment is not skewed only towards one
of the winners at the expense of the other.
To conclude, the first chapter shows that the strategic behaviour of firms has important
implications on the bidding wars for plants between regions. This distinction is important,
since many bidding wars involve multi-nationals, and that such firms receive many subsidies in
short periods by many local governments.
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Chapter 2
Investment in Public Infrastructure
and Regional Bidding Wars for
Multi-Establishment Firms1
1This chapter was prepared in collaboration with Pierre-Henri Morand. I acknowledge the help of Thierry
Madiès, who provided useful comments on this chapter, as well as Nicolas Gravel and Tanguy van Yppersele
for helpful discussions and suggestions. This chapter also benefited from interactions at seminars at the Uni-
versity of Ottawa (Canada), the University of Macedonia (Thessaloniki, Greece), and the University of Fribourg
(Switzerland).
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2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter showed how bidding wars between regions can affect a firm’s investment
allocation across multiple sites. However, in addition to fiscal incentives, regional governments
can also invest in business parks, road accesses, or other public infrastructure, thus hoping
to make their territory more attractive to potential businesses. In fact, Davies (2005) lists a
number of cases of subsidies to large plants where local governments offered road, sewer, and rail
improvements as part of the incentives. Since the firm will only choose a subset of all regions
in the bidding war, it is possible that some of that infrastructure spending is “wasted.”
Jayet and Paty (2006) list some other examples from France where regions invested in
“business areas,” built to attract firms, suggesting that they were actually over-provided by
regions (although actually socially optimal). Jayet and Paty (2006), however, consider many
regions vying for a single mono-plant firm. The reality is that firms usually make several
investment decisions in short amounts of time, such that these bidding wars are not necessarily
independent.
The previous chapter has shown that when a firm allocates production across multiple
establishments through a bidding war, its allocation is modified. Moreover, the production
allocation of the firm certainly affects the amount of public infrastructure needed to host the
firms’ plants. Indeed, bigger plants may need more electricity, better road access, or access
to a rail road, for example.2 Therefore, the prior investment in infrastructure by the regions
introduces a trade-off that was not present in the previous chapter: more differentiation can
increase total subsidies, but may also reduce the number of regions participating in the bidding
war. The objective of this chapter is to explore this trade-off, and analyse how it affects the
allocation decision of the firm.
Our argument is as follows. When using a bidding war, the firm differentiates her establish-
2One specific example is the construction of data centres by companies like Google, Facebook, and Apple. In
Reno (Nevada), Apple built a new data centre in 2012 based not only on tax incentives, but also likely due to
the availability of energy in the region. At the time of the site’s selection, the Reno Gazette Journal reported:
Although energy costs are always a key consideration for any company looking to move or
expand into an area, it’s particularly important for power-hungry data centers, Donovan said.
“They don’t want just low-cost electric power but it also has to be reliable,” Donovan said.
“They also look at the source of that power and make sure that there is enough to support
extra capacity without costs increasing dramatically if it’s needed in the future.” The site
for the proposed data center—Reno Technology Park—currently has access to eight transmis-
sion lines as well as renewable energy sources, something that is always a key consideration for
Apple. (http://www.rgj.com/story/money/reno-rebirth/2015/05/29/how-reno-landed-apple-one-
of-the-biggest-prizes-in-the-data-center-industry/28181319/)
Note that at the time of the selection of Reno for a data centre, Apple had recently opened a similar plant in
Oregon, and later opened another one in North Carolina.
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ments, thus concentrating more production in one plant than without a bidding war. In turn,
this concentration increases the size of one plant, and thus the infrastructure needed to host it.
Consequently, some regions decide not to invest in the necessary infrastructure, and do not take
part in the bidding war. Finally, this reduced competition for the firm’s investment potentially
reduces the subsidies she hopes to receive. At the extreme, only one region enters the bidding
war, completely differentiating itself from the others, and can attract the firm without paying
subsidies.
This paper contributes to the branch of the fiscal competition literature on bidding wars
between regions to attract investment. It is especially related to the works of Taylor (1992),
King et al. (1993), Justman et al. (2005), and Jayet and Paty (2006), who all introduce some
sort of infrastructure investment from the regional governments. The main originality of this
chapter in contrast to these studies is the consideration of a single firm who can build multiple
new plants. In formal terms, we model this type of bidding war as a multi-unit auction with
entry costs.
Taylor (1992) discusses the potential waste of such infrastructure races.3 He builds a model
in which jurisdictions compete for new firms by investing in new infrastructure, in a way that
resembles an all-pay auction.4 He finds that the investment race can potentially be wasteful,
and that regions with a lower initial stock of infrastructure may be less willing to enter the
competition. In this situation, infrastructure inequality between regions could rise over time.
In his paper, the competition to attract firms only takes place through this infrastructure race;
his model does not consider additional subsidies.
King, McAfee and Welling (1993) consider a two-period model with two countries, with
a bidding war for a firm’s investment in each period, and in which the firm can move in the
second period. More closely related to the model of this chapter, they consider an extension in
which regions can invest in infrastructure in a previous stage, thus increasing their productivity
potential. They find that in equilibrium, regions tend to choose different levels of infrastructure,
thus endogenously creating the productivity continuum described in their main model, with one
country having more infrastructure and a higher pay-off.
Jayet and Paty (2006) build a model of competition between many regions to attract a
single investment. In a first stage, regions must decide whether they want to develop a site
3The author notes that the investment can find some use, even in the case of a loss in the bidding war. For
example, the road built to attract a firm can still be useful for motorists.
4In such an auction, all bidders pay the bid they offered, whether they win or lose.
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to host the firm. They assume that regions must make at least part of that spending before
the firm chooses a location, that spending is sunk, and it must be on a productive public good.
They also assume that the firm has private information on her productivity in each region. This
assumption greatly simplifies the analysis of the firm’s problem: she can choose her site with full
information. In this chapter, we make the inverse assumption: regions have more information
(namely, on their own private benefits of hosting the firm). Jayet and Paty (2006) focus on the
analysis of the regions’ decision to develop sites or not, and the chosen tax rates. They find
that even a social planner who knows that only one site will be occupied will choose to develop
many sites. This result implies that over-provision of infrastructure is not necessarily bad from
a social welfare point of view. Indeed, developing many sites increases the probability that the
firm invests on one of the sites, instead of choosing an outside option.
This chapter is also related to the work of Justman et al. (2005). These authors consider a
model consisting of many regions and many firms, but, like us, they are interested in the decision
of regions to invest in infrastructure. They show that regions can use the tool of infrastructure
to differentiate themselves by choosing a different type of infrastructure, thereby mitigating the
direct competition with other regions. They also show that this differentiation is greater when
regions are unable to distinguish the types of firms (i.e., with information asymmetry).
In a related paper, Justman et al. (2002) consider a model where infrastructure can also
be differentiated by quality, thereby allowing regions to segment the market for their territory
vertically. Some regions invest in higher quality infrastructure, attracting a subset of the firms
for lower subsidies (or receiving taxes). The number of regions in this group is bounded according
to the capability of the firms to take advantage of high-quality infrastructure. Remaining regions
instead compete among each other using subsidies. In this chapter, we find a related result,
albeit in a different context. Indeed, in a bidding war for a single firm, when regions can invest
in infrastructure, it is possible for a region to differentiate itself, thus hosting the firm without
paying subsidies.
Zissimos and Wooders (2008) also offer a similar model, in which firms have different public
good requirements to produce, thus allowing regions to differentiate themselves. In this chap-
ter, there is a single firm, but she can endogenously create differences in the infrastructure
requirement of her plants.
The model developed in this chapter is related to the one of the previous chapter. However,
to maintain tractability, we simplify the problem by setting an exogenous total amount of
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capital, thus only considering the split of the firm in the two establishments. We also simplify
the definition of the firm’s profits, by using a reduced form profit function instead. First, we show
that the result of the previous chapter holds under a benchmark model: with a profit function
that favours a maximum split of the firm’s production (i.e., two identical establishments), a
bidding war entices the firm to differentiate her plants.
Second, we show that when considering prior investment in infrastructure, it is possible even
for a firm that would usually favour full concentration of production in a single establishment
to split production across two sites. More generally, we show that the presence of infrastructure
costs tends to reduce the firm’s tendency to locate in one large establishment. This result
highlights an interesting trade-off. While the firm wants to increase differentiation to benefit
from larger subsidies, doing so increases the likelihood that firms exit the competition. At the
extreme, only one region is adequate for the firm’s production facility, and can win it without
offering subsidies. Finally, we show for a uniform distribution of the regions’ private benefits
that while a bidding war might be less efficient than a social planner with full information, it is
more efficient than an uninformed social planner. This result reflects the fact that the bidding
war allocates the plants to the regions that value it the most.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the basic
construction of the model, while Section 3 solves the benchmark model without infrastructure
costs. In Section 4, we add endogenous entry to the model. Regional governments can decide,
before the bidding war takes place, to invest in infrastructure (in other words, pay an entry cost
for the auction). Section 5 discusses some implications of the model on social welfare. The last
section concludes.
2.2 The Model
The players in this incomplete information game are the firm and the n regional governments
indexed by i ∈ 1, ..., n. The firm wants to increase its production capacity, but is unsure of the
optimal location for the new facilities. She may split her production in multiple locations, either
in symmetric or asymmetric establishments. We will assume that the total investment is fixed
at a certain exogenous amount, and that the firm chooses the proportion to allocate in each
location. For simplicity and tractability, we limit the model to the case of two establishments,
indexed by j ∈ 1, 2.
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2.2.1 The Firm
The firm wants to invest a certain exogenous amount of capital K. She can invest in two estab-
lishments, choosing a production split ~α = (α1, α2), where αk is the proportion of production in
establishment k. Since α1 + α2 = 1, we will set α1 = α and α2 = 1− α. Without loss of gener-
ality, we label the establishments such that 12 6 α 6 1. In other words, the first establishment
is the largest.
In each establishment, the firm’s profits are a function of the amount of capital invested.
In this chapter, we choose to use a simplified, reduced-form function for profits: pi(αk · K).
For simplicity, we normalize the exogenous quantity K to 1, so that profits only depend on
the proportion of production in each establishment: pi(αk). We assume that this function is
positive (pi(αk) > 0) on the interval [0, 1]. The functional form of pi(·) describes whether the
firm benefits from concentration. The sign of the second derivative will be determinant for the
analysis. If pi′′(·) > 0, the firm inherently benefits from concentration, while pi′′(·) < 0 implies
that the firm inherently prefers multiple plants. To help understand that profit function, the
following remark describes the behaviour of the firm without a bidding war.
Remark 2.1. Assume the firm chooses production sites without a bidding war. If pi′′(·) < 0,
the firm chooses α = 12 . If pi′′(·) > 0, the firm chooses α = 1.
Proof. The firm’s maximisation problem in the absence of a bidding war is simply
max
α
pi(α) + pi(1− α)
The first-order condition is
pi′(α)− pi′(1− α) = 0
In words, the firm chooses α to equalize profits in both establishments: α = 12 . First assume
that pi′′(·) < 0. Then, the second-order condition satisfies pi′′(α) + pi′′(1 − α) < 0, giving us a
maximum. However, if pi′′(·) > 0, then the second-order condition is positive, thus indicating
that α = 12 is a minimum. In this case, we have a corner solution at α = 1. 
Without a bidding war, then, a firm with pi′′(·) < 0 would choose to have two equally-sized
establishments. In the opposite case (pi′′(·) > 0), the firm would choose to produce in only one
large establishment.
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This profit function is essentially a reduced-form version of the one in the previous chapter.
When pi′′(·) < 0, it corresponds to the case where the firm’s production function has a negative
second derivative (f ′′(k) < 0). In this chapter, however, we are not interested in the amount of
capital (which is fixed), but only its allocation across the two sites. With pi′′(·) < 0, profits are
maximised at α = 12 , just like with f ′′(k) < 0, they are maximised at equal amounts of capital.
The firm’s total ex post revenues are equal to
Π(α) = s∗1 + s∗2 + pi(α) + pi(1− α) (2.2.1)
In other words, the total profits of the firm are equal to the sum of the two winning bids, and
the operating profits in each establishment pi(αk), which themselves depend on the production
split chosen by the firm. The objective of the firm is to maximise Π(α).
2.2.2 The Regions
Each of the n > 2 (symmetric) regional governments has private benefits of hosting the firm,
bi. These private benefits capture, for example, an increase in labor taxation from workers who
will be employed by the firm, as well as spillovers to domestic firms, but also the compatibility
of the firm for the region. Indeed, if the industry of the firm has a bad reputation in one region,
the regional government would receive only small benefits from the firm’s investment (due to,
for example, re-election concerns). The signals are identically and independently distributed
according to a distribution f(·) on some interval
[
b, b
]
(with b ≥ 0). The ex post valuation of
the region for establishment k is then equal to
Vik = αkbi − sik (2.2.2)
where sik is the subsidy paid by region i (or the tax holiday offered by region i) for establishment
k.
2.2.3 The Auction Process and Timing of the Game
The firm then conducts an auction (the bidding war), with both establishments available si-
multaneously. It is an open ascending auction. In particular, the firm runs an ascending clock,
representing the current price for the lowest-value establishment still available (the one with the
lowest proportion of production). Regional governments still in the auction are ready to offer
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a bid equal to the price currently on the clock. The winning bid is determined from the price
on the clock when the previous bidder dropped from the auction. In this kind of auction, it is
optimal for regional governments to drop from the auction when the value on the clock reaches
their own valuation, αkbi. The bid can be interpreted as a total “fiscal package" offered to the
firm.5 At the end of the auction, the two winning regions offer bids s∗1 (for establishment α1)
and s∗2 (for the second establishment), receive their respective parts of the firm’s investment,
and the firm produces its goods, incurring profits.
We can already see that there will be a difference between the symmetric and asymmetric
cases. In the symmetric case, both establishments have the same value, so the winning bid is
determined for both at the same time. In the asymmetric case, the two remaining regions will
continue to compete once the value of the lowest subsidy is determined.
We can summarize the timing of the game as follows:
Stage 0: Nature picks the set of {bi}i=1,...,n. Regional governments learn their bi.
Stage 1: The firm chooses and commits to an allocation of capital α, anticipating the
subsidies offered by governments resulting from the auction in Stage 2.
Stage 2: The multi-unit auction takes place. Winning regions offer s∗1 and s∗2.
Stage 3: The firm invests capital as determined in Stage 1 in the winning region(s), and
receives profits.
2.3 Benchmark Model Without Costs in Infrastructure
We start by calculating the equilibrium in a simple benchmark model without infrastructure
costs. In that case, all n regions enter the auction. We solve the model by backwards induction,
to find the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. In the last stage, production takes place, and
the firm’s operating profits are simply determined by pi(α) + pi(1− α).
2.3.1 Equilibrium subsidies
To calculate equilibrium bids, we first define the order statistics on the signals, {b(i)}i=1,...n,
where b(1) > b(2) > ... > b(n). Recall that every region has valuation Vik = αkbi − si. The
following lemma describes the equilibrium subsidies:
5In effect, our model assumes that all regional governments have the same basic tax rate, but differentiate
themselves with targeted tax holidays that may differ.
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Lemma 2.1. The equilibrium subsidies for the first and second establishments are equal to
s∗1 = (2α− 1)b(2) + (1− α)b(3) (2.3.1)
s∗2 = (1− α)b(3) (2.3.2)
Proof. Regions stay in the auction only as long as their valuation is positive at the current
price. In other words, Vik > 0, and thus αkbi > si. The highest bid that will be offered by
region i for establishment k will be equal to αkbi. As the clock price increases, regions gradually
drop from the auction. The price s∗2 for the second establishment is determined when there are
only two regions left in the bidding. Since the region with the third-highest signal will be the
third-to-last to stop bidding, s∗2 will be equal to the value of the smallest establishment to that
region:
s∗2 = (1− α)b(3) (2.3.3)
At this point, the remaining two regions will continue to bid until one of them exits to
determine who among the two remaining bidders will receive the largest establishment. If the
firm selected α = 12 , the solution is easy: both remaining regions obtain one establishment
for the same price (equal to s∗2). However, by having asymmetric establishments, the firm
can take advantage of the infra-marginal competition between the two remaining regions and
increase the bid on the largest plant. The region with signal b(2) will leave first. To determine
s∗1, we calculate the bid at which that region is indifferent between the two establishments:
α1b(2) − s∗1 = α2b(2) − s∗2. From this point on, the region stops bidding because she receives a
higher payoff by winning the small establishment. This leads to the following equilibrium bid:
s∗1 = (2α− 1)b(2) + (1− α)b(3) (2.3.4)

Note that if α = 12 , the previous equation implies that s∗1 = s∗2.
2.3.2 The Firm’s Revenue Maximization Problem
As mentioned earlier, the firm wants to choose a production split (α, 1 − α) to maximize the
sum of the bids received for the establishments and her profits from production. She decides
on that production split (α) before the auction takes place, committing to it.
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Proposition 2.1. With a bidding war, the firm always chooses α > 12 .
Proof. Recall that the firm’s (ex-post) objective function is:
Π(α) = s∗1 + s∗2 + pi(α1) + pi(α2)
The firm expects the equilibrium subsidies determined in Stage 2, and knows the distribution
of the signals. Her expected revenues are thus equal to
E(Π) =
∫ b
b
∫ b(2)
b
Π(α) · g2,3(b(2), b(3), n)db(3)db(2) (2.3.5)
where g2,3(b(2), b(3), n) is the joint distribution of the second and third-highest signals (b < b(3) <
b(2) < b).6 This distribution is equal to:
g2,3(b(2), b(3), n) = n(n− 1)(n− 2) ·
[
1− F (b(2))
] [
F (b(3))
]n−3
f(b(2))f(b(3))
We can use this expression in the equation for the expected revenues, obtaining:
E(Π) =
∫ b
b
∫ b(2)
b
[
(2α− 1)b(2) + 2(1− α)b(3) + pi(α) + pi(1− α)
]
·
n(n− 1)(n− 2) ·
[
1− F (b(2))
] [
F (b(3))
]n−3
f(b(2))f(b(3))db(3)db(2) (2.3.6)
The firm chooses α ∈ [12 , 1] to maximize this function. The interior solutions7 can be described
by the following first-order condition with respect to α:
∂E(Π)
∂α
= 0 =
∫ b
b
∫ b(2)
b
[
(2b(2) − 2b(3) + pi′(α)− pi′(1− α)
]
· n(n− 1)(n− 2) ·
[
1− F (b(2))
] [
F (b(3))
]n−3
f(b(2))f(b(3))db(3)db(2) (2.3.7)
The optimal value of α will therefore depend on the expected values of the signals, through
6In general, the joint distribution of two order statistics j < k is equal to:
gj,k(b(j), b(k), n) =
(
n
k
)(
k
j − 1
)[
1− F (b(j))
]j−1 [
F (b(j))− F (b(k))
]k−1−j
F (b(k))n−kf(b(j))f(b(k))
where F (·) is the cumulative distribution of the signals.
7On the ]0,∞[ interval, we assume pi(·) and F (·) are continuous and twice differentiable. Therefore, E(Π) is
well-behaved. It is possible that we find a find extrema outside the [ 12 , 1] range. In that case, we’d have a corner
solution at α = 12 or α = 1. However, we can still describe the extremum, and subsequently find if it lies inside
or outside the range.
75
the probability distribution function f(·), and on the functional form for the profits. We can
simplify the first-order condition as such:
pi′(1− α)− pi′(α) =
2
∫ b
b
∫ b(2)
b (b(2) − b(3))
[
1− F (b(2))
] [
F (b(3))
]n−3
f(b(2))f(b(3))db(3)db(2)∫ b
b
∫ b(2)
b
[
1− F (b(2))
] [
F (b(3))
]n−3
f(b(2))f(b(3))db(3)db(2)
= 2E(b(2) − b(3)) = B (2.3.8)
From the definition of order statistics, we know that B is always positive, so the FOC implies
pi′(1− α) > pi′(α)
This inequality has different implications depending on the sign of the second derivative of pi(·).
First, assume that pi′′(·) > 0. In that case, the second-order condition
∂E(Π)2
∂2α
=
∫ b
b
∫ b2
b
(n− 2)(n− 1)n [1− F (b2)]F (b3)n−3f(b(2))f(b(3))
(
pi′′(1− α) + pi′′(α)) db(3)db(2)
= pi′′(1− α) + pi′′(α) (2.3.9)
is always positive, implying that the first-order condition describes a minimum. Furthermore,
the inequality pi′(1 − α) > pi′(α) along with the fact that pi′′(·) > 0 implies that the minimum
α0 is:
1− α0 > α0
α0 <
1
2
Therefore, E(Π) has a minimum at α0 smaller than 12 . In that case, we know that the optimal
split of the firm is to concentrate all production in one location, choosing α∗ = 1.
If pi′′(·) < 0 instead, the second derivative of expected revenues is negative (∂E(Π)2
∂2α < 0).
In that case, the first-order condition describes a maximum. As in the previous case, we can
describe the optimal α0 as such:
1− α0 < α0
α0 >
1
2
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Therefore, E(Π) has a maximum at α0 strictly greater than 12 , so the firm will choose α∗ in
the interval ]12 , 1]. In other words, in these conditions, the firm always either differentiate her
establishments or concentrates all production in one location. 
This result highlights the role of the auction in the firm’s decision process. Without it, in
the case that pi′′(·) < 0,8 she would always split in two symmetrical establishments. With the
auction, she differentiates her production sites, or, in extreme cases, decides to have a single
establishment (α∗ = 1).
The firm only modifies her allocation when it is already optimal, technologically, to split
in multiple locations (i.e., pi′′(α) < 0). In that case, the distortion from the bidding war, or
the extent to which the firm modifies her allocation from symmetric establishments, depends
on the difference between pi′(1 − α) and pi′(α) at the equilibrium. This distortion resulting
from the bidding war is increasing in E[b(2) − b(3)]. Put differently, as the firm expects a
greater difference between the regions’ signals, she increases the differentiation between her
establishments. Intuitively, the firm expects that the bid for the large establishment will increase
by an amount more than large enough to compensate for the reduction in the value of, and thus
the subsidy for, the second establishment. In doing so, she expects an increase in her total
profits (including subsidies). This result show how by running a bidding war, infra-marginal
competition between the last two remaining bidders can increase total subsidies, as in Chapter
1.
Also as in Chapter 1, this benchmark model has the following subgame-perfect Nash equi-
librium. In Stage 1, the firm commits to α > 12 , depending on the sign of pi′′(·) > 0, and
anticipating the subsidies offered by the regions. In Stage 2, the regions bid until the subsidy
on the clock passes their valuation. The region with highest private benefits wins the largest
establishment and pays s∗1 = (2α− 1)b(2) + (1− α)b(3). The region with second-highest private
benefits wins the smaller establishment and pays s∗2 = (1− α)b(3). In Stage 3, the firm receives
profits from both establishments.
An interesting corollary of this proposition follows from how the first-order condition depends
on n, and how the distortion of the firm’s allocation changes with n. Intuitively, we anticipate
that the expected value of the difference between the second- and third-highest signal will
decrease with n. Indeed, as we take a greater number of draws from a bounded distribution,
intuitively we’d expect the higher draws to be closer to the higher bound. Such a result would
8If pi′′(·) > 0, the auction does not affect the firm’s behaviour.
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be difficult to prove in the general sense. We prove it here for the uniform distribution.
Corollary 2.1. Suppose that the regions’ signals are distributed uniformly on [b, b]. The dis-
tortion in the firm’s location decision arising from the auction decreases with n, such that the
firm chooses a split closer to the symmetrical split.
Proof. Assume the private benefits are distributed according to a uniform distribution on [b, b].
Then, we know that (by using F (x) = x−b
b−b ):
B = 2E(b(2) − b(3))
= 2(b− b)
n+ 1
Taking the limit of the last expression as n approaches infinity, we see that 2E(b(2) − b(3)) goes
to zero. In other words, the distortion disappears, and the firm would act the same with and
without an auction. Perhaps more interesting than what happens at very large n, however,
is the behaviour of the distortion as n increases. The relation between B and n is not linear,
although an increase in n always leads to a decrease in B. More formally, the first derivative of
B with respect to n is equal to
∂B
∂n
= 2(b− b)(n+ 1)2
which is always negative. In other words, as n increases, the distortion from the auction
decreases, thus reducing the difference between pi′(1− α) and pi′(α). 
This result actually holds for distributions other than the uniform. One important condition
is that as n increases, the order statistics b(2) and b(3) move closer together. Even very skewed
distributions, such as a χ2 (k = 3), satisfy such a condition.
2.3.3 A Numerical Illustration
As a simple but practical form for pi(αk), assume that the profits are simply equal to an exoge-
nous parameter pi multiplied by a function h(αk) of the share of production in that establish-
ment:
pi(αk) = pi · h(αk)
The parameter pi captures the potential profits of the firm, which does not depend on how she
allocates capital. and its functional form describes the marginal returns to concentration. In
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the simplest case, h(α) = α and the firm is always indifferent between producing in one place
or two. A flexible functional form for that function is h(α, λ) = αλ, where λ determines the
sign of the second derivative of pi(·). If λ < 1, pi′′(·) < 0, while λ > 1 implies that pi′′(·) > 0. If
λ = 1, we have the simple function h(α) = α.
First, assume λ = 2, so that the firm benefits from concentrating its production. With this
value for λ, we obtain a single extremum at:
α0 =
1
2 −
1
2(1 + n)pi
Since the second derivative is positive, we know that it is a minimum. We also see that it
is always lower than 12 , so revenues are always increasing between α =
1
2 and α = 1. With
λ = 2, we thus find that the firm optimally concentrates its whole production in the largest
establishment (α∗ = 1).
If instead we assume that λ = 12 , solving the first order condition gives us:
α∗ = 116
(
8 +
√
64− 2(1 + n)2pi2
(
8 + (1 + n)pi
(
pi + npi −
√
16 + (1 + n)2pi2
)))
As shown above, the first-order condition describes a maximum. As a numerical example, taking
n = 3 and pi = 1, we obtain α∗ ≈ 0.78.
To give a more general idea of the relation between the optimal values of α and different
values of λ, we can calculate α∗ for all λ, using some value of n and pi. Figure 2.1 illustrates a
stylized version of that relation for n = 3 and pi = 1. Unsurprisingly, for λ > 1, the firm always
concentrates in a single establishment. For values of λ below 1, however, the firm never splits in
two equal establishments. The shape of the curve for λ < 1 obviously depends on the functional
forms chosen in solving the problem. However, it will be interesting to compare the shape of
that curve with the one obtained in the more complete model that includes infrastructure costs
(solved with the same functional form).
2.4 Endogenous Entry: Prior Investment in Infrastructure
We now turn to the more complete model, by introducing endogenous entry choice. We’ll assume
that regions must make some investment before they can be considered as a potential host region
by the firm. In terms of auction theory, this investment corresponds to an entry cost. In our
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Figure 2.1: Optimal investment split of the firm (α) given λ
model, regions learn their signals bi before making their entry decision. They also know the
production split chosen by the firm. In this section, we assume that pi(α) = pi · h(α) = pi ·αλ to
keep the model tractable. In the simple model, we saw that the value of λ determined whether
the firm, without a bidding war, preferred to concentrate all production (λ > 1) or to split
in multiple establishments (λ < 1). We also assume that the regions’ signals are distributed
uniformly on [0, 1].
The regions all have the same initial level of infrastructure, which is sufficient to host the
smaller establishment. In other words, it is sufficient for establishments of sizes up to 12 . How-
ever, if they also want to compete for the larger establishment, they need to make additional
investment in infrastructure, which increases with α (in other words, larger establishments re-
quire more infrastructure).9 This investment in infrastructure is sunk once paid. While it may
serve a purpose in later periods that are not considered here, in the model, it only serves to
attract the firm. In other words, the infrastructure costs in the model only represent the part
of infrastructure spending that is non-transferable. To solve the model, we propose a flexible
9Setting additional infrastructure needed for the small establishment to zero is basically equivalent to a
standardization of the infrastructure level. Indeed, if they were greater than zero but still equal for everyone,
it could reduce the total number of regions competing, thus changing the exact solution of the model, but we
suspect that it would not change our discussion, or the main findings of our paper. Another more interesting
extension would consider regions that have different initial levels of infrastructure. In this case, some regions
may already reach the level needed for the large establishment, thus removing infrastructure costs for them. We
leave this possibility for future research.
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functional form for the infrastructure costs:
c(α) = d · (α− 12)
2 (2.4.1)
This function captures the fact that infrastructure costs should increase with α. In particu-
lar, this function assumes that they increase quadratically: slower for lower production, and
increasingly faster as the establishment becomes larger. Infrastructure costs are also null when
the firm splits in two equal establishments (α = 12). The parameter d captures the magnitude
of the costs.
This entry decision modifies the timing of the model, by adding another stage:
Stage 0: Nature picks the set of {bi}i=1,...,n. Regional governments learn their bi.
Stage 1: The firm chooses and commits to an allocation of capital α, anticipating entry
decisions and the subsidies offered by governments resulting from the auction in Stage 3.
Stage 2: The regions decide whether they want to be considered for the large establish-
ment. If so, they pay the infrastructure cost c(α).
Stage 3: The multi-unit auction takes place. Winning regions offer s∗1 and s∗2.
Stage 4: The firm invests capital, as determined in Stage 1, in the winning region(s).
As in the previous section, we solve the model by backwards induction.
By adding an endogenous entry decision, we also add the possibility that no region will
wish to participate in the auction for the large establishment. In that case, we need to consider
the possible courses of action for the firm. Figure 2.2 shows the different possibilities. After
infrastructure costs are made (or not), a certain number of regions m are in the competition for
the largest establishment, while all n > 3 regions are competing for the smaller establishment.
If m = 0, and no regions pay the infrastructure cost, then, if she decides to not change
anything, the firm will only invest a total of 1− α. She can obviously do better. In particular,
she can renege on her previous commitment, and change her allocation to α = 12 , ensuring
every region participates in the bidding war, and allocating the entire amount of capital she
wanted to. This modified auction using α = 12 is labeled as Stage 3′ in Figure 2.2. Obviously,
the regional governments expect this possibility, and will consider it when choosing to enter or
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Figure 2.2: Timing with different number of entries
not.10
If m = 1, then only one region is suitable for the large investment of the firm, and that
region can “win” that investment without further subsidies. In this case, the auction can carry
on, but equilibrium subsidies will have to take into account the nature of the competition for
the large establishment. This scenario is considered in Stage 3′′ of Figure 2.2.
If m > 1, then there are enough participants in the bidding war and the auction takes place
as in the previous section, although only 2 regions will be able to bid for the large establishment.
This scenario is considered in Stage 3′′′ of Figure 2.2.
2.4.1 Bidding Behaviour
First assume that there are n = 3 regions.11 We start by describing the winning bids, taking
entry decisions as given. After infrastructure costs are made (or not), a certain number of regions
m are in the competition for the largest establishment, while all n regions are competing for the
smaller establishment. The equilibrium bids will be similar to the ones in the simple model of
the previous section, although some special cases exist. Table 2.1 summarises the possibilities
10We could also solve the model assuming that the firm makes the investment in infrastructure herself (i.e.,
installation costs). We could also imagine that the firm endogenously chooses a αˆ when faced with such a case.
Alternatively, the firm could cancel the auction and restart the whole process, choosing a slightly lower α using
the new information she gained from the non-entry decisions, repeating this process until at least one region
participates. In all cases, the regions must anticipate that behaviour by the firm. We leave a complete discussion
of dynamic or multi-period models for future research.
11As will be clear in the following paragraphs, additional regions would act exactly like the third.
82
for the bids.
Table 2.1: Possible Cases for the Winning Bids
Number of regions
incurring infrastruc-
ture cost
s∗1 s∗2
0 12b(3)
1
2b(3)
1 0 (1− α)b(3)
2 (2α− 1)b(2) + (1− α)b(3) (1− α)b(3)
3 (2α− 1)b(2) + (1− α)b(3) (1− α)b(3)
First, if m = 0, then there is no region with the infrastructure required to host the large
establishment. As explained above, we assume that, when faced with no demand for her large
plant, the firm reneges on her commitment and instead announces a (12 ,
1
2) split. In that case,
all n regions are participants in the bidding war for both plants. Since the establishments are
of equal sizes, the winning bid for both will thus simply be equal to the third-highest valuation:
s∗2 = (12)b(3). Indeed, these bids are simply a special case of the bids derived in the benchmark
model, with α = 12 . Since the establishments have the same value, there is no competition
among the last two regions remaining in the bidding war, and they both pay the same subsidy.
This case is summarized in the first row of Table 2.1.
If m = 1, there is the only region suitable for the large investment. In this case, the region
can bid as low as zero, and still win the investment with certainty. The winning bid for the
largest establishment will thus be equal to zero: s∗1 = 0. The winning bid for the smaller
establishment is determined by the competition among the remaining regions, and will be equal
to the second-highest valuation among those regions, which is the third-highest valuation among
all regions: s∗2 = (1− α)b(3).12
If m > 1, the regions’ behaviour looks similar to the benchmark model in which there
was no infrastructure cost. In particular, the bid for the smaller establishment will be equal
to the third-highest valuation: s∗2 = (1 − α)b(3). The bid for the larger establishment will
be determined by the infra-marginal competition occurring between the two regions that have
paid the infrastructure cost and have the highest two signals. As shown in Section 2.3, the
equilibrium bid is s∗1 = (2α− 1)b(2) + (1− α)b(3).
12As we will see in the next section, all regions with a signal higher than the threshold pay the infrastruc-
ture cost, and no region with signals lower than the threshold do. Therefore, the only region incurring the
infrastructure cost necessarily has the highest signal.
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2.4.2 The Regions’ Entry Decision
After observing the investment split chosen by the firm in Stage 1 (α), regional governments
decide whether they want to participate in the bidding war for the larger establishment. We
define bt as the minimum signal (threshold) for which a region decides to make the necessary
investment in infrastructure and compete for both the large and small establishments. Our goal
is then to characterize this threshold value.
Take an arbitrary region i. For this region, there are three interesting outcomes: either it has
the highest signal, the second-highest signal, or its signal is lower than at least two other regions.
Now consider a region that is just at the threshold. In other words, this region is indifferent
between incurring the infrastructure cost or not. Its payoff varies according to her position in
the list and whether it paid entry or not. The following table summarises the different cases
and associated payoffs.
Table 2.2: Decomposition of Possible Cases for the Threshold Region
Position Pays infrastructure cost Payoff to region
First Yes αbt − c(α)No (12)bt − (12)b(3)
Second Yes (1− α)bt − (1− α)b(3) − c(α)No (1− α)bt − (1− α)b(3)
Third Yes −c(α)No 0
If the threshold region has the highest signal, it will always win the large establishment if
it makes the required investment in infrastructure. The reason is that all other regions have
a lower signal, and thus a signal lower than the threshold; they do not enter the auction for
the large plant. Therefore, in this case, if the threshold region pays the infrastructure cost,
it will receive a payoff of αbt − c(α). As noted earlier, it does not have to pay a subsidy.
Indeed, since there is no competition, that region can submit a subsidy of zero and still win
the auction. In effect, this corresponds to an absence of tax breaks. If the threshold region
decides not to pay the infrastructure cost, the firm splits in two equal establishments, thus
the threshold region receives one establishment and pays a subsidy equal to the third-highest
valuation, corresponding to a payoff of (12)bt − (12)b(3).
If the threshold region has the second-highest signal, it will always win the smaller estab-
lishment. If it pays the infrastructure costs, the region with a higher signal will win the auction
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for the large establishment, and the threshold region will win the small one, paying a bid equal
to the third-highest valuation, corresponding to a payoff of (1−α)bt− (1−α)b(3)− c(α). If the
threshold region does not pay the infrastructure cost, it will still win the small plant, pay the
same subsidy, but its payoff will be higher since it did not invest in infrastructure. Its payoff is
thus equal to (1− α)bt − (1− α)b(3). Note that in this case, the large plant is awarded without
competition and without subsidies.
Finally, if the signal of threshold region is the third-highest (or lower if more than three
regions), it will never win any of the establishments. Therefore, if it pays the infrastructure cost,
it receives a payoff of −c(α), while it receives a payoff of 0 if it does not incur the infrastructure
cost.
Recall that we defined the threshold signal as the signal at which a region is indifferent
between paying the infrastructure cost, and not paying it. To determine the value for the
threshold, we can therefore calculate the expected payoff from both decisions using the values
described above. In particular, the expected payoff when paying the infrastructure cost is
determined by the probability of being first, second, or lower, and the payoff in each case. The
expected payoff when not incurring infrastructure costs is determined in a similar way. We start
by calculating the expected payoff when investing in infrastructure, which is equal to:
W c =
∫ bt
0
∫ y
0
(αbt − c(α))fx,y(x, y)dxdy
+
∫ 1
bt
∫ bt
0
((1− α)bt − (1− α)x− c(α))fx,y(x, y)dxdy
+
∫ 1
bt
∫ 1
bt
(−c(α))fx,y(x, y)dxdy (2.4.2)
Similarly, we calculate the threshold region’s expected payoff when not paying the infrastructure
cost:
W 0 =
∫ bt
0
∫ y
0
((12)bt − (
1
2)x)fx,y(x, y)dxdy
+
∫ 1
bt
∫ bt
0
((1− α)bt − (1− α)x)fx,y(x, y)dxdy
+
∫ 1
bt
∫ 1
bt
(0)fx,y(x, y)dxdy (2.4.3)
Setting W c = W 0, we can find bt(d, α): the signal at which a region is just indifferent between
paying the infrastructure cost and not paying it. Regions with a lower signal will not pay the
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cost, thus only competing on the small plant, while regions with a higher signal will pay the
infrastructure cost and compete on both establishments.
A complete analytical solution to bt(d, α) is possible, although not informative. We instead
describe the behaviour of that function with respect to both arguments. Figure 2.3 shows the
value of the threshold signal for different values of d and α. The value of the threshold signal
increases with α, and is unsurprisingly higher for higher d. The figure also clearly shows that
for high values of d, the firm would actually drive all regions out of the competition if she
decided to concentrate her production in a large establishment (remember that for simplicity,
we assumed that signals are distributed in the [0, 1] interval).
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
α
1
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5
d
st (d,α)
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Note: Each line represents the values of d and α that give the same value of bt(d, α).
Figure 2.3: Threshold Signal Value for Combinations of d and α
Lemma 2.2. There exists some values of d for which the firm can drive out all competition for
her investment if she chooses a high α.
Proof. Private benefits bi are distributed on the interval [0, 1]. If bt(d, α) > 1, then the threshold
for entry is too high for any region to pay the infrastructure cost. Figure 2.3 illustrates such a
case. For example, for d = 5, α > 0.93 =⇒ bt(d, α) > 1. Therefore, for these values, the firm
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drives out all competition for her large establishment. 
2.4.3 The Firm’s Revenue Maximisation Problem
The firm wants to maximise the sum of the bids received for the establishments and her profits
from production.13 Before the auction takes places, the firm has to decide on a production
split (α). The chosen split has consequences on the magnitude of the infrastructure cost, the
profits of the firm, as well as on the valuation of the regions. She chooses α by maximising the
expected value of her revenues.
For the firm, there are a few cases possible, depending on the number of regions who enter the
competition. Indeed, as seen above, the number of regions competing for the large establishment
will determine the winning bids received by the firm. Moreover, if no region competes for that
establishment, she will not receive profits from it. Expressed in terms of these four case, the
expected revenues of the firm are equal to:
E(R) =
∫ bt
0
∫ x
0
∫ y
0
[z + (h(12) + h(
1
2))pi]gx,y,z(x, y, z) dzdydx
+
∫ 1
bt
∫ bt
0
∫ y
0
[(h(α) + h(1− α))pi + (1− α)z]gx,y,z(x, y, z) dzdydx
+
∫ 1
bt
∫ x
bt
∫ st
0
[(h(α) + h(1− α))pi + 2(1− α)z + (2α− 1)y]gx,y,z(x, y, z) dzdydx
+
∫ 1
bt
∫ x
bt
∫ y
bt
[(h(α) + h(1− α))pi + 2(1− α)z + (2α− 1)y]gx,y,z(x, y, z) dzdydx
(2.4.4)
Revenues come from three sources: profits from the small establishment, profits from the
large establishment, and winning bids. We can already see that the firm always receives the
profits from the small establishment, and the profits from the larger one in three out of four
cases. It may be informative to calculate the total revenues from each source separately. Let’s
consider the expected revenues accruing from the profits of the small establishment:
E(Rs) =
∫ 1
bt
∫ x
0
∫ y
0
h(1− α)pi · gx,y,z(x, y, z) dzdydx (2.4.5)
+
∫ bt
0
∫ x
0
∫ y
0
h(1/2)pi · gx,y,z(x, y, z) dzdydx
= pi
(
(1− b3t ) · h(1− α) + b3t · h(1/2)
)
(2.4.6)
13Note that in this section, the α that maximises the firm’s revenues may not be the actual α realized. Indeed,
we assumed that the firm may renege on her commitment. This behaviour, however, is anticipated by the regions
in their entry choice. Moreover, their bids will be on the realized α.
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First, we should note that the revenues from this plant can either increase or decrease with α,
depending on the value of pi′(α). If pi′(·) = h′(·) > 0, the first derivative of E(Rs) with respect
to α is negative (or equal to zero if, for example, pi = 0). Therefore, a lower production share
in this plant translates in lower revenues. However, increasing α also increases the probability
of no regions paying the infrastructure cost, and the firm reverting to α = 12 , reneging on her
commitment. We can see from the equation above that the expected revenues from the small
establishment can take two distinct values, depending on the value of α, and that the probability
of realisation of each value depends on the threshold signal (b3t and 1− b3t ).
Next, let’s consider the expected revenues accruing from the profits in the large establish-
ment.
E(Rl) =
∫ 1
bt
∫ x
0
∫ y
0
h(α)pi · gx,y,z(x, y, z) dzdydx (2.4.7)
+
∫ bt
0
∫ x
0
∫ y
0
h(1/2)pi · gx,y,z(x, y, z) dzdydx
= pi
(
(1− b3t ) · h(α) + b3t · h(1/2)
)
(2.4.8)
If pi′(·) = h′(·) > 0 (pi′(·) = h′(·) < 0), increasing α translates in higher (lower) revenues from the
large plant. However, a higher α also increases the threshold signal, and thus the probability
that the firm will revert to a symmetric production split. Therefore, the choice of the firm
has an ambiguous effect on her revenues accruing from the large establishment. As one would
expect, high infrastructure costs either through a large d or higher α decreases the expected
revenues from this establishment, by increasing the threshold signal. However, a large α also
has the opposite effect on expected revenues by increasing profits.
To illustrate, Figure 2.4 plots the previous equation for pi = 1, and for h(α) = αλ, with
various values of λ and d. The figure clearly shows the trade-off facing the firm. When costs
are high, she tends to receive higher revenues from splitting her production, but a higher λ has
the opposing effect.
The last portion of expected revenues accrues from the bids made by the region to the firm.
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Figure 2.4: Expected Revenues from Large Establishment vs. α
It is separated in four distinct cases:
E(Rb) =
∫ bt
0
∫ x
0
∫ y
0
[z] · gx,y,z(x, y, z) dzdydx
+
∫ 1
bt
∫ bt
0
∫ y
0
[(1− α)z] · gx,y,z(x, y, z) dzdydx
+
∫ 1
bt
∫ x
st
∫ bt
0
[2(1− α)z + (2α− 1)y] · gx,y,z(x, y, z) dzdydx
+
∫ 1
bt
∫ x
bt
∫ y
bt
[2(1− α)z + (2α− 1)y] · gx,y,z(x, y, z) dzdydx (2.4.9)
= b3t −
3b4t
4 +
1
2α(1 + b
3
t (−6 + 5bt)) (2.4.10)
This portion of expected revenues vary with α and the magnitude of the infrastructure costs
(d), since these parameters affect the threshold signal and thus the number of entrants. When
the firm introduces high infrastructure costs, the threshold increases and fewer regions pay the
cost. In turn, the bids are lower, or even null for the large establishment. However, the firm
can also increase the value of the bids by differentiating the two establishments. Indeed, this
differentiation introduces infra-marginal competition for the largest establishment. Figure 2.5
illustrates the trade-off at play. We observe an inverse U-shaped relationship between α and the
expected revenues from the bids. Moreover, as d increases, the magnitude of the costs increases,
and the expected bids decrease as well. The firm’s optimal split thus also decreases towards
α∗ = 12 .
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Figure 2.5: Expected Revenues from Bids, Depending on α
Combining the three portions we have discussed above, we can describe the total expected
revenues of the firm.
Proposition 2.2. There exist some parameters d (magnitude of infrastructure costs) and pi
(magnitude of potential profits) such that even λ > 1, the firm decides to locate her production
in two asymmetrical establishments.
Proof. We do not provide the full analytical solution for α∗, since it is not informative. Figure
2.6 illustrates a case in which the firm, although benefiting from increasing marginal returns to
concentration (λ = 2), is better off splitting her production in two establishments (with d = 2
and pi = 2). The example also assumes a uniform distribution of private benefits on [0, 1]

In general, higher infrastructure costs (higher d) tend to favour a production split closer
to α∗ = 12 . Like in the simple example of the previous section, increasing marginal returns to
concentration (larger λ) tend to favour concentration. In fact, in the simple example, we found
that the firm always concentrated her production as λ ≥ 1. In the presence of infrastructure
costs, however, it is possible that the firm chooses to split her production even if she would
benefit from increasing marginal returns to concentration.
In the case of the simple model without infrastructure costs, Figure 2.1 showed a stylised
version of the optimal split for a range of values for λ. Figure 2.7 repeats the exercise for the
full model we just described. We take a value of d = 1, and look at the optimal split for various
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Figure 2.6: Total Expected Revenues, Depending on α
values of λ. Most strikingly, we find that with this magnitude of infrastructure costs, the firm
can benefit from increasing marginal returns to concentration but still decide to split in multiple
establishments.
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Figure 2.7: Optimal α for various values of λ, with infrastructure costs
2.5 Welfare
We have shown that a bidding war may affect the firm’s allocation of investment across produc-
tion sites. One remaining question is how these bidding wars may affect social welfare. Let’s
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first suppose that a social planner has complete information about the regions’ signals, and
maximises a social welfare function defined as
Winf = pi(αinf ) + pi(1− αinf ) + αinfb(1) + (1− αinf )b(2) (2.5.1)
We assume, first, that c(α) = 0 (no necessary investment in infrastructure). The first-order
condition is equal to
pi′(αinf )− pi′(1− αinf ) + b(1) − b(2) = 0
pi′(1− αinf )− pi′(αinf ) = b(1) − b(2) (2.5.2)
Since b(1) − b(2) > 0, the FOC implies that pi′(αinf ) < pi′(1− αinf ). Therefore, with pi′′(·) < 0,
the optimal solution is always at ainf > 12 . In other words, the social planner always chooses
differentiated establishments, just like the firm would herself do by using a bidding war. This
distortion in the firm’s investment allocation resulting from the auction (when pi′′(·) < 0),
however, is different from the distortion that existed in the auction.
Proposition 2.3. Assume private benefits are distributed according to a uniform distribution.
Then, a perfectly-informed social planner differentiates the firm’s establishments, but less than
the firm would using a bidding war.
Proof. In a bidding war, the firm chooses an optimal split according to the inequality pi′(1−α)−
pi′(α) = 2E(b(2)− b(3)). In general, b(1)− b(2) is obviously not equal to 2E(b(2)− b(3)). In fact, in
expected values and with a uniform distribution (so E(b(k) − b(k+1)) = E(b(n))), 2E(b(2) − b(3))
is twice as large as b(1) − b(2). In other words, the bidding war introduces a larger distortion
than a perfectly-informed social planner would. 
If pi′′(·) > 0, then the social planner’s solution is to concentrate all production into one large
establishment. The firm chooses the same α in a bidding war under this condition.
This result shows that a bidding war and an informed social planner leads to a similar
allocation of production. In both cases, the establishments are differentiated. However, the
firm and the social planner get to that allocation through very different mechanisms. In the
bidding war, the firm chooses a level of differentiation to maximise the expected bids, through
infra-marginal competition. Therefore, she takes into account the distribution of the second-
and third-highest signals. The social planner, on the other hand, chooses to differentiate the
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establishments because the regions have different levels of private benefits. The planner therefore
chooses to increase investment in the large establishment, to the benefit of the region with largest
private benefits.
To illustrate the difference, let’s assume a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. In this case, with
3 regions, 2E(b(2) − b(3)) = 12 . For the social planner to choose the same level of differentiation
as the firm, there would need to be a difference of 12 between the realizations of the first two
signals, or twice the expected difference of 14 . Obviously, though, any combination of realised
signals is possible.
If the social planner did not know the exact signals, but only their distribution like the firm
does, we would have the following first-order condition:
pi′(αun)− pi′(1− αun) + E(bi)− E(bj) = 0 (2.5.3)
with i, j the two regions hosting the investment. The social planner, in this case, can do no
better than to choose two regions randomly. Since E(bi) = E(bj), the social planner chooses α
such that the marginal profits in the two establishments are equal. In other words, he chooses
the no-bidding war solution that we described earlier: α = 12 with decreasing marginal returns
to concentration, and α = 1 with increasing marginal returns to concentration.
To see how the bidding war may affect social welfare, let’s define social welfare under a
bidding war as such:
Wbw = pi(αbw) + pi(1− αbw) + αbwb(1) + (1− αbw)b(2) − γ · (s1 + s2) (2.5.4)
where γ is the marginal cost of raising public funds, the dead-weight loss incurred by the regional
governments in raising revenues to pay the subsidies. Note that the subsidies themselves are
simply transfers. Here, αbw is chosen by the firm, as in the previous sections.
Lemma 2.3. For low enough marginal costs of public funds, expected social welfare is higher
under a bidding war than under an uninformed social planner.
Proof. If we can prove that ∀α,Wbw > Wun, then we know that at the respective optimal values
of α, Wbw(αbw) > Wun(αun).
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Take an arbitrary α. Then, E [Wbw(α)] > E [Wun(α)] if and only if:
E
[
pi(α) + pi(1− α) + αb(1) + (1− α)b(2) − γ · (s1(α) + s2(α))
]
> E [pi(α) + pi(1− α)] + E(b)
E
[
αb(1) + (1− α)b(2) − γ · ((2α− 1)b(2) + 2(1− α)b(3))
]
> E(b)
m <
1
2
In the third step, we assumed, as before, that the private benefits are distributed according to a
uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Therefore, for γ < 12 , social welfare is higher, in expected terms,
under a bidding war than under an uninformed social planner. 
This result is intuitive. Suppose we must decide, as an uninformed social planner, whether
to maximise social welfare using our limited information, or let the firm conduct a bidding war.
If raising revenues is not too costly for the government (in terms of administrative costs or
distortions), then it is worthwhile to do so and achieve a better allocation of establishments to
regions. However, that result might not hold if the social planner observes the private benefits
of every region.
Lemma 2.4. Expected social welfare is always lower under a bidding war than under a perfectly-
informed social planner.
Proof. As previously, we only need to prove that ∀α, Wbw < Winf . Take an arbitrary α. Then,
E [Wbw(α)] < E [Winf (α)] if and only if:
E
[
pi(α) + pi(1− α) + αb(1) + (1− α)b(2) −m · (s1(α) + s2(α))
]
< E
[
pi(α) + pi(1− α) + αb(1) + (1− α)b(2)
]
E
[
αb(1) + (1− α)b(2) −m · ((2α− 1)b(2) + 2(1− α)b(3))
]
< E(αb(1) + (1− α)b(2))
E[−m · ((2α− 1)b(2) + 2(1− α)b(3))] < 0
Sincem > 0 and s1(α)+s2(α) ≥ 0, the previous is always true. Therefore, ∀α,Wbw < W inf . 
This result is not very surprising. A social planner with all the information can achieve
the allocation of establishments to the regions that value it the most, without the added cost
of raising public funds to pay subsidies to the firm. The previous two lemmas thus show that
social welfare under a bidding war falls under the two extreme assumptions of information for
the social planner.
94
Proposition 2.4. Social welfare under a bidding war is lower than social welfare under a
perfectly-informed social planner, but higher than under an uninformed social planner.
Proof. See Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4. 
As an example, assume that pi(α) takes the same functional form: pi(α) = α 12 . Also assume
a uniform distribution on [0, 1] Figure 2.8 shows social welfare under the three possibilities.
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
α1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
Welfare
Informed
Uninformed
Auction
Figure 2.8: Social Welfare Under Three Possibilities
Finally, the addition of prior investment in infrastructure modifies the welfare implications
of the model. Since the infrastructure costs are needed only to host the firm, the social planner
would only impose these costs once, in the winning region. In the bidding war, the number of
regions why pay the infrastructure varies. When more than one region pays the infrastructure
cost, social welfare is lower. This result follows from how we modelled infrastructure invest-
ment, which has no benefit other than allowing a region to host the firm (such as signalling
or productivity differences). Ex ante, the number of regions who pay the infrastructure cost
depends on the shape of the distribution function of private benefits.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies how bidding wars for multiple investments can influence the allocation
of investment of the firm across sites. It introduces an additional trade-off that was absent
from the first chapter of this thesis, as well as from the previous literature. In particular,
when investment quantities are endogenous, we have to consider whether their sizes affect the
infrastructure required to host the plant, and whether regions wish to make infrastructure costs
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in order to participate in the bidding war. We explore this question by building a model where
regions may have to make investment in infrastructure before participating in the bidding war,
assimilating these infrastructure costs to entry costs in an auction.
In the first chapter, we showed how a bidding war can incite a firm to differentiate her
establishments, in order to attract greater subsidies. In this chapter, we argue that by increasing
the size of one of the establishments, this establishment requires a greater level of infrastructure
to host. Consequently, regions have to pay a greater cost to participate in the bidding war,
thereby potentially reducing the number of regional governments competing for the larger plant.
In turn, when the firm increases the differentiation between her plants, she runs the risk of
driving all regions out of the bidding war, and receive lower subsidies. In the extreme case, a
firm with a production technology such that she chooses to produce in a single large plant in
the benchmark case without the prior investment in infrastructure would choose to invest in
two plants when the bidding war includes a prior stage of infrastructure investment.
The infrastructure costs in this chapter were modelled such that they allow regions who
make them to participate in the bidding war. Consequently, from the point of view of a social
planner, it is socially optimal to make this investment in infrastructure in only one region.
This conclusion differs from, e.g., Jayet and Paty (2006), who find it socially optimal to have
investment in infrastructure in many regions. Like this chapter, however, Jayet and Paty
(2006) find that in a competition between many local governments, too many localities may
pay the infrastructure cost. The difference between these models is in part due to the modelling
choice of information asymmetry. Jayet and Paty (2006) assume the opposite, such that it is
optimal to develop more than one site to increase the probability of developing at least one
high-productivity site. In this chapter, the regions have more information than the firm, and
there are no productivity differences.
The model in this chapter uses an open ascending auction. It could prove interesting to
determine whether this auction can implement the optimal mechanism, as was the case in
Chapter 1. We leave this for future research. Menezes and Monteiro (2000) show, however,
that in auctions with endogenous participation, the optimal auction features a reserve price
higher than under an auction with a fixed number of participants. In the terms of our model in
Chapter 1, then, taking endogenous entry of regions into account may have a negative impact
on social welfare; the firm would more often choose not to allocate the plants.
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Chapter 3
Diversity and Municipal Secession:
Evidence from Referendums in
Quebec1
1In the preparation of this chapter, I benefitted from helpful discussions and suggestions with Mohammad
Arzaghi, Philippe Bontems, Charlotte Cavaillé, Philippe De Donder, Dong-Hee Joe, Dominik Duell, Horracio
Larreguy, Michel Le Breton, Thierry Madiès, Mickaël Melki, Pierre-Henri Morand, Sonia Paty, Tuukka Saarimaa,
Melissa Sands, Janne Tukiainen, and Karine Van der Straeten. This chapter also benefited from interactions
in presentations at the following seminars and conferences: Workshop on Cultural Diversity at Paris School of
Economics, Public Economics seminar at Toulouse School of Economics, the 2015 Meetings of the Canadian
Economics Association, the 2015 Spring Meeting of Young Economists, the Political Economy Seminar at the
IQSS of Harvard University, the 2014 French Economics Association conference, a seminar at the VATT (Helsinki),
the 2013 European Public Choice Society conference, and a seminar at the University of Le Havre (France).
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3.1 Introduction
In recent years, several countries experienced municipal consolidation, including Canada in the
2000s, but also Japan and several European countries such as Finland and France. While central
governments promise cost savings following mergers, voters may have different priorities and
oppose them, as evidenced in the Canadian case. In fact, the economic literature on endogenous
borders often emphasises a trade-off between economies of scale and heterogeneity of preferences
(see, e.g., Alesina and Spolaore, 1997). Larger jurisdictions can more efficiently provide public
goods, but there might be a better match between the preferences of voters and the public good
in smaller jurisdictions.
However, in their study on the borders of local jurisdictions, Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby
(2004) point out that voters may dislike heterogeneity for two reasons. The first reason is the
one just mentioned: heterogeneity results in greater differences between a voter’s preferences
for public goods and those of other voters in the same town. The second reason is that voters
inherently dislike living in a jurisdiction with people different from them. In fact, Putnam
(2007) argues that people in diverse neighbourhoods “hunker down;” they have lower trust in
others and fewer friends. Other researchers have shown that the co-existence of different ethnic
groups in municipalities or communities can lead to public goods of lower quality (Alesina et
al., 1999; Algan et al., 2016), or to lower spending on social welfare (Luttmer, 2001). In other
words, voters may exhibit some loyalty towards their own ethnic group. Alesina, Baqir, and
Hoxby (2004) conclude that both channels must be effective, but their results do not distinguish
between the two. The main goal of this chapter is to determine whether only one or both
channels are present in the decisions of voters.
To do so, I use data from a set of municipal referendums in the Canadian province of
Quebec. After the provincial government unilaterally enforced a wave of municipal mergers
in 2001, public opposition led to a change of government in the following elections. Having
campaigned on the idea of reversing these mergers, the new government organized, in 2004,
simultaneous public consultations in the 213 cities that were part of the merger wave. In this
consultation process, voters were asked whether they wanted their pre-merger town to secede
from the consolidated municipality or not. In the analysis, I use the consultation results as the
dependent variable, and look at the effect of a number of socio-economic factors on whether a
town decides to secede or not. Moreover, the co-existence of two language groups in Quebec
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allows me to study how ethn-linguistic diversity affected the choice of voters. Indeed, in Quebec,
language is at the foundation of a strong “ethnic” identity.2 The mergers created by the central
government amalgamated towns with significantly different linguistic compositions. I can use
this characteristic to investigate whether greater differences in language composition resulted
in more secessions.
This chapter contributes to three literatures: the literature on municipal consolidations and
secessions, the literature on the provision of local public goods in diverse communities, and the
more general literature on secessions.
To the literature on municipal mergers, the originality of this chapter is twofold. First, my
results suggest that voters prefer homogeneous cities not only because such a city results in
a better match between their preferences and the public goods, but also because they dislike
sharing a jurisdiction with people of different ethnic backgrounds. I obtain this finding by
looking at interaction effects, based on the following argument. Indeed, while I find that both
larger language and income differences between a town and its merging partners (the other towns
part of the same consolidation or merger) are associated with an increased probability that this
town will secede from the merger, I also find that these two variables are not independent. In
particular, the effect of income differences on the probability of a town secession is stronger
when language differences are larger. The argument is as follows. If voters dislike living with
different people, they would be less likely to accept compromises on the provision of the public
goods when mixed people of other ethnicities (a reasoning similar to that of Luttmer (2001)
for social welfare spending in the US). Therefore, while voters may be more likely to vote for
a secession when faced with greater differences in income, that effect should be larger when
language differences (an important marker of ethnicity in Quebec) are larger. In other words,
individuals more readily accept having people of different incomes (and preferences) in the same
jurisdiction, and thus compromise on the composition of the public good, when these people
share a common group identity (in this case, language). This result is robust to the addition of
additional variables such as differences in house values and turnout at the referendum, and to
the choice of specification, including to the inclusion of a spatial lag.
2For historical context on language and identity in Quebec, see Taylor, Bassili and Abboud (1973) and
Thompson (1995). A more general treatment on the role of language in the formation of identity is provided in
Edwards (2009). In Spain, for example, language is a strong differentiator between Catalonia and the rest of the
country. In that region, Clots-Figueras and Masella (2012) find that individuals who had greater exposure to the
Catalan language in school had a greater probability to support regional parties. These results support the idea
that language is important in the formation of group identity. In Quebec, the French-speaking majority actually
organised two secession referendums in 1980 and 1995, from Canada as a whole.
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The second originality of this chapter compared to most of the literature on municipal bor-
ders is due to the source of the data. Indeed, by using referendums, I can study the preferences of
voters directly, instead of relying on the choices of local government officials, who may be swayed
by many different political factors. Hyytinen, Saarimaa, and Tukiainen (2014), for example,
show that politicians may vote for or against mergers based on career considerations, instead
of voter preferences. Brink (2004) uses data from public consultations in Swedish municipali-
ties. However, her dataset only includes few observations over 20 years, and the referendums
took place only in cities that officially requested one. In my chapter, the central government
itself organised 213 referendum processes, and those referendums all took place simultaneously.3
Tanguay and Wihry (2008) used data from the same events, but they do not explain why lin-
guistic diversity affects border choice. My analysis differs from theirs on three fronts. First, I
provide evidence suggesting that group loyalty is an important factor, thus providing a better
explanation of why language differences matter in these referendums. Second, I use a method
that considers the probability of actual secessions instead of the number of votes, which also
allows the use of the full sample of 213 cities instead of a reduced sample of 89 cities. Third,
I include additional variables such as house values (reflecting wealth) and political preferences,
thus refining the analysis of these referendum votes.
The use of referendums on de-mergers also presents advantage in contrast to analyses of
mergers. Indeed, I can circumvent much of the difficulties encountered by other researchers
studying municipal mergers. Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2014) explain these difficulties in depth.
In summary, the difficulty results from the impossibility to observe alternative mergers that were
not chosen. Indeed, mergers are only observed when all partners agree to it, and while all towns
can choose from multiple potential mergers, they can only choose one merger. With the inability
to observe the non-chosen mergers, it can be difficult to explain the determinants of any city’s
choice. Researchers can overcome these difficulties in different ways, such as using structural
methods (e.g., Weese, 2015), or by only looking at the end result of decades or mergers and
secessions (e.g., Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby, 2004). Di Porto, Merlin and Paty (2013) instead
look at formal cooperation agreements between municipalities in France, a version of joint public
goods provision that is less extreme than outright merger. Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2014), for
their part, create a dataset of all potential mergers in Finland, and compare the observed
3The central government opened a register for signatures simultaneously in the 213 towns that were previously
forcibly merged. Only 89 towns actually had a referendum, although the absence of a referendum can be observed
and is indicative of a low support for secession.
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mergers to potential mergers, thus changing the unit of observation from city to merger. With
data from de-merger referendums instead, the analysis is much simpler. Voters are asked to
express their opinions, choosing between only two alternatives: accept the merger, or secede
from the consolidated town. This approach also eliminates the need to look at all possible
mergers, since at the time of the referendum, these alternative mergers are irrelevant. Moreover,
the agents making the choice in my data, the voters, had no say in the prior creation of the
mergers.
I also contribute to the literature on the provision of local public goods in diverse com-
munities (see reviews by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Stichnoth and Van der Straeten
(2013)). Papers in that literature show that the amount and composition of public goods deliv-
ered in local jurisdictions, or the support for welfare spending or redistribution, depend on the
demographic make-up of the region. Cutler et al. (1993) argued that this relationship is not
explainable by Tiebout sorting, but that voters have community-dependent preferences. Later
research by, e.g., Luttmer (2001) and Lind (2007) reinforced the idea that voters care about the
identity of other people receiving the public goods (or redistribution). In other words, group
loyalty matters: individuals favour people in their group. In this chapter, I argue that this
effect could also be present in the choice of local borders. In fact, secession gives voters the
opportunity to create a more homogeneous jurisdiction in which to provide local public goods.
Finally, this chapter is also related to the study of secessions at a national level. The main
argument of that literature is that with larger jurisdictions, economies of scale lead to more
efficient provision of public goods, but smaller jurisdictions can provide a bundle closer to the
citizens’ preferences (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Bolton and Roland, 1997). That trade-off is
also at play in the work of Oates (1972) on fiscal federalism. There are some differences between
municipal and national secessions. For example, the rules in the referendums studied in this
chapter were clear, thus reducing the uncertainty usually present in national referendums. Also,
since local governments are relatively smaller spenders, the stakes could be lower in the minds
of some voters. That being said, the arguments of the secession literature are still relevant for
municipalities. In fact, while the formal model of Alesina and Spolaore (1997) considers the
number of countries, it also applies to lower levels of government. Therefore, if I find that group
identity plays a role in small jurisdictions, it could certainly play a role in regional secessions.4
4In the case of regions seeking autonomy from a state, the attachment to a national identity is often very
clear. For example, in 2012, 69 per cent of persons living in Scotland declared they either felt “Scottish not
British,” or “more Scottish than British” (Park et al., 2013). That sense of belonging to the Scottish identity
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The next section reviews a selection of the literature related to the work in this chapter,
including other works on the factors leading to municipal mergers and de-mergers, both from
the point of view of governments and voters. It also discusses in greater detail how diversity
plays a role in the provision of public goods, and how it may also affect votes on local borders.
Section 3 provides some context on the municipal organization in Quebec, and the policies that
led to these referendums. Section 4 presents the general empirical strategy of this chapter,
along with the variables included in the analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical results, while
Section 6 provides some robustness checks. The last section concludes.
3.2 Municipal Consolidations: Economies of Scale, Heterogene-
ity of Preferences, and Diversity
To provide some context for my empirical analysis, this section reviews a selection of papers
on municipal consolidations, highlighting the factors that lead to mergers (or the opposition
to them). It then reviews some theoretical and empirical evidence about the effect of ethnic
diversity on the provision of public goods, to explain how ethnic diversity may also affect
municipal borders.
3.2.1 Empirical Analyses of Municipal Mergers and De-Mergers
The study of municipal consolidations is closely linked to the question of the optimal size of
jurisdictions. Oates (1972) and Alesina and Spolaore (1997), in particular, discuss the trade-
off involved in determining the size of jurisdictions. On the one hand, larger jurisdictions
bring economies of scale in the provision of public goods. However, on the other hand, larger
jurisdictions are also accompanied by a greater heterogeneity of preferences for public goods.
This trade-off drives a large part of the literature on municipal mergers. For example, Alesina,
Baqir and Hoxby (2004) find that “there is strong evidence that people are willing to sacrifice
economies of scale in order to avoid racial heterogeneity in their local jurisdiction.” They
also find some evidence, albeit weaker, for a trade-off between economies of scale and income
heterogeneity. They do so by analysing how the number of local jurisdictions (e.g., school
districts) in US counties vary according to different measures of heterogeneity.
Their result considers the end result of many decades of mergers, annexations, and seces-
was certainly one factor pushing for the organization of the secession referendum in 2014.
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sions.5 In an earlier paper, Nelson (1990) uses a similar approach with the number of local
governments in about 300 metropolitan areas in the US. He finds that income, race, and age
heterogeneity increases the number of local jurisdictions. In contrast to these two papers, my
dataset allows for a direct investigation of voter preferences in specific referendums.
Other papers instead study specific examples of municipal border modifications. They differ
on two important dimensions. Some study events of municipal mergers, while others are inter-
ested in de-mergers. Also, some study the choices of elected officials, while others are interested
in the preferences of voters. Table 3.1 shows a classification of a selection of papers according
to these two dimensions.
Table 3.1: Selection of Papers on Municipal/Local Jurisdiction Consolidations
Mergers De-Mergers
Analysis of Elected Officials Weese (2015)a n.a.
Choices (or implied) Saarimaa and Tukiainien (2014)
Hanes et al. (2009)
Sorensen (2006)
Brasington (1999, 2003)
Austin (1999)
Analysis of Voter Choices Miyazaki (2014)b Tanguay and Wihry (2008)
Brink (2004)
Current chapter
a Weese (2015) uses data from Japanese municipal mergers. Some of these mergers included direct
voter consolidations, but those are not used specifically in his paper. Miyazakz (2014) studies these
referendums directly.
b Miyazaki (2014) studies results of voter referendums in Japan, although they were technically non-
binding.
In this chapter, I consider specific instances of de-mergers of municipalities. In that respect,
my analysis is more closely linked to the works of Brink (2004) and Tanguay and Wihry (2008).
Brink (2004) studies a set of municipal referendums that took place in Swedish municipali-
ties between 1977 and 1999. She finds that wealthier neighbourhoods are more likely to vote
for secession. Her results, however, are based on only few referendums that were specifically
requested by citizens of the voting municipalities, spread over two decades. Moreover, the ref-
erendum results had to be approved and accepted by the central government (i.e., the results
were non-binding).
The referendums in Quebec are thus unique. They took place simultaneously, were numer-
5In their paper, Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2004) also use panel data that features exogenous variation in
the level of diversity due to migration of Blacks from the South to the North during the World Wars. With these
data, they are able to argue for a causal estimate of diversity on the number of jurisdictions. They find that
counties that were affected by the Black Migration had, on average, more districts after the two world wars.
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ous, and the results were binding. Tanguay and Wihry (2008) recognized the uniqueness of
these referendums and analysed the results. They find that more individuals vote for secession
in towns that: spent different amounts on public goods than their merging partners, have differ-
ent median incomes, and have different linguistic compositions. However, they did not explain
why ethnic differences may affect voters’ decisions on municipal borders. In this chapter, I will
address this issue, and provide some evidence that ethnic groups do not matter only because
they have different preferences for the public goods, but also because of a “group loyalty” effect.
More precisely, I show that individuals more readily accept having people of different incomes in
the same jurisdiction when these people share a common group identity (in this case, language).
Furthermore, my analysis will focus on the probability to secede, instead of the share of votes
for secession, thus using the full sample of 213 referendums, in contrast to the 89 in Tanguay
and Wihry (2008). I also show that this distinction can be important. Because of the minimum
turnout rule, the definition of the dependent variable affects the results.
This work is also related to papers analysing specific examples of municipal mergers. One
example is the work of Miyazaki (2014), who studies the municipal mergers that took place in
Japan in the early 2000s. These mergers were decided locally, but many localities organised
referendums to approve consolidation before implementing them. Miyazaki finds that consoli-
dations were more successful when accompanied by an increase in the efficiency of public goods
provision, indicating that voters take economies of scale into account. He also finds that grants
from the central government play a role (although Weese (2015) shows that in the Japanese
case, these transfers were too low to attain the optimal number of mergers). The referendums
in Japan, however, were not mandatory and were non-binding.
Table 3.1 shows that many of the past analyses rely on the choices of elected officials.
However, politicians may have considerations other than voter welfare when choosing borders.
Hyytinen, Saarimaa, and Tukiainen (2014), for example, show how politicians may vote for
or against mergers based on career considerations, which may conflict with voter preferences.
Since I am interested in the preferences of voters regarding local borders, my analysis on voter
referendums is more appropriate.
Hanes et al. (2009), like Brink (2004), use data from Swedish municipalities, but from
the 1950s, and where decisions were taken by elected officials instead. After a national policy
of (state-imposed) municipal mergers, individual municipalities were given the opportunity to
comment on the final merger, expressing their approval of or opposition to the amalgamation.
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They find a quadratic effect of population size: small and large municipalities are more likely to
accept the merger. Small cities may have more to gain from a merger in terms of economies of
scale, while large municipalities have the less to lose in terms of loss of control. Medium-sized
cities, however, may have only limited potential gains from economies of scale and somewhat
large costs in terms of loss of control. They find only limited evidence for an effect of income
(richer cities more likely to accept), but no effect from income differences between a town and
the merger.
In contrast to the papers by Miyazaki (2014) and Hanes et al. (2009), empirical analyses of
municipal consolidations are often complicated due to the matching process between municipal-
ities. Saarimaa and Tukiainien (2014) point out the difficulties encountered in their own work
as well as that of others. In particular, studying mergers directly requires analysing a two-sided
decision. Localities can usually merge with any of their neighbours, but we only observe the
merger with the partner(s) they chose. Furthermore, these neighbours themselves choose their
own partners, and a merger including a large number of cities can be blocked by one potential
partner, thus changing the set of choices for the whole region.
Saarimaa and Tukiainien (2014) solve this problem by creating the set of all possible (realis-
tic) mergers, and conducting the analysis at the merger level. They find officials were less likely
to implement mergers when it would imply a greater geographic distance between the median
voter of the merger (calculated using GIS data) and the likely administrative centre (the largest
city). In this way, the mergers implemented were somewhat in line with voter preferences.
Expenditure heterogeneity is another important predictor of mergers in their analysis, while
income heterogeneity does not affect the probability of a merger. Another interesting finding is
that voters do not seem to look for economies of scale in mergers, although this result may be
due to existing cooperation among many towns prior to mergers.
Brasington (1999, 2003) looks at cooperation for the provision of public schooling, and uses
a bivariate Probit to account for the correlation between neighbouring districts’ decision to
cooperate. Notably, Brasington (2003) finds that the race composition of communities affects
who they will cooperate with. For example, he finds that whiter communities are more likely to
cooperate with less white communities, as long as incomes are similar. More precisely, whiter
communities are less likely to cooperate with both richer and poorer non-white communities. In
contrast to Brasington, my analysis will consider the actual decisions of voters, and not those
of officials. Also, it will examine decisions on outright mergers at the municipality level, instead
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of collaboration on specific topics such as schooling.
Sorensen (2006) relies instead on answers to a questionnaire administered to mayors and
local officials in Norway. This survey measures the preferences of these official for mergers with
their neighbours. He relies, like previous papers, on the trade-off between economies of scale
and preference heterogeneity. He finds that support for mergers increases as efficiency gains
are larger, but also that officials from richer towns are less likely to favour merger with poorer
neighbours. He measures differences in preferences using differences in political party prefer-
ences, finding that towns with dissimilar party preferences are less likely to merge. However,
he is also interested in political factors and the effect of grants from central governments. In
particular, generous central government grants are an impediment to voluntary mergers. Also,
officials of small towns are less likely to support mergers, possibly because they expect positions
of lower prestige and importance in merged entities.
Other authors turn to structural methods to solve the many empirical difficulties. Weese
(2015) uses data from a wave of consolidation of Japanese municipalities. He estimates a struc-
tural model, and finds that the number of mergers was sub-optimal, probably due to financial
incentives from the central government that were to weak. One advantage of a structural method
is the ability to conduct counter-factual simulations. In an earlier version of his paper, Weese
ran such simulations, finding that providing financial incentives only to the municipalities that
are most opposed to mergers (the richest) can increase welfare. Gordon and Knight (2009)
also use a structural method to analyse the factors that led to school district consolidations in
the state of Iowa in the 1990s. However, as pointed out by Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2014),
structural approaches also have drawbacks. Indeed, it is impossible to use natural experiments
for causal analysis, and the included set of covariates is necessarily limited.
In the US, many municipal consolidations happen through annexations of suburbs by central
municipalities. Austin (1999) studies these annexations and finds that, contrary to popular
belief, city politicians do not mainly use annexations to increase their fiscal base. Instead,
political factors play a larger role. Indeed, he finds that annexations are motivated by a desire
to offset the change in the cities’ demographic composition arising from the migration of poorer
people to the inner cities, and of richer people to the suburbs. Austin (1999) also notes that
race did play a small role in annexations, although politicians did not simply annex white
neighbourhoods per se. However, the annexations did result in an increase in the ratio of white
people in the new city, thus diluting the political power of non-whites.
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3.2.2 Diversity and Local Public Goods
Racial or ethnic composition is a common factor in many of the papers cited above. Notably,
Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2004) mention the idea that citizens may dislike interacting with
others of different ethnic backgrounds. For example, voters may dislike redistribution or social
welfare spending when the beneficiaries of such spending are of a different race. Luttmer (2001)
finds some evidence for this reasoning in the United States. In a similar fashion, ethnic diversity
may also affect municipal borders. If voters dislike interacting with people of different ethnic
backgrounds, they may choose more homogeneous towns.
The goal of this chapter is not to review the whole literature on the subject of diversity
and public goods. For a more exhaustive survey, one should consult the reviews of Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005), and Stichnoth and Van der Straeten (2013). Important contributions
include that of Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999), who find that ethnic fragmentation in local
jurisdictions leads to a lower provision of productive public goods. Similarly, Luttmer (2001)
uses micro-data in the United States to show that preferences for welfare spending depend on
the race of others in their neighbourhood. In particular, people increase their support for welfare
spending when the share of welfare recipients in their own race group increases. The author
notes that race in itself is not the driver of his results. The identification of individuals to this
group is the driving factor. In fact, the result could be replicated using, for example, religious
groups, if these are important to the community. In the case of Québec, language should be an
important defining characteristic.
Other papers looking at diversity and local public goods include one by Alesina and La
Ferrara (2002), who find that higher levels of heterogeneity in race and income in a community
are associated with low levels of interpersonal trust in that community. More recently, Algan,
Hémet and Laitin (2016) use a natural experiment in France to show that the quality of local
public goods depends negatively on the diversity among adjacent neighbourhoods. Li (2010)
studies national public goods, but finds that ethnic heterogeneity in a country lowers “tax
morale,” such that tax collection is costlier, in turn affecting the performance of the public
sector.
Lind (2007) and Flamand (2015) make arguments similar to the one in this chapter, but
on the subject of redistribution. Flamand (2015) argues that redistribution is hindered in
centralised economies when group loyalty is important, since richer individuals are less likely
to support it. In that argument, the focus is on the fact that individuals are more altruistic
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towards people of their own ethnic group. This argument is also supported by the findings of
Fong and Luttmer (2009, 2011) on how race affects charity donations. Similarly, in experimental
economics, a large number of papers, including those Chakravarty and Fonseca (2012) and
Ahmed (2007), show that individuals show preferences for people of their own group. These
results also relate to the theory of social identity, developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) and,
more recently, by Akerlof and Kranton (2000).
In this chapter, I argue that if individuals are altruistic towards their own ethnic group (i.e.,
exhibit group loyalty), they will more readily accept their town being merged with towns of
similar ethnic composition. Indeed, merging usually translates in a modification of the local
government policies, since it changes the composition of the voting population. For example,
the new merged town may include poorer people with different public policy priorities. These
compromises in public spending should be more readily accepted, and the merger supported,
if the merged town is homogeneous on the ethnic dimension, in the same way that rich people
accept greater welfare spending when the recipients are of the same ethnic group (as in Luttmer,
2001).
3.3 Institutional Context: Municipalities in Quebec and the
Rules Governing the Referendums
In 2000, there were around 1300 municipalities6 in the Canadian province of Quebec. Out of
those municipalities, only five counted more than 100,000 inhabitants, while 552 included less
than 1,000. The Census Metropolitan Agglomeration (CMA)7 of Montreal, the largest city in
the province, included over 100 municipalities (with about half of the provincial population).
In that CMA, but also across the province, one concern of the provincial government was the
disparity in tax rates between the core city and the periphery. In theirWhite Book that preceded
the reform, the provincial government writes that in Montreal, property taxes amounted to 2.12
dollars per 100 dollars of property evaluation, while they amounted to 1.88 dollars on average
in the periphery municipalities (Government of Quebec, 2000).
As in many places around the world, politicians (both at the municipal and provincial levels)
were discussing the possibility of municipal mergers in order to provide public services more
6Municipalities in Quebec include towns, cities, villages, etc. In this chapter, I will use these terms inter-
changeably, as my focus is not on the differences between these categories.
7A statistical area defined as the main city along with all fringe municipalities to which it is closely integrated
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efficiently. While some municipalities willingly decided to merge, the provincial government
decided to merge other municipalities without consulting citizens. In particular, in 2001, it
created in this way 42 new municipalities out of 213 towns. The mergers were very different in
size, ranging from only 2 towns to 26 of them in Montreal, and from about 600 individuals to
over 1.8 million in population.
In some of these mergers, part of the population disapproved of this policy. When a new
government was elected in 2003, they promised to hold a referendum in every municipality that
was merged without consultation. This new government kept its promise, and put in place
a process to hold secession referendums in 2004 for all of the 213 ex-towns that were part of
the wave of forced mergers. This section will describe the referendum process in detail, after
providing some broader institutional context for those referendums.
Municipalities in Quebec are responsible for a range of local public services. These services
include police and fire protection, local roads, water treatment and waste management, libraries,
parks, cultural events, urbanism, public transport, and local economic development. To pro-
vide these services, municipalities collect a property tax as well as service fees (e.g., for public
transport). They may also receive transfers from higher levels of government. Of particular
interest to this chapter is that these transfers depend on population size. In fact, the provin-
cial government argued in their White Book that municipalities avoided merging on their own
specifically to avoid losing transfers once they passed to 5,000 population mark (Government
of Quebec, 2000:22). In that case forced mergers seemed like a good solution.
Even before 2001, governments have realized the need for some regional cohesion in public
services provision. Especially in more rural regions, municipalities are grouped by region in
“counties” or MRC (in French: Municipalités régionales de comté). The governments of these
MRC are composed of politicians from the constituent towns, instead of being directly elected by
the general population. In the three largest urban areas (Montreal, Quebec, Outaouais), there
were, before 2001, similar arrangements although with different names. Still, some politicians
pushed for greater collaboration, and in 2001, the provincial government decided to go ahead
and organize the wave of mergers described above. It created single municipalities for the largest
agglomerations in the province, and created mergers from other smaller municipalities across
the territory.8
8A map of mergers can be found on the website of the provincial government, in French, at
http://www.mamrot.gouv.qc.ca/pub/organisation_municipale/cartotheque/Projet_loi_9.pdf.
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Since the mergers were done without public consultation, citizens in many towns felt slighted
by the government. Keen to capitalize on that public anger, the opposition party decided to
campaign, in the 2003 provincial elections that followed, on the idea of organizing referendums
in every town merged without consultation. They eventually won the election, and a year later,
announced the rules for these consultations.
These rules were as follows. To have a referendum, ten per cent of the voters registered in
the previously-existing town had to sign a public register. Out of the 213 municipalities included
in the merger wave, 89 met that condition. Then, for the referendum to be successful, at least
35 per cent of registered voters had to cast a vote in favour of secession (thus introducing a
minimum participation criterion). Furthermore, for separation to occur, at least 50 per cent
of votes cast plus one had to be in favour of separation. Out of the 89 referendums organized
in the province, 31 met both criteria and were re-constituted.9 If there had been no minimum
participation criterion, almost twice as many towns would have seceded (58 of them voted in
favour of secession including those in which turnout was too low).
In the agglomerations where there was at least one re-constitution, a new governance struc-
ture, an agglomeration council, was put in place (this structure was planned before the refer-
endums, and known by voters). Therefore, a positive answer to the referendum did not lead
to a complete severing of the ties between the reconstituted town and the agglomeration. The
agglomeration council is constituted of representatives from the central municipality (the part
of the merger left unchanged by the referendums) and towns that were re-constituted, in pro-
portion to their respective populations. The agglomeration (through the central municipality)
is responsible for services including police, fire protection, municipal courts, water purification
and distribution up to the local systems, maintenance of main roads, tourism, and elimination
of waste. Re-constituted towns keep local services such as libraries, the urbanism plan and
delivery of construction permits, local water distribution, local waste collection, local roads,
and sports and culture installations. A special arrangement was also planned for Montreal. In
that city, a number of boroughs (“arrondissements”) were created to oversee neighbourhood
services in places that had not separated. However, these sub-governments function mostly
with transfers from the central municipal government.10
9When only some of the towns in a merger successfully secedes, the other towns part of the same merger stay
merged.
10Some of them levy special local taxes, or fees for specific services. However, these are minor compared to
municipal taxes.
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3.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
In an earlier section, we saw how municipal consolidations can be difficult to analyse empirically.
Fortunately, the sequence of events that led to the referendums in Quebec simplifies the analysis.
Two features of the data explain how my analysis can rely on simpler methods. First, in contrast
to municipal mergers elsewhere, in Quebec they were imposed by a higher level of government
in an authoritarian fashion, instead of decided by local officials. Second, voters had to decide
between only two options: either they accepted or opposed the already-realised merger. For
these reasons, and due to the observations being at the level of pre-merger towns, I do not need
to account for the problem of two-sided decisions described earlier. Another advantage of the
dataset in this chapter is that it allows an analysis of voter decisions, instead of relying on the
choices of governments.
The results from these public consultations11 thus provide a relatively large dataset of votes
for or against de-mergers. Furthermore, these data can be combined with data from the 2001
Canadian Census Community Profiles (at the Census Sub-Division level) to obtain a detailed
socio-economic portrait of every town before the merger events. This section describes the
empirical methods and describes the data and variables included in the analysis.
3.4.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the analysis is the results of the referendums in each pre-merger
town (N = 213). I choose a binary variable indicating the outcome of the consultation process,
constructed as such:
Separation =

0 if a town stayed in the merger
1 if a town seceded
For example, if a town does not gather the 10 per cent of signatures required for a referendum,
the dependent variable would be equal to 0. The definition of this variable implicitly assumes
that if a town did not manage to gather the number of signatures required, the referendum
would have failed if one had been held.12
11Available from the Ministry of Municipalities, at http://www.mamrot.gouv.qc.ca/organisation-
municipale/historique/consultation-sur-la-reorganisation-territoriale/registres/, and from Elections Quebec,
at http://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca/english/tables/result-referendum-2004.php.
12However, there are several other possible ways to measure the results. Appendix 3.6.4 presents results using
a categorical variable. Another definition is the share of votes in favour of secession in the referendum. However,
that variable only exists in the 89 municipalities that actually had a referendum, so the econometric estimations
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In the analysis below, I estimate a simple linear probability model (i.e., OLS), as well as
a more sophisticated Probit model. The electoral results are provided by Quebec’s General
Director of Elections. I estimate both models with robust standard errors clustered by merger.
For the Probit estimations, unless noted otherwise, I report the marginal effects
3.4.2 Description of the Independent Variables Included in the Analysis
For the socio-economic data, I collect data from the most recent Canadian Census that took
place before the merger wave (namely, the 2001 Community Profiles at the level of Census
Subdivisions), as well as data from the Ministry of Municipalities (data on municipal budgets)
and Elections Canada (federal election results). I use these data to paint a portrait of each town
involved in the merger wave, before it took place.13 The choice of variables is driven by the
theory on secessions and previous empirical analyses of municipal mergers, as described above.
Socio-Economic Characteristics
First, I include variables that may capture differences in the preferences for public goods. As
in earlier papers, I thus include differences in income, language, etc. These characteristics may
indeed be correlated with preferences for public goods.14 The analysis in this chapter will
focus mostly on income and language, but robustness tests will include heterogeneity in other
characteristics such as education levels.
To measure income differences between a pre-merger town and its merging partners, I cal-
culate the following variable for each town i in a merger with towns j ∈ {1, ..., n}:
Diff. Median Incomei =
∣∣∣∣MedianIncomei −
∑
j 6=i Populationj ·MedianIncomej∑
j 6=i Populationj
∣∣∣∣
This variable captures the degree to which a town differs from the others in the same merger
in terms of median income.15 Since it is in absolute value, it will take the same value for a
richer and a poorer town, only capturing the degree of heterogeneity between a town and the
rest of the merger. In the analysis, I also include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the town
would suffer from sample selection. It is possible to solve this problem using a sample selection model, but the
main analysis would still only include 89 data points. Tanguay and Wihry (2008) chose to use this method.
13Data are missing for some of the 213 municipalities, so estimations actually include fewer observations. See
Table 3.2 for details.
14See Appendix 3.A for some results on the correlation of socio-economic characteristics and the level of
spending, both for all municipalities in Quebec and restricted to those in the sample.
15More precisely, I use individual total income.
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has a lower median income than the average of median incomes in the agglomeration. This
variable should help understand whether there is a “rich town effect,” according to which richer
communities are the ones opting for secession.
Since taxes at the municipal level are applied on house values, and not income, it may be
interesting to include differences in house values instead of median income. In fact, controlling
for differences in the value of the tax base (i.e., house values) may help isolate the preferences
effect of income differences from a tax base effect. More specifically, we could suspect that rich
towns (often on the periphery) might oppose mergers to avoid tax increases, for example. For
this reason, I create a variable similar to the one for income, but instead using the average value
of houses in each pre-merger town. However, I do not calculate that variable in absolute value,
since I want to capture whether rich towns (in terms of the tax base) are the ones seceding.16
To measure the differences in language composition, I take the same approach, with the
percentage of English speakers in each town:
Diff. % English-Speakingi =
∣∣∣∣ShareEnglishi −
∑
j 6=i Populationj · ShareEnglishj∑
j 6=i Populationj
∣∣∣∣
This variable captures the difference between the share of English-speakers in the municipality
and the weighted average share in the rest of the merged agglomeration. I also include an
indicator variable equal to 1 if the share of English speakers is larger in the town than in the
merger (i.e., the town is more English-speaking than the average of its partners in the merger).
In addition to income and language, I also include data, constructed in a similar way, on
the percentage of university-educated people, visible minorities, recent migrants (past 5 years)
from elsewhere in the province, as well as on the unemployment rate and inequality (measured
crudely by the ratio of average to median income). These variables all account for some potential
preference heterogeneity between individuals of different municipalities.
Control Variables
In Quebec, political parties are mostly absent from local politics, except in bigger cities in
recent years. For that reason, it is virtually impossible to compare the political alignment of
local politicians in different cities. However, it is still possible that voters in different cities
have different political preferences, more generally. Moreover, these preferences are probably
16In the interest of completeness, robustness checks indicate that in absolute value, this variable has no effect
on probability to secede. Results are not reported, but are available from the author.
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highly correlated with other characteristics such as language composition. Therefore, I control
for political preferences using electoral results at the federal level, in each pre-merger town.
First, I take voting results at the level of voting district17 in the 2000 federal elections, which
took place before the merger events. These data are available from Elections Canada. Then, I
aggregate these results by pre-merger town to obtain the political preferences of each town. In
Quebec in 2000, two federal parties dominated the results: the Bloc Quebecois and the Liberal
Party.18 To measure the differences in political preferences between a pre-merger town and its
merging partners, I calculate the following variable, with %BQ the share of the vote going to
the Bloc Quebecois:
Diff. % BQi =
∣∣∣∣%BQi −
∑
j 6=i Populationj ·%BQj∑
j 6=i Populationj
∣∣∣∣
Differences in preferences for public goods could translate in different levels of spending
in pre-merger towns. Therefore, differences in the spending level between municipalities could
affect the probability of municipal secession. In addition, these differences are likely to be
correlated with income differences, for example. To measure differences in spending levels, I
use financial data from municipalities in 2001, before the mergers, on total public spending. I
then calculate a variable similar to the ones for income and language, using the total amount
of spending per capita:
Diff. Public Spendingi =
∣∣∣∣SpendingPerCapitai −
∑
j 6=i Populationj · SpendingPerCapitaj∑
j 6=i Populationj
∣∣∣∣
It is also possible that the differences in public goods preferences are completely captured by
the previous variables (e.g., language and income). In that case, I might not find
Any discussion of public spending is incomplete without a discussion on taxes (or revenues).
Voters may be more reluctant to vote for secession if they expect tax increases (all else being
equal). Tax increases could reflect the loss of economies of scale due to the smaller size of the
re-constituted town. However, variations can also reflect, for example, debt incurred during the
period in which the merger existed that will become the responsibility of a re-constituted town
(if that debt was incurred for local goods). Nevertheless, that variable could play an important
role in the voters’ decision, and should be included in the analysis if possible.
17Each electoral riding at the federal level, which includes several towns, is made up of a large number of
voting districts.
18On average, in my data, these two parties together represent 87% of the municipal vote share.
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Fortunately, when it organized the referendums, the central government also mandated pri-
vate consultant firms with the task of estimating the tax increase or decrease that an average
household would experience in the re-constituted municipality. In doing so, these firms estimate
how much an average voter would pay in tax to the agglomeration (basically the central town
still responsible for part of the public goods) and to the re-constituted town (including referen-
dum and transition costs, debt sharing, and re-assignment of current spending to re-constituted
towns), and calculated the difference between that total and the taxes paid before the referen-
dum. These estimates are certainly imperfect, but they were made available to all voters before
the referendums. In my estimations, I use the estimated tax increase or decrease predicted after
five years, in percentage.19
So far, the discussion in this section focused on one side of the traditional trade-off between
closeness of preferences and economies of scale. It can be more difficult, however, to analyse
the impact of potential economies of scale on voting for secession. Larger municipalities may
benefit more from economies of scale, but population size is only an imperfect measure (two
towns of the same size may have different abilities to benefit from these economies of scale).
In any case, the process governing the reconstitution of former towns is such that even when
secession takes place, citizens in seceded towns still benefit from economies of scale, since some
public goods are to be provided by the central city. Despite these considerations, the analysis
will include some variables controlling for the size of jurisdictions.
First, I simply include the population of every pre-merger town. Second, I calculate the
share of the agglomeration’s population for each constituent town. Third, I include the size of
the largest town in each merger. The last two variables may control for the loss of representation
that might be experienced by a smaller town merged with other larger towns.
The geographical distance between the municipality and the merger’s central town may also
influence the choice of voters. This variable may have effects both on efficiency gains and on
the heterogeneity of preferences. Indeed, as municipalities are farther away, their needs may
differ. Efficiency gains are also probably lower, because public services have to be delivered
in a larger geographical area. Both explanations point in the same direction: a more distant
town should be more likely to secede from the agglomeration. I calculate distance using the
19More details on these studies are available, in French, at the following address:
http://www.mamrot.gouv.qc.ca/organisation-municipale/historique/consultation-sur-la-reorganisation-
territoriale/etudes/.
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geographical location (latitude and longitude)20 of every town in my sample, and measuring the
distance between each pre-merger town and the location of the core municipality of the merged
agglomeration.21 In addition to distance, I also include population density to account for the
rural, urban or suburban composition of the municipalities.
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics for the variables described in this section.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
N Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
Secession 213 0.146 0.353 0 1
Turnout in Referendum 89 53.357 11.494 31.010 98.000
% of Yes Votes in Referendum 89 32.213 13.695 10.500 74.000
% of Signatures in the Register 213 10.643 12.459 0.000 79.167
Diff. Median Income (thousands) 204 3.649 3.344 0.046 18.156
Diff. % English-Speaking 211 5.514 10.894 0.008 83.906
Larger Proportion English-Speaking 211 0.469 0.500 0 1
Poorer than merging partners (in median income) 204 0.422 0.495 0 1
Median Income 207 21811.627 4838.157 11591 38537
Diff. House Values (thousands) 211 4.386 50.476 -181.745 387.626
Diff. % of Votes for Bloc Québécois 206 6.159 6.913 0.001 35.693
Delta Public Spending per Capita (thousands) 206 0.521 0.992 0.003 9.500
Tax Impact (5 years) 210 7.440 16.430 -37.100 94.000
Distance to core city 209 12.356 15.602 0.000 165.147
Population Density 212 746.525 1294.063 0.150 7551.942
Population in 2001 212 19835.307 74228.950 35 1039534
Share of merger population 212 19.811 24.190 0.054 95.481
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) 213 172.694 340.808 0.402 1039.534
Diff. Median Age 209 3.012 2.141 0.003 12.308
Diff. Unemployment Rate 211 3.397 4.082 0.080 28.912
Diff. % of Visible Minorities 211 2.064 3.932 0.000 21.071
Diff. % University-Educated 208 6.229 6.557 0.062 34.452
Delta Recent Intra-Provincial Migrants 208 4.387 4.170 0.014 20.656
Delta Inequality (Average over Median Income) 201 0.110 0.099 0.001 0.679
3.4.3 Estimation Strategy and Hypotheses
With the variables described above, I estimate equations based on the following (for OLS):
Secessioni = β0 + β1(Diff. Median Incomei) + β2Ii(Poorer)
+ β3(Diff. % English-Speakingi) + β4Ii(More English-Speaking)
+ xi · γ + ui
20The geographical location of a municipality is approximated by its centroid.
21While the core municipality is often in the geographic centre, it is not always the case. The core municipality
is identified in government documents, and is usually the one including the business core. In rare cases where it
was not clearly identified, I assume that the largest town in terms of population is the core municipality.
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where Ii(·) represents the indicator function (takes values 1 or 0) for observation i. Estimations
will differ by the control variables included in X and the estimation method (OLS or Probit).
I am interested in the effects of language and income differences on the decision to secede.
Based on the literature on secessions (e.g., Alesina and Spolaore, 1997), I will test the following
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3.1. Larger differences in income between a town and the rest of the merger
increase the probability that the town secedes. In addition, richer towns have a greater probability
of secession.
Hypothesis 3.2. Larger differences in language between a town and the rest of the merger
increase the probability that the town secedes. In addition, more English-speaking towns have a
greater probability of secession.
Indeed, I expect a positive effect of these two variables on secession. As voters experience
more heterogeneity in the merged jurisdiction, they will prefer to secede. Intuition would also
predict that towns that are more English-speaking than the average of the other towns in the
merger would secede more, and that towns that are poorer (richer) would secede less (more).
Median income could capture two distinct effects: richer periphery towns want to secede
to avoid facing higher tax rates, and people of different incomes are likely to have different
priorities concerning public goods. Since the tax rates in the sample municipalities are defined
on the value of houses, I could measure the effect of income differences net of the “tax base
effect.” First, I expect that towns with larger average house values are more likely to secede, to
avoid higher tax rates.
Hypothesis 3.3.A. Towns with larger house values than the rest of the merger secede more
often.
Second, I expect the effect of income differences to be robust to the addition of differences
in house values, thus capturing the preferences effect.
Hypothesis 3.3.B. The effect of income differences is robust to the addition of differences in
house values.
Explaining the Effect of Diversity: Interaction Terms
If I find a significant effect of differences in socio-economic characteristics on votes for secession,
there are at least two possible explanations for it. One is that these differences translate into
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differences in preferences for public goods. The other (possibly complementary) explanation
is that voters care about the identity of people living in their jurisdiction. To investigate this
second possibility, I will refine the analysis using interaction terms between the two variables of
income and language differences. If voters vote according to some group loyalty component, the
effects of language and income differences should depend on one another. The main idea behind
this argument is that if people identify with others according to one dimension (say, language),
they would be more willing to compromise on preferences related to other dimensions (say,
income) when grouped with similar people in terms of their identity.
In this chapter, I argue that language is an important group marker, given the importance of
that characteristic in Canada, and especially in Quebec. The territory of Quebec was colonized
by both the French and the English more than 400 years ago, and is still characterized today
by the co-existence of these two language groups. Although violent conflict mostly disappeared
today, some animosity still exists between them, and people still identify (to different degrees)
with their linguistic group (Thomson, 1995; Edwards, 2009). Moreover, debates regularly take
place on the validity of the language laws in place to protect the French language (e.g., on the
size of French writing on commercial signs). In 1980 and 1995, the province itself organised two
referendums to secede from Canada, and language was an important aspect of the secessionist
movement.
Interaction Terms
Therefore, in the first estimations, I include an interaction term between income and language
differences, both defined as in the previous section.
Secessioni = β0 + β1(Diff. Median Incomei) + β2(Diff. % English-Speakingi)
+ β3(Diff. Median Incomei) · (Diff. % English-Speakingi)
+ β4Ii(Poorer) + β5Ii(More English-Speaking)
+ xi · γ + ui
If I do not find a significant interaction term, then preferences alone might explain the result.
However, if I do find a significant interaction term, preferences alone could not explain the
results. Instead, it would suggest that voters exhibit group loyalty. In summary, I test the
following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 3.4. There is a significant and positive interaction effect between income and
language differences.
A positive interaction term reflects the fact that voters in towns merged with partners similar
on one dimension (e.g., small differences in language) should be more willing to compromise on
a second dimension. Therefore, the effect of the latter dimension on the probability of secession
would be lower at small levels of the former.
Threshold Effects
Another way to look at this question is by using threshold values for language (income) differ-
ences, to test whether the effect of income (language) differences is different below and above
the threshold. To do so, I split the cities in categories using two binary variables. The first
equals 1 if the town is characterized by small language differences, and 0 otherwise (I will refer
to this variable as the small language differences indicator). The second is calculated similarly,
but using income differences (I will refer to this variable as the small income differences indica-
tor). Defining the cut-off for large or small differences is not obvious, so I use two definitions
for robustness. In particular, I define the cut-off either at the average or median difference for
the variable of interest for the whole set of observations.22 Using these two indicator variables,
I estimate two additional models.
In the first model, I include income differences as defined in previous sections (continuous
variable), but instead of the continuous language differences, I include the small language dif-
ferences indicator. The model then includes an interaction term between that dummy variable
and the continuous income differences variable.
Secessioni = β0 + β1(Diff. Median Incomei) + β2Ii(Small Language Diff.)
+ β3(Diff. Median Incomei) · Ii(Small Language Diff.)
+ β4Ii(Poorer) + β5Ii(More English-Speaking)
+ xi · γ + ui
That model will allow a comparison of the effect of income differences between two groups of
cities: those with large differences in language and those with small differences.
22For income differences, the mean is 3.65 thousands and the median 2.81 thousands. For language differences,
the mean is 5.51 percentage points and the median 1.08 percentage points.
119
The second model will include language differences as a continuous variable, but instead
will include income differences as a dichotomous variable: large or small income differences, as
defined earlier.
Secessioni = β0 + β1Ii(Small Income Diff.i) + β2(Diff. % English-Speakingi)
+ β3Ii(Small Income Diff.i) · (Diff. % English-Speakingi)
+ β4Ii(Poorer) + β5Ii(More English-Speaking)
+ xi · γ + ui
That model will allow a comparison of the effect of language differences between cities in the two
categories. Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that people may create their social identity along
many dimensions. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) make the same argument. For that reason, I
could find a group loyalty effect in both dimensions. I thus make the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.5. The effect of income (language) differences on the probability to secede is
simaller in towns that have small language (income) differences.
If voters identify more with others along one dimension (say, language), it is possible that I
find asymmetric effects.
3.5 Results
Before proceeding with the regression estimates, Figure 3.1 provides a closer look at one of the
mergers: the island of Montreal (all included in the Montreal merger), with the constituent
ex-municipalities colour-coded according to their median incomes and proportions of English-
speakers. The map also depicts the voting results in each town.
This figure shows that first intuitions are somewhat true: richer and English-speaking towns
seceded in greater numbers. However, the map also highlights that some richer towns may be
willing to stay in the merged city, especially when other characteristics such as language are
not too different (e.g., Outremont). Also, on the island of Montreal, one secession took place
in a relatively poor francophone city.
In Montreal, the map shows that the proportion of English-Speakers is somewhat correlated
to median incomes. However, province-wide, the correlation coefficient between these two vari-
ables is only equal to 0.12. Moreover, Table 3.3 shows that towns that have a lower median
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Figure 3.1: Referendum Results in Montreal
income than the rest of the merger can be either more English-speaking or less.
Table 3.3: Number of Cities of the Sample, by Relative Income and Language
Less Anglophone More Anglophone
Higher median income 61 57
Lower median income 47 39
3.5.1 Determinants of De-Merger Votes
The regression results confirm the relationships shown in Figure 3.1. Results from OLS estima-
tions and marginal effects from the Probit estimations are shown in Table 3.4. I find that both
income and language differences affect the choice of citizens.
Language Differences
First, towns that have a greater proportion of English-speaking people than the rest of the
merger have a probability to secede that is about 9 percentage points higher. Furthermore,
even accounting for that effect, the level of language differences also plays a role. In particular,
an increase of 1 percentage point in the language differences variable is associated with an
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Table 3.4: Determinants of De-Mergers: OLS and Probit Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS Probit M.E. Probit M.E. Probit M.E.
Diff. Median Income (thousands) 0.0221*** 0.0191** 0.0124* 0.0132** 0.0133*** 0.0098**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0138*** 0.0115*** 0.0062** 0.0071*** 0.0042** -0.0004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Larger Proportion English-speaking 0.0981*** 0.0966*** 0.1095*** 0.0809** 0.1004*** 0.1034***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Poorer than merging partners -0.0556* -0.0096 -0.0159 -0.0390 -0.0186 -0.0429
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Diff. % of Votes for Bloc Québécois 0.0132* 0.0085***
(0.01) (0.00)
Diff. House Values 0.0008 0.0006
(0.00) (0.00)
Diff. Public Spending per Capita 0.0509 0.0480 0.0346 0.0356**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Tax Impact (5 years) -0.0047** -0.0046*** -0.0048*** -0.0043***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Distance to core city -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0031* -0.0008*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Density -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000* -0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of Merger Population -0.0030** -0.0029** -0.0038*** -0.0030***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.0456 0.0505 0.0263 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
N 204 194 194 204 194 194
R2 (Pseudo-) 0.405 0.496 0.537 0.400 0.581 0.643
F-test/χ2-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: For OLS, clustered (by merger) robust standard errors in parentheses. For Probit, marginal effects are reported, with robust
standard errors (unconditional) in parentheses. Probit estimations themselves calculated using clustered standard errors (by merger).
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
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increase in the probability of secession of between 0.4 and 1.4 percentage points. This effect
is present in almost all models presented, and statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level,
depending on the model.
Result 3.1. Towns with a greater proportion of English-speakers are more likely to secede from
the merger. Furthermore, the probability of secession is positively affected by the absolute level
of differences in language composition between a city and its merging partners.
This effect is robust in OLS estimations to the inclusion of differences in political preferences.
However, it is not robust to that inclusion in the Probit estimations (Column 6, Table 3.4).
This finding suggests that political preferences are correlated with language, such that the two
variables capture a similar effect. In fact, in my data, the share of English-speakers in a given
town and the share of votes going to the Bloc Québécois in 2000 are correlated with a coefficient
of about -0.6, suggesting that it is indeed the case that political preferences and linguistic
composition are intrinsically linked. That being said, the main interest of my investigation
is not language composition per se, but the attachment of voters to a social identity or ethnic
group. The question, then, is whether differences in political preferences in this sample captures
the same effect as language differences.
In Quebec, one of the main federal parties (the Bloc Québécois) is a nationalist party, existing
to promote the independence of the province of Québec, an option popular mostly (if not only)
among French-speaking voters. Since the sovereigntist movement in Québec is strongly linked
to language, political results in that province probably don’t capture political preferences as
commonly understood (on a left-right axis). In fact, Nadeau, Guérin and Martin (1995) argue
that the main cleavage in Québec politics23 was according to “the national question,” instead
of more traditional questions such as the role of the state.
If votes at the federal level are driven by support for the provincial secessionist movement,
which is itself fuelled by linguistic differences, then my variable for political preferences and
that for linguistic differences might indeed capture the same underlying effect: attachment to
one’s ethnic group (in this case, linguistic). Moreover, the coefficient on differences in political
preferences is positive and significant, both in OLS and Probit estimations. Both results point
in the same direction: greater differences lead to more secessions. In fact, this result suggests
that it is indeed not language per se that drives the results, but some loyalty to the ethnic
23Their paper studies the 1993 elections, but the Bloc Québécois remained popular in the province at least
until 2008
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group. Without a better indicator of true political preferences (e.g., left-right), I cannot know
if differences in this variable would affect the choice to secede.
Income Differences
Differences in median income between a city and other towns in the merger are also associated
with an increase in the probability of secession.24 An increase of a thousand dollars in the
absolute earnings difference is associated with an increase of about 1 to 2 percentage points in
the probability of secession, depending on the model considered.
Interestingly, while income differences seem to affect the probability to secede, being poorer
than the rest of the merger has no impact (except in the OLS estimation without any control
variable).25 This result contradicts the commonplace idea that richer jurisdictions are the ones
seceding. The fact that only difference between median incomes matter, and not its sign (richer
or poorer), suggests that it is preferences resulting from income that are driving the decision to
secede, not selfish desires to stop paying for poorer communities.
Result 3.2. Differences in median income between a city and its merging partners increases
the probability that a town will successfully secede. However, richer towns are not more likely
to secede.
I do not find a significant effect of differences in house values on the probability to secede.
This result suggests that, at least in my sample, secessions are not driven by rich periphery
towns seceding to escape higher tax rates resulting from a merger. When accounting for house
values, but not political preferences, I find a significant effect of differences in house values, and
the effect of income differences are less significant (Table 3.B.1). However, if house values and
political preferences are somewhat related, adding both is preferable.
Result 3.3.A. Differences in house values do not affect the probability to secede.
Moreover, these coefficients on income differences are robust to the inclusion of differences
in house values. When accounting for that vairable (i.e., differences in the value of the tax
base), the effect of income differences is still statistically significant, albeit at a lower level (at
the 10% significance level for OLS, but still 5% in Probit).
24To control for a potential effect of the scale of the difference variable (differences are larger for towns with
higher median incomes), I also estimate the same equations, but with the Diff. Median Income variable as a
percentage of the town’s median income. The results do not change.
25Replacing the dummy variable indicating that the town is poorer or richer with simply the level of median
income of the pre-merger town does not change these results.
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Result 3.3.B. The effect of income differences is robust to the addition of differences in house
values.
This last result suggests that the effect of income differences is not merely due to a tax base
effect.
Table 3.B.1 also presents the results when including merger fixed effects (i.e., a dummy for
each merger), as a simple robustness check. I find that differences in income and language
still affect the probability of secession. However, due to the large number of variables included
in these estimations, the model perfectly predicts some of the results (as illustrated by the
reduction in the number of observations in the Probit estimation). Therefore, these specific
results may be problematic and are presented mostly for completeness.
Control Variables
In most regressions, I include a number of additional control variables that produce some in-
teresting results. Differences in total spending per capita seem to affect the decision to oppose
mergers. However, the coefficient on that variable is only significant in some of the Probit esti-
mations, and at low levels of significance. As expected, however, a predicted increase in taxes
after a re-constitution is associated with a decrease in the probability of secession. In particular,
a predicted increase in taxes of 1 percentage point is associated with a decrease in the secession
probability of approximately 0.4 percentage points. The result is quite robust across models.
Demographic factors also seem to play a role in the decision of voters. Towns that have
a larger share of the agglomeration’s total population are, unsurprisingly, less likely to secede.
That result is robust across models and indicate that an increase of 1 point in the town’s share
of merger population is associated with a decrease in the probability of secession of around 0.3
percentage points. Density also negatively affects the probability of a town to secede, although
this result is significant only in some OLS estimations. This result would indicate that more
urban towns are less likely to secede, which is not a surprising observation. For its part, the size
of the largest town in the merger is positive and significant only in some of the OLS estimations.
While it is not very robust, this result would indicate that voters do resent being lumped with
very large towns, who would usually get more say in decisions simply due to their sheer size.
In terms of geography, distance to the core city does not affect the voters’ decision. However,
this variable is only crudely measured as some towns have very large territories and their centroid
does not accurately represent where most of the population resides.
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Other Measures of Heterogeneity
Finally, other measures of heterogeneity, such as differences in unemployment or median age,
have only limited explanatory power (Table 3.B.1). Indeed, in the OLS estimations, none of
the coefficients are significant. In the Probit model, I do find an effect from differences in the
share of visible minorities (positive, as expected) and in inequality (negative). The coefficient on
differences in inequality warrants some further discussion. Indeed, the negative sign indicates
that towns that have different inequality levels (measured as the ratio of average to median
income) than the rest of the merger are less likely to de-merge. A further investigation, by
eliminating the absolute value on the variable, indicates that it is actually towns with larger
inequality that are more likely to de-merge. Better measures of inequality would help understand
this result, but they are not available at the municipal level.
3.5.2 Interaction Effects: Group Loyalty Matters in the Voters’ Decisions
The previous section presented some interesting results on the motivations behind the voters’
decision to accept or oppose municipal mergers. However, while it shows that income and
language differences are important factors, it does not explain why. As explained earlier, I will
rely on interaction terms to offer a deeper investigation.
The first models test whether there is a positive interaction term in the model using con-
tinuous variables for both language and income differences. The results are shown in Table 3.5,
and do show a positive interaction term between these two variables. In the Probit estimations
(Columns 4 and 5, Table 3.5), this interaction effect is robust to the inclusion of the squares
of each variable (to account for the potential correlation between the two interacted variables).
In the OLS estimations (Columns 1 to 3, Table 3.5), I fail to find a significant interaction term
in the simplest model, but I find a positive interaction term (at a 5% significance level) when I
add non-linearities in income differences (column 2). Again, this effect is robust to the addition
of squared terms for both income and language differences (column 3).26
Result 3.4. The effects of language and income differences positively interact with each other,
suggesting the existence of group loyalty effects.
To better interpret this result, Figure 3.2 shows the marginal effect of income differences on
the probability of secession at multiple levels of language differences, using the Probit estimates
26The results are also robust to the inclusion of merger fixed effects, as shown in Table 3.B.2.
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Table 3.5: Interactions between Continuous Income and Language Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit
Diff. Median Income (thousands) 0.0132 0.0002 -0.0076 0.0575 0.1726
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.11)
Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0089* -0.0002 0.0089 -0.0166 0.0359
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Diff. Median Income * Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0005 0.0039*** 0.0048** 0.0229** 0.0208*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Larger Proportion English-speaking 0.0972*** 0.0956** 0.0981*** 1.1122*** 1.0813***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.39) (0.34)
Poorer than merging partners -0.0089 -0.0035 -0.0080 -0.0790 -0.0812
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.41) (0.42)
(Diff. Median Income)2 0.0008 0.0014 -0.0096
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
(Diff. Median Income)2 * Diff. English-Speaking Proportion -0.0002** -0.0002**
(0.00) (0.00)
(Diff. English-Speaking Proportion)2 -0.0002** -0.0010*
(0.00) (0.00)
Diff. Public Spending per Capita 0.0556 0.0838 0.0975* 0.5717** 0.5921**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.26) (0.24)
Tax Impact (5 years) -0.0046** -0.0046** -0.0046** -0.0491** -0.0506***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Distance to core city -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0364* -0.0347*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Density -0.0000*** -0.0000** -0.0000* -0.0002** -0.0002*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of Merger Population -0.0030** -0.0031** -0.0032** -0.0452*** -0.0472***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) 0.0002** 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0002 -0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.0699 0.0919 0.0843 -1.5173*** -1.8211***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.46) (0.49)
N 194 194 194 194 194
R2 (Pseudo-) 0.501 0.513 0.530 0.606 0.620
F-test/χ2-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Clustered (by merger) robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
a The F test with fixed effects and clustered standard errors cannot be estimated (not enough information).
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(with 95% confidence intervals). The figure shows a positive slope, although the confidence
intervals are large at higher levels of language differences. For that reason, the results are more
suggestive that there is a cut-off in language differences over which income differences have an
effect on voters’ choice, instead of a real continuous relationship as stated in the first hypothesis.
However, it is clear from the result that voters are more affected by income differences between
their town and the rest of the merger when language differences are also present, suggesting the
existence of a group loyalty effect.
Figure 3.2: Average Marginal Effects of Delta Median Income on Probability to Secede (with
95% Confidence Intervals)
In light of that result, the remainder of the analysis focuses on the thresholds in each
dimension (language and income). As explained earlier, I include binary variables that categorise
the observations in groups defined by the size of the language or income differences. In the first
case, the dummy variable splits the observations in the two following groups: those that have
small language differences between them and the rest of the merger, and those that have large
language differences.
Looking at Probit estimates, (Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.6), I find a negative interaction
term, but only when using the threshold defined by the mean. In other words, the effect of
income differences on the probability of secession is smaller for towns where language differences
are small. To facilitate the interpretation of Probit estimates, I also calculate the marginal effect
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Table 3.6: Interactions between Income and Language Variables Using Thresholds (Probit Results)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income
Diff. Median Income (thousands) 0.2062*** 0.1528***
(0.04) (0.06)
Small Income Differences (mean) -0.5460**
(0.25)
Small Income Differences (median) -0.1891
(0.23)
Language
Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0642*** 0.0781***
(0.02) (0.03)
Small Language Differences (mean) -1.4698**
(0.60)
Small Language Differences (median) -1.2016*
(0.69)
Interaction Language × Income
Relevant Interaction term -0.1088** -0.0186 -0.0269 -0.0509*
(0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03)
Poorer than merging partners -0.5521 -0.4684 -0.2905 -0.2494
(0.42) (0.42) (0.39) (0.38)
Larger Proportion English-speaking 1.2892*** 1.3453*** 1.0650*** 1.0255***
(0.46) (0.50) (0.33) (0.32)
Diff. Public Spending per Capita 0.4741** 0.4013 0.3899 0.3690*
(0.22) (0.28) (0.24) (0.22)
Tax Impact (5 years) -0.0623*** -0.0463** -0.0536*** -0.0504**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Distance to core city -0.0274* -0.0277 -0.0322* -0.0372*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Density -0.0003** -0.0002*** -0.0001* -0.0001*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of Merger Population -0.0513*** -0.0420*** -0.0455*** -0.0465***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) 0.0001 0.0007* 0.0005 0.0004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.3113 -1.2094** -0.8425* -0.9845**
(0.58) (0.48) (0.44) (0.43)
N 194 194 194 194
Pseudo-R2 0.639 0.584 0.568 0.565
χ2-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Table reports Probit coefficients. Clustered (by merger) standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
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Table 3.7: Interactions between Income and Language Variables Using Thresholds (OLS Results)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income
Diff. Median Income (thousands) 0.0484*** 0.0361***
(0.01) (0.01)
Small Income Differences (mean) -0.0360
(0.04)
Small Income Differences (median) -0.0100
(0.03)
Language
Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0139*** 0.0147***
(0.00) (0.00)
Small Language Differences (mean) -0.1151
(0.08)
Small Language Differences (median) -0.0551
(0.05)
Interaction Language × Income
Relevant Interaction term -0.0458*** -0.0293* -0.0054 -0.0080
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Larger Proportion English-speaking 0.1184*** 0.1359*** 0.1005*** 0.0991***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Poorer than merging partners -0.0094 -0.0304 -0.0174 -0.0138
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Diff. Public Spending per Capita 0.0928** 0.0505 0.0623 0.0661
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
Tax Impact (5 years) -0.0046** -0.0041** -0.0047** -0.0047**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Distance to core city -0.0005 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0017
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Density -0.0000** -0.0001*** -0.0000** -0.0000*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of Merger Population -0.0032*** -0.0031** -0.0030** -0.0030**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) 0.0001 0.0003** 0.0002** 0.0002**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.1932** 0.1105 0.1339 0.1177
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
N 194 194 194 194
R2 0.523 0.466 0.482 0.483
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Clustered (by merger) standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
130
of income differences at the two values of the threshold (i.e., the binary variable). These results
are found in the first column of Table 3.8, along with p-values for t tests for the difference
between the two. The results show that the marginal effect of income differences is significantly
larger in presence of large language differences. Somewhat surprisingly, however, income differ-
ences have an effect (but smaller) even with low language differences, although only at a 10%
level of significance.
Table 3.8: Interactions between Income and Language Variables Using Thresholds (Probit
Marginal Effects)
(1) (2)
M.E. of Income M.E. of Language
Large Language Differences (mean) 0.0326***
(0.01)
Small Language Differences (mean) 0.0057*
(0.00)
p-value, t-test 0.000**
Large Language Differences (median) 0.0242***
(0.01)
Small Language Differences (median) 0.0047*
(0.00)
p-value, t-test 0.053*
Large Income Differences (mean) 0.0067**
(0.00)
Small Income Differences (mean) 0.0034
(0.00)
p-value, t-test 0.211
Large Income Differences (median) 0.0076**
(0.00)
Small Income Differences (median) 0.0026
(0.00)
p-value, t-test 0.093*
Note: Calculated from the Probit coefficients with clustered standard errors. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.7 instead present the results of an OLS estimation of this model.
Using both the mean and the median as the cut-off, I again find a negative interaction term,
as expected, significant at the 1% and 10% significance level, respectively. Furthermore, the
magnitude of the interaction term is virtually equal to the magnitude of the coefficient on the
income differences variable, suggesting that in fact, income differences have no effect at small
levels of language differences.
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In the second model, the threshold is defined using income differences, separating towns
in two groups: those with small income differences between them and the rest of the merger,
and those with large differences. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.6 present the results of Probit
estimations of that model. I find a negative interaction term in the equation using the median
value as the threshold, but only at the 10% significance level.Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.7
present the results of that OLS estimation, where I do not find a significant interaction term.
The second column of Table 3.8 summarises the marginal effects of language differences
at different values of the binary variables. In this case, I find that these marginal effects are
significant only for towns with large income differences. Furthermore, the t-tests are not as
conclusive for the difference between the estimates at high and low income differences. Indeed,
the difference is only significant at the 10% level and only when using the median as the
threshold. To summarize these results:
Result 3.5. The interaction effects are asymmetric. While the marginal effect of income dif-
ferences on the probability to secede is strongly affected by the presence of language differences,
the opposite is not true.
3.6 Robustness Checks
Overall, the results using the interaction terms suggest the existence of a group loyalty effect.
However, one could potentially offer alternative explanations. In this section, I first investigate
the robustness of the interaction effect when including a number of additional variables. Then, I
look at alternate definitions of the dependent variable, to better understand how voters decided
to secede or not. In particular, I check the importance of the participation criterion.
3.6.1 Interaction Effects with Additional Variables
In Section 3.5, I showed results suggesting that differences in political preferences and house
values (i.e., the value of the tax base) also have an effect on the probability to secede. Although
political preferences are only imperfectly measured, given the idiosyncratic cleavage in Quebec
politics (i.e., federalist-nationalist instead of left-right), it may interesting to determine whether
the interaction term is robust to the addition of that variable. Tables 3.B.3 and 3.B.4 show
the results this robustness test. In the Probit estimations, the results show that the positive
interaction term between income and language preferences is quite robust, especially when
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including square terms to account for potential collinearity between the interacted variables.27
In the OLS estimations, I also show that the interaction is robust when including non-linearities
in income (as in the previous results of Table 3.5).
As discussed in the previous section, political preferences may capture the same underlying
characteristic as language composition. In that case, I should find the same effect when in-
cluding an interaction term between income differences and differences in political preferences.
Column 5 in Table 3.B.4 shows the results of that test with Probit estimation. I do find a
positive interaction term between income differences, and differences in the share of votes for
the nationalist Bloc Québécois party.28
Another possible explanation for the interaction term is that towns with larger differences
in language also have larger median incomes, if language and income are correlated. In that
case, the larger effect of differences in income at larger language differences would simply result
from higher median incomes. That explanation would lead to the same results observed so far.
To check if that is the case, I include the level of median income of pre-merger towns directly in
the regression. The interaction terms are robust to this inclusion (as reported in Tables 3.B.5
and 3.B.6).
Finally, another possibility is that as differences in language composition increase, so does
turnout at the referendums. Indeed, towns with a very different language composition may
be more motivated to go vote, thus increasing turnout. Given the referendum rules, and in
particular the minimum turnout rule, increased turnout would inevitably lead to a greater
probability of secession. Fortunately, I have data on turnout in every town that had an actual
referendum. As expected, I find a strongly statistically significant effect of turnout on the
probability to secede (see the first column of Tables 3.B.7 and 3.B.8).
Even when controlling for turnout in the regression, I still find a positive interaction between
language and income differences. In the Probit results, I find that the interaction is significant
even when including the squared variables, as well as differences in political preferences and
house values (see columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.B.8). Figure 3.3 shows the marginal effects
of income differences at various levels of language differences. This relationship is similar to
the one found without including turnout. The OLS results are somewhat less convincing, but
I do find a positive interaction term when including non-linearities and differences in political
27Without these square terms, the coefficient on language differences is negative. However, since there is some
correlation between the two interacted variables, the full model should be superior.
28OLS results are not included but show the same positive interaction term.
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preferences and house values (at the 5% level, see Table 3.B.7, Column 4), and when accounting
for non-linearities alone (at the at the 10% level, see Table 3.B.7, Column 3).
Figure 3.3: Average Marginal Effects of Differences in Median Income on Probability to Secede,
with Turnout as a Control Variable (including 95% Confidence Intervals)
Table 3.B.9 presents the results from Probit estimations, for the analysis on thresholds.29
The results are similar to the analysis without the threshold variable. In particular, the inter-
action term is significant only in the case of differences in median incomes interacted with a
dummy indicating small language differences (with the mean as the threshold). Table 3.B.10
reports the marginal effects. That table shows that the marginal effect of income differences is
significantly larger when large language differences are present. This result mirrors the one of
Table 3.8, which did not include turnout.
These results are encouraging and suggest that increases in turnout at high levels of language
differences does not explain the interaction term completely. However, since the sample size is
reduced, the analysis may suffer from a selection problem. To correct for this bias, researchers
usually turn to sample selection models, which require a variable that affects selection but
not the outcome. In my case, the selection process is clear: towns select themselves into the
restricted sample (of having a referendum) by gathering enough signatures on the register. One
could reasonably argue that every variable that affects the number of people manifesting their
29I do not include the OLS results, but they are similar to the ones obtained with Probit.
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desire for a referendum would also affect the support for secession. For that reason, it would
be difficult to justify the usage of a Heckman selection model.30
Another possibility is to attempt an estimation of the turnout in towns that had no ref-
erendum. In fact, in the restricted sample of 89 towns with a referendum, the “turnout” at
the registers (i.e., the % of signatures gathered) is highly correlated with the turnout in the
referendum (correlation coefficient of 0.67). Using this information, I can estimate a regression
with the turnout as the dependent variable, and the percentage of register signatures as an
independent variable, along with a set of controls. In turn, I can use these regression estimates
to extrapolate the turnout to towns that did not have a referendum. I can then include this
estimated turnout in the regression that includes turnout, using in this case the whole sample.
In doing so, I again obtain a positive and significant interaction term.31 This test is obviously
not ideal, since it is possible that a town with a low amount of signatures could have a high
turnout if, for example, the issue becomes more important during the referendum campaign.
However, it provides some support to the finding of a positive and significant interaction term.
3.6.2 Expectations of Secession Votes in Neighbouring Towns
Another possible bias in my analysis is due to potential spatial interactions between voters of
different towns in the same merger. Indeed, all referendums took place at the same time, and
while the choice was between re-constitution of the previous town or accepting the merger as
is, the final configuration of the merger is unknown until all after the referendums. Therefore,
choices of voters in a given town could be affected by those of voters in the towns taking part
in the same merger.
Since the consultation process took place in two steps, voters had an idea, at the moment of
the actual vote, of the popularity of the secession movement in the other towns in the merger.
Indeed, the share of registered voters that signed the register is likely a good indication of the
amount of support for re-constitution. In this sub-section, I use these data to re-estimate the
previous model accounting for these expectations.
30One possibility is to use rainfall on the day where registers are open as an instrument, such as in Hansford and
Gomez (2010). Unlike regular elections, however, the registers took place over several days (16 to 20 May 2004).
Nevertheless, I collected data on total rainfall on these days for every pre-merger town from Environment Canada
(http://climate.weather.gc.ca/advanceSearch/searchHistoricData_e.html), using geographic coordinates
to find the closest weather station to every town. However, unlike for elections, these data do not reliably predict
the organisation of a referendum. This result is somewhat expected, since voters actually had 5 days to sign
the register. For that reason, it is impossible to reliably estimate a selection model using this variable as the
instrument.
31Results are not shown but available from the author.
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To do so, I will limit the analysis to towns that had a referendum. Those that did not gather
enough signatures are not relevant since at the second stage of the consultation, i) they do not
make a choice, and ii) there is no uncertainty on their final choice. Reducing the number of
towns in the sample inevitably leads to a sample selection problem. However, this sub-section
abstracts from this problem, since it was already discussed in the discussion on turnout.
In the first step of the consultation process, voters in the 213 towns had to sign a register.
The percentage of registered voters who signed it in each town will stand in for the expected
“strength” of the secessionist movement in that town. Voters in every neighbouring town
observe that percentage, and can use it when choosing how to vote in the second stage. I
will calculate the overall expectations of voters in town i on votes of neighbouring towns in
two ways. First, I will calculate the average percentage of register signatures in neighbouring
towns simply weighted by population. Note that the sample is reduced only to those towns
that had a referendum. Second, I will weight these percentages not only by population, but
also by language similarity (i.e., 1−
∣∣∣∣ShareEnglishi − ShareEnglishj∣∣∣∣). This second variable
will capture the idea that voters in a given town react more to their expectations of votes in
towns that are similar to them.
Table 3.B.11 presents the results of Probit estimations when including the weighted averages
of register signatures. In these estimations, we report only robust (not clustered) standard errors
given the low number of observations and clusters. The interaction term between language and
income is, once again, robust to this specification, although only at the 10% level of significance
when including all controls.
The results on the average share of register signatures themselves are also interesting. First,
note that they are significantly positive in almost all specifications, so that when voters in
a given town observe that their neighbours have strong secessionist movements in the first
consultation stage, they also are more likely to secede. This effect is also marginally stronger
and more significant when using language similarity weights, which would indicate, as expected,
a stronger relationship in voting expectations between culturally similar towns.
While these results are interesting, the percentages of voters signing the registers are strongly
correlated with the actual referendum results. Therefore, I am essentially estimating a model
with a spatial lag. These models are inconsistent when estimated with OLS or Probit.
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3.6.3 Spatial Econometrics Results
In this subsection, I provide results from estimations that explicitly account for the spatial
correlation between the votes for secession in neighbouring towns using MLE methods. This
type of model requires the definition of a matrix of spatial weights indicating the relationship
between two towns. I define two such matrices. The first (W ) is simply a neighbourhood matrix.
Weights for town i take value 1/ni for each ni town that is part of the same merger as town
i. The second matrix (Wlang) puts greater weights on towns that are more similar in terms of
language composition.
Table 3.9 presents the results of estimations using two models.32 The first, in columns 1
and 2, is the usual spatial auto-regressive model (SAR), with ρ as the spatial lag:
Secession = ρ ·W · Secession+ X · β + 
 ∼ N(0, σ2In)
The second model (SEM), in columns 3 and 4, includes spatial dependence in the error term
instead, which is captured by the parameter λ:
Secession = X · β + u
u = λ ·W · u+ 
 ∼ N(0, σ2In)
First, note that the interaction effect between language and income differences is still posi-
tive, as in the main results. This result is thus robust to the inclusion of a spatial lag. Second,
the spatial lag ρ is also significant, but only when using Wlang and only at the 10% level of
significance. This finding is consistent with the results using signature registers in Section 3.6.2.
Finally, note that λ is statistically significant using both weight matrices, indicating that the
data exhibit spatial dependence through the error terms.
3.6.4 Importance of the Participation Criterion
In the results in the main part of the chapter, I consider a binary dependent variable, indicating
whether the secession was successful. As such, the coefficients above estimate the effect of the
32Both models are estimated with MLE methods in MATLAB using the sar and sem functions of the Spatial
Econometrics Toolbox developed by James P. Lesage.
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Table 3.9: Spatial Econometrics Estimations (MLE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ρ 0.133 0.143*
(1.571) (1.678)
λ 0.173** 0.175**
(1.968) (1.997)
Diff. English-Speaking Proportion -0.00099 -0.00093 -0.00146 -0.00145
(-0.204) (-0.190) (-0.299) (-0.298)
Diff. Median Income (thousands) -0.00021 -0.00036 -0.00010 -0.00049
(-0.010) (-0.018) (-0.005) (-0.024)
Interaction term 0.00398*** 0.00393*** 0.00409*** 0.00409***
(2.529) (2.499) (2.616) (2.615)
(Diff. Median Income)2 0.00082 0.00084 0.00081 0.00085
(0.448) (0.460) (0.428) (0.446)
(Diff. Median Income)2 * Diff. English-Speaking Proportion -0.00019** -0.00019** -0.00019** -0.00020**
(-2.114) (-2.015) (-2.165) (-2.178)
Larger Proportion English-speaking 0.0988*** 0.101*** 0.0906** 0.0902**
(2.647) (2.682) (2.518) (2.505)
Poorer than Merging Partners -0.00587 -0.00640 -0.00392 -0.00372
(-0.155) (-0.169) (-0.107) (-0.102)
Constant 0.0891 0.0900 0.101* 0.101*
(1é536) (1.557) (1.699) (1.687)
Neighbourhood Weight Matrix W Wlang W Wlang
Controlsa Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 194 194 194 194
R2 0.510 0.511 0.524 0.525
Note: Estimated in MATLAB using the sar and sem functions of the Spatial Econometrics Toolbox developed by James P.
Lesage. Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
a Controls include Difference in Public Spending per Capita, Tax Impact (5 years), Distance to core city, Population Density,
Share of merger population, Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands).
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independent variables on the probability of a successful secession. However, for a referendum to
be successful, two conditions had to be met: enough votes in favour, and a high enough turnout.
In this appendix, I will discuss the importance of this participation criterion in the definition
of the dependent variable.
For a referendum to be successful, it had not only to gather more than 50 per cent of the
expressed votes in favour of re-constitution, but also to gather the votes of at least 35 per cent
of the registered voter population in favour of re-constitution. That turnout rule was important
in determining the number of secessions. Indeed, while 31 towns were reconstituted in 2004, if
the turnout rule had not existed, 58 towns would have been reconstituted.
To examine whether this rule is important for my results, one possibility is to consider
another categorical variable, more sophisticated than a binary one. To that effect, I group the
towns in 4 categories:
• No referendum: Towns without a referendum
• No criteria met: Towns with a failed referendum
• Participation criterion (PC) not met: Towns with a referendum that had a majority in
favour of secession, but without meeting the turnout rule
• Referendum successful: Towns that seceded
Using a multinomial Logit model, it is then possible to examine how the independent variables
affect the probability for towns to be in one of these 4 categories.
Table 3.10 shows the marginal effects for each category. Consistently with previous results,
language differences increase the probability to be in the two categories indicating the strong
presence of secession preferences: actual town re-constitutions, and large vote share for secession
with low participation (categories 3 and 4). Considering income differences, richer towns are
more likely to be in the third category (large share of votes for de-merger, but not enough
participation; column 2), while larger income differences increase the probability of an actual
secession (category 4; column 3). These results might suggest that richer cities are more likely
to support secession, but only actually de-merge when income differences are high.
Although different, these results are not completely inconsistent with the previous analyses.
For language differences, the results are qualitatively the same: larger differences result in more
votes in favour of secession as well as more secessions. Regarding income differences, the results
from the Multinomial Logit suggest that there is actually an impact from being richer than the
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agglomeration on the share of votes for secession, in contrast to the previous analysis. In fact,
richer towns are more likely to gather a large proportion of votes in favour of secession. However,
being richer has no impact on the probability of a successful secession, only the magnitude of
income differences does. However, the overall message is the same: income differences do play
a role in the voters’ decision to favour secession or not.
In the previous analysis including interaction terms, I was comparing category 4 to the
three others (successful secession vs. all other outcomes). It may be interesting to estimate
the Multinomial Logit model with the interaction term. Table 3.11 reports the results of these
estimations. Columns 1 to 3 reports the results using “No Referendum” as the base outcome,
while column 4 shows the coefficients using “Participation Criterion Not Met” as the base
outcome. I find a positive coefficient on the interaction term only when the base outcome
is “Participation Criterion Not Met,” indicating that the relationship is especially important
when comparing Outcomes 3 to 4 (a referendum failed due to low participation vs. a successful
referendum).
Table 3.12 shows the average marginal effects for the main variables. It shows that the
average marginal effects are similar with and without interaction terms. However, I am also
interested in the marginal effect of income differences at various levels of language differences,
as in earlier analyses. Figure 3.4 shows the marginal effects of differences in income on the
probability of outcomes 3 and 4. The estimates are imprecise, but the relationship is nevertheless
interesting. At higher levels of language differences, income differences decreases the probability
of Outcome 3 (referendum failed due to low participation) and increase the probability of
Outcome 4 (successful referendum). This result is in line with previous discussions.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the determinants of municipal consolidations. The main contribution is
to consider the choice of voters for municipal borders, and especially how ethnic diversity affects
voters’ choices. First, I find that differences in income and linguistic composition between a
town and the rest of the merger increases the probability of a secession. To investigate whether
these effects are simply a reflection of differing preferences for public goods (correlated with
income and language), or due to a preference for cultural homogeneity, I analyse the interaction
effects between differences in income and linguistic composition. I find that income differences
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Figure 3.4: Average Marginal Effects of Differences in Median Income on Probability of Selected
Outcomes (with 95% Confidence Intervals)
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Table 3.10: Multinomial Logit Model, Marginal Effects
Base Outcome: No referendum
(1) (2) (3)
No criteria met PC not met Referendum passed
Delta Median Income (thousands) -0.0155 -0.0085 0.0125**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Delta % English-Speaking -0.0096 0.0129*** 0.0077***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Larger Proportion English-Speaking -0.0187 0.0792** 0.0978***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Poorer than merging partners (in median income) -0.0145 -0.1175*** -0.0278
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Delta Public Spending per Capita -0.0176 -0.0107 0.0358
(0.10) (0.05) (0.03)
Tax Impact (5 years) 0.0009 0.0021 -0.0055***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Distance to core city 0.0027** -0.0039 -0.0025
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population Density 0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of merger population -0.0020 -0.0052*** -0.0023*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) -0.0005** 0.0002** 0.0001**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
The table reports marginal effects calculated from Multinomial Logit results (estimated with clustered standard
errors). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
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Table 3.11: Multinomial Logit Model, with Interaction Term
Base Outcome: No referendum Base Outcome: PC not met
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No criteria met PC not met Referendum passed Referendum passed
Delta Median Income (thousands) -0.1999 -0.0048 0.0636 0.0684
(0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.10)
Delta % English-Speaking -0.1337 0.2264*** 0.1398 -0.0866
(0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
Delta Median Income (thousands) 0.0305 -0.0148 0.0334 0.0482**
* Delta % English-Speaking (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Larger Proportion English-Speaking 0.2084 1.6608*** 2.9658*** 1.3050
(0.57) (0.59) (1.04) (0.83)
Poorer than merging partners (in median income) -0.4700 -1.9685*** -1.0596 0.9089
(0.47) (0.59) (0.91) (1.02)
Delta Public Spending per Capita -0.0093 0.0354 1.0558 1.0204**
(0.92) (0.86) (1.07) (0.42)
Tax Impact (5 years) 0.0014 -0.0091 -0.1047** -0.0956*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
Distance to core city 0.0118 -0.0557 -0.0892** -0.0335
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Population Density 0.0004 -0.0008* -0.0008* 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population in 2001 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of merger population -0.0360** -0.0863*** -0.1071*** -0.0208
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) -0.0038 0.0029** 0.0022 -0.0007
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.1111 -0.1917 -2.0305 -1.8388**
(0.53) (1.24) (1.30) (0.93)
N 194
Pseudo-R2 0.376
χ2test(p-value) n.a.a
a The χ2 test with fixed effects and clustered standard errors cannot be estimated (not enough information).
The table reports Multinomial Logit coefficients. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
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Table 3.12: Multinomial Logit Model with Interactions, Marginal Effects
Base Outcome: No referendum
(1) (2) (3)
No criteria met PC not met Referendum passed
Delta Median Income (thousands) -0.0172* -0.0150 0.0197**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Delta % English-Speaking -0.0098 0.0110** 0.0091**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Larger Proportion English-Speaking -0.0213 0.0796** 0.1006***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Poorer than neighbors (in median income) -0.0138 -0.1398*** -0.0061
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Delta Public Spending per Capita -0.0079 -0.0179 0.0474*
(0.10) (0.06) (0.03)
Tax Impact (5 years) 0.0009 0.0013 -0.0046***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Distance to core city 0.0027** -0.0032 -0.0030*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population Density 0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population in 2001 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of merger population -0.0019 -0.0047*** -0.0029**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) -0.0005* 0.0003** 0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
The table reports marginal effects calculated from Multinomial Logit results (estimated with clustered
standard errors). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
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matter more in towns where language differences are large. I interpret this result as a group
loyalty effect. Voters’ choices are more affected by income differences when they must share a
jurisdiction with people of a different linguistic group. This result is robust to the addition of
additional variables such as differences in house values and turnout at the referendum, and to
the choice of specification, including to the inclusion of a spatial lag.
In addition to the more academic interest in the determinants of jurisdiction borders, this
chapter can also provide some more concrete lessons for policy-makers. When promoting mu-
nicipal mergers, governments often tout the economies of scale realized compared to a more
fractionated map. However, voters seem to care more about the heterogeneity of people in
the jurisdiction. Given the difficulties encountered by some governments in promoting these
mergers (notably, in Quebec), my results may help create borders that are more likely to be
accepted. However, if governments care about the potential long-term benefits of ethnic diver-
sity in local jurisdictions (as suggested by Putnam (2007) and Ottaviano and Peri (2005)), my
results suggest that they may prefer to impose mergers, and commit to a policy of not allowing
de-mergers.
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Appendix
3.A Determinants of Municipal Public Spending Per Capita
Table 3.A.1: Determinants of Public Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% English-Speaking 2.8383* -5.0526 3.9537 9.7735
(1.70) (6.48) (3.77) (11.82)
Median Income 0.0129* 0.0099 -0.0361** -0.0337**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Interaction 0.0004 -0.0002
(0.00) (0.00)
Average House Values -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0042*** 0.0045***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ratio of Average over Median Income 332.8919*** 322.2829** -79.2582 -58.0270
(122.64) (125.51) (312.00) (314.62)
% Immigrants -1.1765 -2.9466 -26.6102* -27.9376*
(5.98) (6.30) (14.05) (15.92)
% Visible Minorities -18.2086 -15.1918 1.9164 1.9951
(14.39) (15.88) (15.68) (15.77)
% University Educated 5.3914* 4.7227 12.1055* 11.9941*
(3.22) (3.05) (6.51) (6.62)
Unemployment Rate 8.4321*** 7.9712*** -0.1696 0.5739
(2.07) (1.81) (6.94) (6.11)
% Immigrants from Other Municipalities 1.9864 2.4545 -0.3255 -0.9409
(1.81) (1.73) (4.20) (4.40)
Density -0.0486 -0.0419 -0.1164** -0.1180**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Population 0.0011* 0.0012** 0.0010* 0.0010*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Montreal 1115.3045** 1011.0588* 1127.6670 1151.1621
(521.85) (574.90) (736.52) (780.88)
Constant -39.8320 55.3014 1274.7261* 1175.0382*
(223.56) (253.69) (667.21) (627.98)
N 1233 1233 204 204
R2 0.224 0.230 0.429 0.429
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
Columns 3 and 4 only include municipalities part of the merger wave.
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3.B Appendix Tables
Table 3.B.1: Determinants of De-Mergers: Additional Results
(1) (2) (5) (6) (3) (4) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit M.E. Probit M.E. Probit M.E. Probit M.E.
Diff. Median Income (thousands) 0.0176** 0.0127 0.0226*** 0.0118* 0.0120*** 0.0102* 0.0082*** 0.0113**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0067** 0.0107*** 0.0106** 0.0113*** -0.0002 0.0038** 0.0111*** 0.0042***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Larger Proportion English-speaking 0.1105*** 0.0960*** 0.0789** 0.0982*** 0.1111*** 0.0919*** 0.0673 0.1006***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03)
Poorer than merging partners -0.0279 0.0041 -0.0185 -0.0383 -0.0543 -0.0116 -0.0961 -0.0363
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
Diff. % of Votes for Bloc Québécois 0.0138** 0.0087***
(0.01) (0.00)
Diff. House Values 0.0010** 0.0006**
(0.00) (0.00)
Diff. Public Spending per Capita 0.0425 0.0571 0.1300*** 0.0376 0.0297* 0.0412* 0.1400 0.0331**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.14) (0.02)
Tax Impact (5 years) -0.0049*** -0.0043** -0.0043** -0.0044** -0.0047*** -0.0043*** -0.0108*** -0.0048***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Distance to core city -0.0018* -0.0009 -0.0026** -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0020 -0.0007 -0.0016
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Density -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0001*** -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0001*** -0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** -0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of Merger Population -0.0028** -0.0030** -0.0034** -0.0025** -0.0033*** -0.0034*** -0.0140** -0.0033**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) 0.0001 0.0002** -0.0198 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0114 -0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Diff. Median Age 0.0077 0.0083
(0.01) (0.01)
Diff. Unemployment Rate 0.0042 0.0018
(0.01) (0.00)
Diff. % of Visible Minorities 0.0265 0.0098**
(0.02) (0.00)
Diff. % University-Educated 0.0037 -0.0003
(0.01) (0.00)
Diff. Recent Intra-Provincial Migrants -0.0018 -0.0054
(0.00) (0.00)
Diff. Inequality (Average over Median Income) -0.2641 -0.3303**
(0.21) (0.15)
Constant 0.0167 0.0605 0.1768* 0.0332 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05)
Merger Fixed Effects No No Yes No No No Yes No
N 194 194 194 194 194 194 72 194
R2 0.531 0.506 0.623 0.541 0.637 0.586 0.741 0.647
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 n.a.a 0.000 0.000 0.000 n.a.b 0.000
Note: For OLS, clustered (by merger) robust standard errors in parentheses. For Probit, marginal effects are reported, with robust standard errors (unconditional) in
parentheses. Probit estimations themselves calculated using clustered standard errors (by merger).
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
a The F-test with fixed effects and clustered standard errors cannot be estimated (not enough information).
b The χ2 test with fixed effects and clustered standard errors cannot be estimated (not enough information).
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Table 3.B.2: Interactions between Continuous Income and Language Variables: With
Merger Fixed Effects
(4) (3)
OLS Probit
Diff. Median Income (thousands) 0.0042 -0.0389
(0.02) (0.06)
Diff. English-Speaking Proportion -0.0032 0.0283
(0.01) (0.07)
Diff. Median Income * Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0044*** 0.0349**
(0.00) (0.01)
(Diff. Median Income)2 0.0005
(0.00)
(Diff. Median Income)2 * Diff. English-Speaking Proportion -0.0002***
(0.00)
Larger Proportion English-speaking 0.0799** 0.3840
(0.04) (0.52)
Poorer than merging partners -0.0133 -0.4670
(0.03) (0.56)
Diff. Public Spending per Capita 0.1619*** 1.3062
(0.03) (1.73)
Tax Impact (5 years) -0.0043** -0.1227***
(0.00) (0.03)
Distance to core city -0.0028** 0.0030
(0.00) (0.02)
Density -0.0001** -0.0007***
(0.00) (0.00)
Population -0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00)
Share of Merger Population -0.0037** -0.1293***
(0.00) (0.04)
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) -0.0283* 0.2924
(0.02) (0.22)
Constant 0.2624** -1.3089
(0.11) (1.38)
Merger Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 194 72
R2 0.628 0.773
Note: Clustered (by merger) robust standard errors in parentheses. For Probit: reporting
Probit coefficients.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
The F and χ2 tests with fixed effects and clustered standard errors cannot be estimated (not
enough information).
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Table 3.B.3: Interactions between Continuous Income and Language Variables: OLS Results (Robustness Check: House Values and Political
Preferences)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Diff. Median Income (thousands) 0.0116 0.0027 0.0129 -0.0019 0.0115 0.0005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0099* -0.0033 0.0047 -0.0052 0.0056 -0.0079
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Diff. Median Income * Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0002 0.0050*** 0.0004 0.0040** 0.0001 0.0051***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Diff. House Values 0.0008* 0.0019*** 0.0007 0.0017**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Diff. % of Votes for Bloc Québécois 0.0135* 0.0139** 0.0132* 0.0133**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
(Diff. Median Income)2 -0.0001 0.0010 0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(Diff. Median Income)2 * Diff. English-Speaking Proportion -0.0003*** -0.0002** -0.0003***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Larger Proportion English-speaking 0.0963*** 0.0932** 0.1106*** 0.1093** 0.1096*** 0.1066**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Poorer than merging partners 0.0025 0.0249 -0.0270 -0.0217 -0.0171 0.0054
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Diff. Public Spending per Capita 0.0579 0.1082* 0.0465 0.0765 0.0486 0.0994*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Tax Impact (5 years) -0.0044** -0.0040** -0.0048*** -0.0048*** -0.0046*** -0.0042**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Distance to core city -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0018* -0.0020** -0.0014 -0.0012
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Density -0.0000*** -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of Merger Population -0.0030** -0.0032*** -0.0028** -0.0029** -0.0029** -0.0031**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) 0.0002*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.0658 0.0740 0.0330 0.0567 0.0303 0.0414
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
N 194 194 194 194 194 194
R2 0.506 0.532 0.534 0.548 0.537 0.564
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Clustered (by merger) robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
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Table 3.B.4: Interactions between Continuous Income and Language Variables: Probit Results (Robustness Check: House Values
and Political Preferences)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Diff. Median Income (thousands) 0.0314 0.0644 0.0159 0.0553 -0.0395
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.13) (0.10)
Diff. English-Speaking Proportion -0.0189 -0.1080** -0.1348** -0.1003 -0.0089
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.02)
Diff. Median Income * Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0227* 0.0297*** 0.0337*** 0.0344***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Diff. House Values 0.0061* 0.0123** 0.0116** 0.0131**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Diff. % of Votes for Bloc Québécois 0.1364*** 0.1559*** 0.1449*** 0.0188
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Diff. Median Income * Diff. % of Votes for Bloc Québécois 0.0323**
(0.02)
(Diff. English-Speaking Proportion)2 -0.0005
(0.00)
(Diff. Median Income)2 -0.0039
(0.01)
Larger Proportion English-speaking 1.0615*** 1.6279*** 1.6144*** 1.4963*** 1.6522***
(0.37) (0.43) (0.45) (0.36) (0.39)
Poorer than merging partners -0.0132 -0.5002 -0.3678 -0.3303 -0.5224
(0.42) (0.52) (0.50) (0.50) (0.53)
Diff. Public Spending per Capita 0.6535** 0.5864** 0.8138*** 0.8334*** 0.9566***
(0.28) (0.25) (0.28) (0.27) (0.36)
Tax Impact (5 years) -0.0452** -0.0581*** -0.0529*** -0.0525*** -0.0616***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Distance to core city -0.0262 -0.0310 -0.0146*** -0.0126*** -0.0116
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Density -0.0002*** -0.0002* -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of Merger Population -0.0418*** -0.0504*** -0.0455*** -0.0452*** -0.0454***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -1.6021*** -2.3080*** -2.6108*** -2.6601*** -2.4635***
(0.47) (0.57) (0.53) (0.53) (0.47)
N 194 194 194 194 194
Pseudo-R2 0.610 0.674 0.687 0.691 0.682
χ2-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Table reports Probit coefficients. Clustered (by merger) robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
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Table 3.B.5: Interactions between Continuous Income and Language Variables: OLS Results (Robust-
ness Check: Median Income)
(1) (2) (3)
Diff. Median Income (thousands) 0.0163*** 0.0008 0.0007
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0114*** -0.0001 -0.0077
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Diff. Median Income * Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0038*** 0.0050***
(0.00) (0.00)
Larger Proportion English-speaking 0.0958*** 0.0951** 0.1068**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Median Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Diff. House Values 0.0017***
(0.00)
Diff. % of Votes for Bloc Québécois 0.0135**
(0.01)
(Diff. Median Income)2 0.0006 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00)
(Diff. Median Income)2 * Diff. English-Speaking Proportion -0.0002** -0.0003***
(0.00) (0.00)
Diff. Public Spending per Capita 0.0549 0.0878 0.1005*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Tax Impact (5 years) -0.0046** -0.0045** -0.0042**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Distance to core city -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0012
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Density -0.0000*** -0.0000* -0.0000***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of Merger Population -0.0029** -0.0030*** -0.0030***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -1.9999 -1.5472 -3.3096**
(1.40) (1.38) (1.34)
N 194 194 194
R2 0.498 0.515 0.565
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Clustered (by merger) robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
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Table 3.B.6: Interactions between Continuous Income and Language Variables: Probit Results (Robustness Check:
Median Income)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Diff. Median Income (thousands) 0.1427* 0.0584 -0.0098 0.0779
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11)
Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0445** -0.0177 -0.1354** -0.1014
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
Diff. Median Income * Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0232** 0.0344*** 0.0345**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Larger Proportion English-speaking 1.0678*** 1.1057*** 1.5906*** 1.4532***
(0.37) (0.41) (0.48) (0.38)
Median Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Diff. House Values 0.0127** 0.0120**
(0.01) (0.01)
Diff. % of Votes for Bloc Québécois 0.1524*** 0.1412***
(0.04) (0.04)
(Diff. Median Income)2 -0.0084
(0.01)
(Diff. English-Speaking Proportion)2 -0.0005
(0.00)
Diff. Public Spending per Capita 0.3458 0.5586** 0.7859*** 0.8125***
(0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26)
Tax Impact (5 years) -0.0518** -0.0490** -0.0516*** -0.0516***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Distance to core city -0.0344 -0.0375 -0.0144** -0.0126**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Density -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0003*** -0.0003***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of Merger Population -0.0418*** -0.0460*** -0.0460*** -0.0456***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) 0.0007* 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0006
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -1.9999 -1.5472 -3.3096** -3.3955**
(1.40) (1.38) (1.34) (1.46)
N 194 194 194 194
Pseudo-R2 0.580 0.606 0.686 0.691
χ2-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Table reports Probit coefficients. Clustered (by merger) robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
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Table 3.B.7: Interactions between Continuous Income and Language Variables: OLS Results (Robustness Check:
Turnout)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Diff. Median Income (thousands) 0.0234 0.1040** 0.0881* 0.0634
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0077 -0.0003 0.0097 -0.0088
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Diff. Median Income * Diff. English-Speaking Proportion -0.0001 0.0016 0.0024* 0.0044**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Larger Proportion English-speaking 0.1560* 0.1649** 0.1521* 0.1840**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Poorer than Merging Partners 0.0117 0.0544 0.0457 -0.0048
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Turnout 0.0124*** 0.0130*** 0.0132*** 0.0124***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Diff. House Values 0.0008
(0.00)
Diff. % of Votes for Bloc Québécois 0.0214**
(0.01)
(Diff. Median Income)2 -0.0076** -0.0063* -0.0050
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(Diff. Median Income)2 * Diff. English-Speaking Proportion -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(Diff. English-Speaking Proportion)2 -0.0002** -0.0001
(0.00) (0.00)
Diff. Public Spending per Capita 0.1105*** 0.1777*** 0.1858*** 0.1923***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Tax Impact (5 years) -0.0084*** -0.0089*** -0.0086*** -0.0081***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Distance to core city -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0023
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Density -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of Merger Population -0.0042 -0.0049 -0.0057 -0.0060
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0003*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.5848** -0.7621*** -0.7582*** -0.7167**
(0.28) (0.25) (0.26) (0.30)
N 81 81 81 81
R2 0.551 0.588 0.602 0.646
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Clustered (by merger) robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
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Table 3.B.8: Interactions between Continuous Income and Language Variables: Probit Results (Ro-
bustness Check: Turnout)
(1) (2) (3)
Diff. Median Income (thousands) 0.0452 0.5581** 0.5221**
(0.05) (0.28) (0.23)
Diff. English-Speaking Proportion -0.0161 0.0698** -0.0080
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
Diff. Median Income * Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0282** 0.0163** 0.0202**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Larger Proportion English-speaking 0.8191 0.8523 1.5530*
(0.61) (0.69) (0.84)
Poorer than Merging Partners 0.5679 0.8325 0.3281
(0.57) (0.66) (0.81)
Turnout 0.0842*** 0.0892*** 0.1287***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Diff. House Values -0.0059
(0.01)
Diff. % of Votes for Bloc Québécois 0.1670***
(0.06)
(Diff. Median Income)2 -0.0380** -0.0313**
(0.02) (0.02)
(Diff. English-Speaking Proportion)2 -0.0015*** -0.0012
(0.00) (0.00)
Diff. Public Spending per Capita 0.8268*** 1.0189*** 1.0458**
(0.25) (0.24) (0.53)
Tax Impact (5 years) -0.0456** -0.0561* -0.0669***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Distance to core city -0.0030 -0.0040 -0.0176**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Density 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of Merger Population -0.0401 -0.0373 -0.0485
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0014*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -6.6977*** -8.2723*** -11.5480***
(2.10) (2.22) (2.30)
N 81 81 81
Pseudo-R2 0.630 0.664 0.743
χ2-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Table reports Probit coefficients. Clustered (by merger) robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
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Table 3.B.9: Interactions between Income and Language Variables (Using Thresholds): Probit
Results (Robustness Check: Turnout)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income
Diff. Median Income (thousands) 0.5407** 0.1529**
(0.23) (0.07)
Small Income Differences (mean) -0.7108
(0.53)
Small Income Differences (median) -0.6571
(0.55)
Language
Diff. English-Speaking Proportion 0.0647** 0.0694***
(0.03) (0.03)
Small Language Differences (mean) -1.0702
(0.72)
Small Language Differences (median) -1.2713
(0.85)
Interaction Language x Income
Relevant Interaction term -0.4619** -0.0544 -0.0118 -0.0216
(0.21) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03)
Larger Proportion English-speaking 0.7881 0.9959* 0.8790 0.8511
(0.70) (0.56) (0.54) (0.54)
Poorer than Merging Partners 0.1552 0.5102 0.3834 0.4057
(0.60) (0.44) (0.54) (0.56)
Turnout 0.1031*** 0.0800*** 0.0922*** 0.0904***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Diff. Public Spending per Capita 0.7935*** 0.5056*** 0.6454*** 0.5905***
(0.25) (0.14) (0.18) (0.18)
Tax Impact (5 years) -0.0723** -0.0351* -0.0501** -0.0493**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Distance to core city -0.0029 -0.0110 -0.0016 -0.0073
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Density 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of Merger Population -0.0590* -0.0626 -0.0379 -0.0414
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Size of Largest Town in Merger (thousands) -0.0006 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -6.7096*** -5.6041*** -6.4841*** -6.2655***
(2.36) (1.73) (2.27) (2.18)
N 81 81 81 81
Pseudo-R2 0.699 0.613 0.588 0.591
χ2-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Table reports Probit coefficients. Clustered (by merger) robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
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Table 3.B.10: Interactions between Income and Language Variables (Using
Thresholds): Probit Marginal Effects (Robustness Check: Turnout)
(1) (2)
M.E. of Income M.E. of Language
Large Language Differences (mean) 0.0663**
(0.03)
Small Language Differences (mean) 0.0076
(0.00)
p-value, t-test 0.042**
Large Language Differences (median) 0.0270**
(0.01)
Small Language Differences (median) 0.0082**
(0.00)
p-value, t-test 0.079*
Large Income Differences (mean) 0.0094***
(0.00)
Small Income Differences (mean) 0.0078**
(0.00)
p-value, t-test 0.727
Large Income Differences (median) 0.0097***
(0.00)
Small Income Differences (median) 0.0072**
(0.00)
p-value, t-test 0.547
Note: Calculated from the Probit coefficients with clustered standard errors. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
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Table 3.B.11: Probit Estimations Including the Weighted Average of the Percentage of Register Signatures in Neighbouring Towns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Avg. % Register Signatures 0.0829** 0.0916* 0.0805** 0.0948*
(Language-weighted) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Avg. % Register Signatures 0.0556* 0.0785 0.0542* 0.0848*
(Population-weighted) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Diff. Median Income (thousands) 0.1585*** 0.1569** 0.0716 0.0652 0.1714*** 0.1621** 0.0838 0.0664
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11)
Diff. % English-Speakers 0.0306** 0.0410** -0.0320 -0.0353 0.0354** 0.0434** -0.0282 -0.0344
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Interaction Term 0.0210** 0.0250* 0.0218** 0.0253*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
More English-Speaking 0.3545 0.8040 0.3191 0.8508 0.2593 0.7675 0.2161 0.8250
(0.43) (0.73) (0.45) (0.75) (0.43) (0.71) (0.44) (0.74)
Poorer than Merging Partners 0.3680 -0.7518 0.6316 -0.1972 0.3981 -0.7496 0.6730 -0.1977
(0.50) (0.62) (0.46) (0.50) (0.48) (0.61) (0.46) (0.50)
Constant -3.4193*** -3.1909** -3.1618*** -2.7142** -2.9402*** -3.0533** -2.7098*** -2.5934**
(0.80) (1.28) (0.78) (1.10) (0.70) (1.31) (0.71) (1.12)
N 72 70 72 70 73 70 73 70
Pseudo-R2 0.410 0.622 0.456 0.649 0.392 0.615 0.440 0.644
χ2 34.9 45.7 24.4 44.0 31.6 44.9 22.7 44.3
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
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Chapter 4
An Experimental Study of Secession
Under Alternative Levels of
Decentralisation1
1A preliminary version of this chapter appeared in Bjedov (2015). This chapter was prepared in collaboration
with Tjasa Bjedov, Thierry Madiès, and Marie-Claire Villeval. This research was supported by a grant from the
University of Fribourg and was performed within the framework of the LABEX CORTEX (ANR-11-LABX-0042)
of the University of Lyon, within the program “Investissements d’Avenir” (ANR-11-IDEX-007). The authors are
grateful to Quentin Thévenent for the programmation of the experiment. This chapter benefited from discussions
with researchers at the IQSS (Harvard University), and was presented at the Universities of Fribourg and Lyon,
and at the Journées de Microéconomie Appliquée, in Besançon (France).
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4.1 Introduction
In recent decades, we observe two parallel trends. First, many new independent states have
emerged, either through secession, decolonisation or through the dismantling of existing coun-
tries. Recently, for example, South Sudan gained its independence from Sudan, and central
governments in Belgium (Flanders), the United Kingdom (Scotland), and Spain (Catalonia)
have been dealing with secessionist movements in some regions of their countries. Simulta-
neously to these separatist trends, both OECD and developing countries have experienced an
increase in fiscal and political decentralization. Nowadays, for example, the OECD counts about
140 000 sub-national governments, made more powerful and influential by the decentralization
trend of the last twenty years (OECD, 2014).
These two parallel trends raise the question whether decentralization can suppress secession-
ist groups. For example, when central governments are confronted with a secessionist threat in
one or more regions they might decide to devolve some power or competences to the regional
entity, in the hope that the decentralization of power will accommodate regional demands and
thereby quell the separatist movement (Sorens 2004; Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson, 2004;
Miodownik and Cartrite, 2009). However, granting a region greater autonomy may have two op-
posing effects. On the one hand, greater autonomy brings the overall mix of public goods closer
to the local preferences, and more generally increases the confidence of citizens that their inter-
ests are well or even better represented. On the other hand, as argued by Lustick, Miodownik
and Eidelson (2004: 210): “creating autonomous, federal, or otherwise devolved institutions of
self-government or self-administration [...] is liable to contribute to secessionism by affording
elites and groups the political resources they need to undertake mass mobilization and wage
separatist struggles.” Consequently, devolving the power of self-administration to other layers of
government is a double-edged sword. As such, it is not clear whether decentralization actually
decreases the probability of a country to break up. Ezgi (2009) makes a similar argument, rea-
soning that the effect of decentralisation on secession movements depend on the nature of the
regions’ grievances. If they are material, such that the conflict arises from, e.g., the composition
of public goods, then decentralisation will reduce secession incentives. However, if grievances are
symbolic (e.g., they result from ethnic differences), then decentralisation does nothing to reduce
secession incentives, and instead just provides regions with self-governing experience, essentially
reducing the costs of secession. The objective of this chapter is to find whether decentralisation
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increases or decreases the probability votes for regional secession, using a laboratory experiment.
This question is more than theoretical. For example, following the rise in popularity of the
Scottish nationalist movement in the 1960s and 1970s, the central government in the United
Kingdom started entertaining the idea of making concessions to that region. In 1973, the
Royal Commission on the Constitution submitted a report, proposing the creation of regional
parliaments (including in Scotland), a proposal that materialised with the Scotland Act of
1998. Nevertheless, Scotland organised, in 2014, a referendum on secession. Without observing
the counter-factual, it is virtually impossible to know whether the increased decentralization
helped keep the Union together, or if it actually contributed to the growth of the secessionist
movement. Another example is Canada, where following the failed referendums in the province
of Quebec, central governments have devolved the administration (at least in part) of a number
of programs, such as the public pension system, to provinces that asked for it (mostly Quebec).
The economic analysis of secession is mostly theoretical, including the seminal contributions
of Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Bolton and Roland (1997). These papers highlight the
importance of the basic trade-off at play between a better matching between the public goods
and the preference of voters in smaller jurisdictions and the economies of scale to be gained
in larger jurisdictions. The rarity (and idiosyncrasies) of actual secessions make it difficult
to analyse real-world secessionist movements empirically (Spolaore, 2008). Some authors who
attempted such analyses include Bakke and Wibbels (2006), Sorens (2004), Brancati (2006),
and Ezgi (2009). This chapter instead turns to a laboratory experiment to study the decision
of “sub-national” groups to secede. Specifically, we examine the effects on secession votes of
(1) different levels of decentralization in the supply of public goods and of (2) the salience of
local group identities on the decision to secede. While the laboratory imposes restrictions on
the complexity of the institutions that can be modelled, it has the advantage of creating a large
dataset of comparable instances of secession votes, with no endogeneity problem inherent to
most empirical studies. The other advantage is the possibility to modify institutions to study
how it affects the decision to vote for a secession, keeping everything else constant.
To this purpose, we build an original experimental design based on a multiple public good
game using the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) (Isaac and Walker, 1988). When
arriving at the laboratory, subjects are randomly put into groups. The large groups, which
we name global groups, are composed of 9 subjects. These 9 subjects are then divided in 3
local groups of 3 subjects. Consequently, each subject is a member of two groups, and interacts
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with others in these two groups. The public goods game has multiple public goods supplied at
two different levels: at the local level and at the global level. All 9 subjects in a global group
contribute to the global public goods, while subjects can only contribute to the local public
goods corresponding to their own local group. Since there are more individuals in the global
group, the global public good has a higher potential social return. Additionally, the marginal
per capita returns (MPCR) of these two types of public goods are different. Namely, the MPCR
is 0.5 for the local public goods and 0.2 for the global public goods.
The timing of the experiment is as follows. In the first part, subjects decide the share
of their endowment to contribute to each group account while keeping the remainder on their
private account. After 12 periods under this configuration, the second part takes place, in which
subjects repeat the exercise, but with three local public goods for the same number of periods.
This configuration allows the subjects to experience a “seceded” configuration (basically full
decentralisation).2 At the beginning of the third part of the experiment, individuals are asked
to vote over these two institutional arrangements, knowing that they will play the next 12
periods in the configuration that obtained the majority of votes. A vote for three local public
goods is therefore essentially a vote for a local secession.
Our experiment uses a 2× 2 design, where the two dimensions of treatment are the level of
decentralisation and the salience of the local group identity. The first dimension, the level of
decentralisation, modifies the configuration of the public goods available to the subjects. In the
Centralisation treatments, subjects face two global public goods and one local public good. In
the Decentralization treatments, the first part of the experiment is modified. Subjects instead
contribute to one global public goods and two local public goods. The other features of this
treatment are identical to those described in the Centralisation treatment.
The second dimension is the salience of local group identities. In the Identity treatment, we
use a different procedure for the formation of local groups. Remember that without the Identity
treatment, local groups were randomly constructed. When the Identity treatment is applied,
groups were constituted based on the proximity of the subjects’ opinions in a preliminary ques-
tionnaire. Each local group is formed with subjects that share the closest opinions.
Overall, we therefore obtain four different treatment groups: centralisation without local
identity, centralisation with local identity, decentralisation without local identity, and decen-
tralisation without local identity. Our experimental design tests the effects of the treatments
2We control for order effects by switching the order of Parts 1 and 2 in half of the sessions.
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on contribution levels and on the probability of votes for secession. In our paper, a vote for
secession is defined as a vote for the institutional arrangement that includes only local public
goods.
Our results show that the Decentralisation treatment increases the contributions to the local
public goods. Regarding the votes, the Decentralisation treatment decreases the probability
that subjects vote for secession, indicating that when subjects have more interactions with their
smaller group, they are less likely to vote for a secession. This result is true even net of the
effect of contributions on votes. Indeed, we also find that subjects vote less for secession when
the global group is more cooperative, and vote more for secession when the local group is more
cooperative. Finally, the Identity treatment does not affect significantly the level of individual
contributions, nor the votes of subjects.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 surveys the related literature.
Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures and states our predictions. Section
4 reports the experimental results, while Section 5 briefly discusses them and concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
This chapter relates to several strands of the economic literature, including experimental papers
with multiple public goods, experimental papers in which subjects endogenously choose their
groups, as well as the experimental literature on group identity. This section will review some
important contributions from these different strands.
This chapter is related to other experimental papers that study contribution behaviour
under multiple public goods games. These papers include one by Bernasconi et al. (2009),
who explore how contributions differ when a single group of subjects contributes to one public
good or to multiple public goods. They show that the aggregated contributions of the subjects
increase when a single public good is later split into two identical public goods. In this chapter,
we also split our public goods in multiple identical public goods (for example, some subjects
will contribute to two local public goods). However, in our case, the total number of goods is
always three.
McCarter, Samak and Sheremeta (2013) also run an experiment where subjects are facing
two public goods. Instead of varying the number of public goods, they vary the how subjects
are matched with each other. In one treatment, subjects play both public goods with the same
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group of players, while in the other treatment, subjects play each public good with a different
group of players. Their results support the idea that individuals are conditional cooperators.
Indeed, participants matched with different groups shift their contributions towards the more
cooperative group. This result will be important in the analysis of our experiment, but we differ
from their experiment by having multiple public goods of one type, and by allowing subjects to
choose which group(s) they wish to continue interacting with in the middle of the experiment.
Other papers look specifically at the outcomes under local and global public goods. Projects
at a local level can provide more direct and larger benefits to their members than global projects
that are distributed over more individuals. Additionally, interacting in local groups enables
mutual monitoring and creates opportunities to gain social approval. These two factors have a
positive effect on cooperation, especially because they are prerequisites of conditional cooper-
ation (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Gächter 2007). Thus, the return from
contributing to a local public good is higher. However, individuals may prefer more efficient
outcomes and choose actions that maximise social surplus. Since more individuals can con-
tribute to the provision of a global public good, contributions to the global public goods may
lead to higher efficiency.
Before looking at papers that directly analyse local and global groups, it is thus important
to understand the potential effects of different marginal per capita returns (MPCR) and group
sizes. The literature shows that participants in sessions with a high marginal per capita return3
contribute more that participants in sessions with a low marginal per capita return (MPCR)
(Marwell and Ames (1979); Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984); and Isaac McCue and Plott
(1985)). Furthermore, Kim and Walker (1984) and Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993) find that
participants significantly increase (decrease) their contributions when the marginal per capita
return is increased (decreased) during the experiment. Regarding group size, Isaac and Walker
(1988) show that increasing the group size from 4 to 10 participants (while keeping the marginal
per capita return fixed) increases the average contributions of the participants. In a subsequent
study, Isaac, Walker and Williams (1991) find that a group of 40 participants contributed a
larger portion of their endowment than groups of 4 or 10 participants with the same marginal
per capita return.
3The marginal per capita return (or the marginal payoff) corresponds to the factor that multiplies the total
amount of contributions invested in the public good. It determines how much each participant will get for every
unit invested (by any of the participants) in the public good and independently of the fact that a participant is
a free-rider or not.
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Turning to experiments with local and global groups, Wachsman (2002) builds a public goods
experiment in which participants can allocate their endowment to a local group account with a
relatively high marginal per capita return and a global group account with a lower marginal per
capita return. When participants were not allowed to communicate with their local group, they
allocated more resources to the global group account, suggesting that individuals assign greater
importance to the potential payoff4 of the global group account than to the higher MPCR of
the local group account. When communication was allowed, subjects attempted to coordinate
their contributions to the global group account with members of the other local groups.
Our experiment does not allow communication, so it is closer to the work of Fellner and
Lünser (2008). In their experiment, they find that stable cooperation is only achieved for the
local public good. Individuals first attempt to cooperate for the global public good, especially
when it has a higher potential payoff (they vary the MPCR of the global account), but this
tendency rapidly collapses and cooperation builds up and remains stable in the provision of the
local public good instead. Fellner and Lünser (2008) only provide subjects with information
on the contributions from local group members, reflecting how it is easier to monitor local
group members. In turn, this helps explain their results: cooperation was more sustained in
local groups. In contrast, our experiment provides feedback on contributions by both groups.
Notably, subjects are able to observe whether their fellow local group members contribute
significant amounts to the global good as well as the local good.
Blackwell and McKee (2003) also study contributions to local and public goods, while varying
the returns of one of the accounts. The local account has a marginal per capita return of 0.3
that remains fixed through all the sessions while the global account has a return that varies
across treatments, taking on four possible values: 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, and 0.3. They introduce the
concept of average per capita return (APCR) for the comparison of the relative payoffs from the
global public good and local public goods.5 The results indicate that when the APCR of the
global public good exceeds the APCR of the local public good, individuals contribute more to
the global public good but do not reduce their contributions to the local public good. Blackwell
and McKee (2011) also find that individuals contribute more to a local public good (with a
smaller group), even across three different cultures: US, Russia, and Kazakhstan.
4The potential per capita return (or the potential payoff) corresponds to the maximal possible payoff each
participant can get from a public good when all participants contribute the totality of their endowment. It is
positively correlated to the number of participants playing the public good game.
5The APCR a theoretical tool only, expressing how much a subject in the whole session receives, on average,
for each token contributed to the good.
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Finally, Nitta (2014) investigates individuals’ simultaneous contributions to a local and a
global public good with heterogeneous endowments. His key finding is that overall contributions
are higher when endowments are homogeneous across local groups (i.e., every subject receives
the same endowment). Interestingly, when endowments are heterogeneous (i.e., endowments
vary by local group), subjects contribute more the local public good and less to the global
public good. In our experiment, we do not consider differences in endowment, focusing instead
on the role of different institutional arrangements.
Other papers let subjects choose, to some degree, their membership to groups. One example
is Page et al. (2005), who find that voluntary association can mitigate the free-rider problem.
Indeed, in their experiment, subjects sorted themselves into groups of high and low contributors.
Charness and Yang (2014) also let subjects form endogenous groups via voting: groups can be
merged, individuals can be cast out, and individuals can “secede” from their group. They
also find that such institutions can increase contributions. In contrast to these two examples,
subjects in our experiment have less freedom in choosing their fellow group members. We impose
such a feature deliberately, mimicking how real-world secessions can usually only be done by
pre-determined regions. Indeed, it would be virtually impossible for many non-contiguous sub-
regions to secede together from a larger country, for example.
Finally, this chapter is related to the literature in both psychology and economics about
group identity and how it affects contribution behaviour. For instance, Campbell (1958) argues
that grouping individuals into a reference group enhances cooperation amongst members of the
group. Later, Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1996), Dufwenberg and Muren (2006), Buchan,
Johnson and Croson (2006), and Ahmed (2007) have shown that group identity as well as social
distance, defined as the perceived affinity and nearness between people or groups, are important
factors of the economic decision-making. Luttmer (2001) shows, empirically, that individuals
may dislike providing social welfare when recipients are of another ethnic group, while Falk et
al. (2013) bring evidence that individuals have a differentiated cooperative attitude towards
the different groups they are affiliated with. Similarly, Carpenter and Cardenas (2011) report
evidence of a significant change in the behaviour of individuals in a common pool resource game
depending on the cultural diversity within the group.
Even in situations in which individuals have been assigned to groups based on arbitrary char-
acteristics, they treat the members of their group differently than members of other groups (Fes-
tinger 1954; Tajfel et al. 1971; Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Tajfel (1970) named this
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experimental technique the minimal group paradigm. Following the minimal group paradigm
of Tajfel (1970), Chen and Li (2009) and Chakravarty and Fonseca (2012) study the effects of
induced group identity on social preferences and public good provision, relying, in their experi-
mental designs, on artificially-induced identities. They introduce identity through an arbitrary
task completely unrelated to the main focus of the experiment. Subjects were asked to review
the paintings of two modern artists, Paul Klee and Wassily Kandinsky. Groups were formed
according to the preferences of the participants for these two artists. In our experimental design,
we have two degrees of local group identity. First, when individuals are placed in three local
groups randomly, we may assume, based on the minimal group paradigm, that our experimental
design induced a local group identity. To reinforce this local group identity, we apply a second
treatment in which subjects were asked to answer a short questionnaire, and were then grouped
with the 2 other subjects (out of 9) that expressed the opinions nearest to theirs.
4.3 The Experiment
Our experiment employs a 2 × 2 research design. We thus have a total of 4 treatment groups,
differing on two dimensions. The first treatment dimension is the configuration of the public
goods (decentralization or not), and the second is the creation of local group identity. In each
treatment participants interacted under a partner matching protocol.
4.3.1 The Baseline Experimental Protocol
We first describe the basic experimental protocol, used in the sessions where there was no
decentralisation or local identity (i.e., the Baseline treatment, or, as will be introduced later,
the Cent-NI treatment). Before the start of the first part the computer program forms randomly
groups of 9 subjects. Each group of 9 subjects is composed of three sub-groups of 3 subjects.
A group of 9 subjects is called a “global group” and a sub-group of 3 subjects a “local group”.
A global group thus comprises 3 local groups labelled A, B and C. Each subject is at the same
time a member of a local group with 2 other subjects and a member of a global group that
includes his local group and the 6 members of the two other local groups (see Figure 4.1).
A session consists of 36 periods divided in three parts of 12 periods each. In each part
subjects can contribute to three public goods. Public goods are either local or global. Two
main differences distinguish local public goods from global public goods. First, their potential
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Note: This figure illustrates the formation of the groups. It shows how the three local groups
are embedded in a global group. Arrows represent contributions to public goods. Subjects
of different genders are randomly assigned to groups.
Figure 4.1: Formation of Local and Global Groups
contributors are different. While only 3 subjects can contribute to a local public good, all 9
subjects can contribute to the global public good. Consequently, the global public good has a
higher social return. Second, local and global public goods have different marginal per capita
returns (MPCR). Namely, the MPCR is 0.5 for the local public goods and 0.2 for the global
public goods. Thus, each Experimental Currency Unit (ECU) allocated to a local group account
pays back 0.5 ECU while each ECU allocated to a global group account pays back 0.2 ECU.
At the beginning of each period, each participant receives an endowment of 60 ECU to allocate
between a private account, a local group account and a global group account. Participants
can allocate all of the 60 ECU endowment to a single account (and 0 to the others), or split
it between multiple accounts. The private account yields a one-to-one return. Players do not
observe contribution decisions of any other player before they make their own choices. The
payoff of subject i, pii, equals:
pii = (60− ci) + 0.5
3∑
j=1
cj + 0.2
9∑
k=1
ck
where ci is player i’s contribution to the local and global public goods, and cj and ck that of
each local group member, j = 1, 2, 3 and global group member, k = 1, ..., 9.
In the first part of the Baseline treatment, at each period players have to choose how many
ECU of their endowment (between 0 and 60) to contribute to the unique local group account
and to two global public accounts, with the remainder kept in their private account. The total
amount contributed to the local public account times the MPCR is shared equally among the 3
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local group members while the total amount contributed to the global public accounts times the
MPCR is equally shared among the 9 global group members (see instructions in the appendix
for snapshots of computer screens displayed to participants).
After each period, each participant is informed of his individual contributions to each one
of the three public goods, his payoff, the total contributions of the global group to each good,
and the total contributions of the local group to each good (i.e., both local and global goods).
Participants are not informed of the contributions by the members of the two other local groups
of which they are not members.
In the 12 periods of the second part of the Baseline treatment subjects can contribute to
3 local public goods. There is no more global public goods. At each of the 12 periods players
have to choose how to allocate their endowment between these three local group accounts and
their private account.
After having experienced the settings of part 1 and part 2, subjects are asked at the beginning
of the third (and last) part to express their preference for one of these two configurations with
a vote between two options:
• The option with one local group account and two global group account (as in part 1)
• The option with three local group accounts (as in part 2).
Subjects can answer yes to only one of these two options. The final outcome of the vote is
based on a double majority rule. Concretely, the computer program first determines how many
members voted in favour of three local public goods in each local group. The majority is attained
when two members out of three voted for that configuration. Then, the computer calculates
how many local groups attained a majority in favour of that situation. Again, majority is
reached when two local groups out of three voted for the same situation. The third part of the
experiment is the application of the configuration that won the vote to all local groups.
A double majority rule was necessary to ensure that subjects would end up in a configu-
ration they already experienced, namely either public goods with only the members of their
local group, or public goods with both the members of their local groups and all 8 other mem-
bers of the global group. Allowing a single local group to secede would create global groups
of six people only, which would be a completely new situation for the subjects and bring ad-
ditional uncertainty. Concretely, a double majority rule resembles decentralised countries such
as Switzerland, for instance, where the use of double majority rule is common in referendums
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and popular initiatives. It also captures some aspect of secession decisions in countries such
as Canada, which adopted a law that allows some level of federal oversight in the decision of
provinces to secede.
Finally, to account for the effect of the order in which parts 1 and 2 are played on the
outcome of the vote, each treatment is conducted with parts 1 and 2 inverted. Figure 4.2
schematises the parts of the experiment.
Note: GPG and LPG stands for global public goods and local public goods, respectively.
Figure 4.2: The Basic Experimental Protocol
4.3.2 The Decentralization Treatment
The difference between the Baseline and Decentralization treatments is the number of public
goods in each category. Instead of two global public goods and one local public good, there
will be one global public good and two local public goods. As a result, players at each period
have to choose how many ECU of their endowment (between 0 and 60) to contribute to the two
local group accounts and to the unique global group account, with the remainder kept in their
private account.
All the other features of the Decentralization treatment are identical to those of the Baseline
treatment. This treatment aims at testing whether individuals vote differently at the beginning
of the third stage after experiencing a different configuration where more local group accounts
are available. Figure 4.3 schematises the Decentralization treatment.
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Note: GPG and LPG stands for global public goods and local public goods, respectively.
Figure 4.3: The Experimental Protocol Under the Decentralisation Treatment
4.3.3 The Identity Treatment
The difference between the Baseline and the Identity treatments is the reinforcement of local
identity, prior to the procedure as explained above. As the literature shows (Festinger 1954;
Tajfel et al. 1971; Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979), placing participants of an experiment
in random groups and simply labelling those groups already creates group identity. Thus, even
when we do not apply the Identity treatment, members of local groups already share a local
group identity. The Identity treatment reinforces this local group identity and tests how it affects
the outcome of the vote. In particular, we test if emphasising local group identity increases the
tendency of subjects to vote for secession (i.e., in favour of three local public goods).
As in previous treatments, at the beginning of the experiment the computer program ran-
domly forms groups of 9. But in the Identity treatment, subjects are not assigned randomly
to local groups. Instead, they are grouped according to a measure of their general preferences
(arts, sports, etc.).
Prior to the first part of the experiment, subject respond to a short questionnaire. The
questionnaire contained four statements to which subjects were asked to give an appreciation
by selecting one of the four following options: 1. I strongly disagree, 2. I disagree, 3. I agree,
and 4. I strongly agree.6 Once the questionnaire is completed the computer program used
an algorithm to form the local groups according to the proximity of the answers given to the
6The statements in the questionnaire covered subjects unrelated to the experiment. See the instructions in
the appendix for a detailed presentation of the questionnaire.
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different statements.
At the local level, each subject is thus paired with the two other subjects that, among
the overall group of 9 subjects, express the opinions nearest to his. As a result, each local
group is formed with subjects that share the closest opinions. Consequently, from the point of
view of each local group, members of the other two local groups have opinions more distant to
them. All the other characteristics of the Identity treatments are identical to the Baseline and
Decentralization treatments.
4.3.4 Predictions
In all treatments, assuming that players maximise their own earnings, the sub-game perfect
equilibrium is to not contribute at all to the public goods, regardless of the category. Indeed,
the marginal per capita returns of both types of public goods are always lower than the marginal
return of the private goods. In contrast, the socially optimal behaviour is to contribute entirely
to the global public good, as 0.5 · 3 > 1 as well as 0.2 · 9 > 1. However, as previous laboratory
experimental studies on public good games reported that individuals do, generally, contribute
to the public good (Ledyard, 1995), our first prediction is that contributions to both categories
of public goods will not be zero.
Hypothesis 4.1.A. Individuals will contribute positive amounts to both categories of public
goods.
The next hypothesis pertains to how individuals behave within local and global groups. To
the extent that the subjects identify more as a member of their local group, they will have a
preference for contributing to local public goods. We expect local groups to be more cohesive,
leading to larger contributions to local public goods. Fellner and Lünser (2008), for example,
show that cooperation is easier to sustain in the smaller group. Free riding in local groups is
also easier to detect and, consequently, less likely to occur. For these reasons, in addition to a
higher MPCR, we hypothesise that individuals will contribute more to local public goods.
Hypothesis 4.1.B. Individuals will contribute more to the local public goods.
The next two hypotheses concern the effect of the treatments on the contribution behaviour
of the subjects. First, we make the hypothesis that the Decentralisation treatment will incite
greater contributions to the local goods. Bernasconi et al. (2009) show that subjects contribute
more when there are two public goods than a single one. Therefore, we expect that contributions
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will be higher to any given type of good when subjects face multiple goods of that type. This
hypothesis translates how decentralisation usually implies more spending and public goods at
the local level.
Hypothesis 4.2.A. The Decentralisation treatment will lead to more contributions to the local
public goods.
Similarly, we make the hypothesis that the Identity treatment will incite greater contribu-
tions to local goods. Indeed, as subjects identify with other members of the local group more
strongly, we expect that they will contribute more, and that this cooperation will be easier to
sustain.
Hypothesis 4.2.B. The Identity treatment will lead to more contributions to the local public
goods.
We are ultimately interested in the effect of the treatments on the probability of secession
votes. Regarding the Decentralisation treatment, there are two effects at play. The first effect
operates through contributions. If, under decentralisation, contributions to the local public
goods are higher, subjects might be more likely to vote for secession. Indeed, faced with a
relatively more cooperative local group, subjects might decide they prefer only having local
goods. However, having a cooperative local group might reduce the need for subjects to leave
the global group. There might also be an effect net of contributions, although the direction is
ambiguous, as explained in the motivation to the chapter. We predict that decentralisation will
reduce the probability of votes for secession.
Hypothesis 4.3.A. The Decentralization treatment will decrease the probability for a group to
break up.
Regarding the Identity treatment was designed to emphasise local group identity. Therefore,
we expect that this treatment will increase the probability of secession votes.
Hypothesis 4.3.B. The Identity treatment will increase the probability of secession votes.
Following the argument of Ezgi (2009), we also test whether decentralisation and local
identities have synergistic effects on the decision to secede. Indeed, the desire of a local group
(or, in the real world, a region) to secede might be due to the widespread free-riding in the global
group, or to the fact that subjects in the local group feel closer to one another (for example,
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when we apply the Identity treatment). For that reason, decentralisation could be less efficient
at reducing secession votes when we reinforce local identities.
Hypothesis 4.3.C. The Identity treatment will reduce the effect of the Decentralisation treat-
ment on the probability of secession votes.
We also hypothesise that contributions by other members of both groups will affect the
individuals’ votes for secessions. In particular, when local group members contribute more to
public goods, it should incite more votes for secession. Indeed, it allows subjects to choose the
group members that they know are cooperators. Conversely, if global group members contribute
more to public goods, it should incite fewer votes for secession. Indeed, as the global goods have
potentially greater payoffs (given the larger number of participants), subjects that experience a
more cooperative global group will choose to continue sharing public goods with that group.
Hypothesis 4.4. Greater contributions to public goods by other members of the local (global)
group increases (decreases) the probability of a secession vote.
4.3.5 Procedures
The experiment consists of 33 sessions conducted at the GATE-LAB research institute located in
Lyon, France. The 432 participants were recruited from local engineering and business schools,
using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004). No subject participated in more than one session.
55.79% of the participants are females and their mean age is 22.97 years (S.D. = 6.22). We
organised three sessions per treatment. To account for the effect of the order in which parts 1
and 2 are played on the outcome of the vote, three supplementary sessions were organised for
each treatment with parts 1 and 2 inverted. This results in a total of six sessions per treatment.
108 participants took part in each treatment. The experiment was computerised using the
ZTree software package (Fischbacher, 2007). Table 4.1 summarises the characteristics of the
experimental sessions.
Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to a computer after drawing a tag from
an opaque bag. Sets of instructions were distributed at the beginning of each part and read
aloud. On average a session lasted 90 minutes, including payment. The participants were paid
the sum of their earnings in each period, at the rate of 100 Experimental Currency Units = 0.45
Euro. In addition, they were paid a 5 Euro show-up fee. On average, participants earned 17.12
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Table 4.1: Characteristics of the Experimental Sessions
Session Number of Treatment Name Decentralisation Identity Order
Number Participants
1 18 Cent-NI No No Mixed first
2 18 Cent-NI No No Mixed first
3 18 Cent-NI No No Mixed first
4 18 Decent-NI Yes No Mixed first
5 18 Decent-NI Yes No Mixed first
6 18 Decent-NI Yes No Mixed first
7 9 Cent-NI No No Three Local First
8 18 Cent-NI No No Three Local First
9 18 Decent-NI Yes No Three Local First
10 18 Decent-NI Yes No Three Local First
11 9 Cent-NI No No Three Local First
12 18 Cent-NI No No Three Local First
13 9 Decent-NI Yes No Three Local First
14 9 Decent-NI Yes No Three Local First
15 9 Cent-I No Yes Mixed first
16 9 Cent-I No Yes Mixed first
17 9 Decent-I Yes Yes Mixed first
18 9 Decent-I Yes Yes Mixed first
19 9 Cent-I No Yes Mixed first
20 9 Cent-I No Yes Mixed first
21 9 Cent-I No Yes Mixed first
22 9 Cent-I No Yes Mixed first
23 9 Decent-I Yes Yes Mixed first
24 9 Decent-I Yes Yes Mixed first
25 9 Decent-I Yes Yes Mixed first
26 18 Decent-I Yes Yes Three Local First
27 18 Cent-I No Yes Three Local First
28 9 Decent-I Yes Yes Three Local First
29 9 Cent-I No Yes Three Local First
30 9 Cent-I No Yes Three Local First
31 18 Cent-I No Yes Three Local First
32 18 Decent-I Yes Yes Three Local First
33 18 Decent-I Yes Yes Three Local First
Total 432
Note: The “Order” column refers to the order of the first two parts of the experiments. All subjects
experienced 12 periods with a mix of local and global public goods and 12 periods with only local
goods. The difference was in the ordering. Some sessions started in Part 1 with a mix of local and
global public goods, while others started Part 1 with only three local goods.
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Euro (S.D. = 1.68). Payments were made individually in cash and in private in a separate
room.
At the end of the experiment, we administered a demographic questionnaire including ques-
tions on gender, age, and relative wealth of the family compared to other students (on a scale
from 0 for the poorer to 10 for the wealthier).
4.4 Results
Our experiment yielded these main results:
4.1.A (Contributions) Subjects contribute non-null amounts to public goods
4.1.B (Contributions) Subjects contribute more to local goods.
4.2.A. (Contributions) The Decentralisation treatment increases contributions to local
goods, but has no effect on contributions to global goods.
4.2.B. (Contributions) The Identity treatment has no effect on individual contributions.
4.3.A. (Vote) The Decentralisation treatment decreases the probability of a secession vote.
4.3.B. (Vote) The Identity treatment has no effect on the probability of a secession vote.
4.4. (Vote) The probability of a secession vote is increased when local group members
contribute more, but decreased when global group members contribute more.
4.4.1 Preliminary Results on Contributions
Figure 4.4 illustrates the average individual contributions to local public goods (in blue) and to
global public goods (in red) in the four treatment categories for all periods (periods 1 to 36),
for periods before the vote (periods 1 to 24), and for those after the vote (periods 25 to 36).
First, note that contributions are positive on average, thus replicating the usual result of
public good games:
Result 4.1.A. Subjects contribute non-null amounts to the public goods.
Figure 4.4 also shows that (in all treatments) average individual contributions to both types
of goods are higher before the vote, when the institutional arrangement is exogenously imposed.
Therefore, implementing a setting that was decided endogenously by a vote did not encourage
the subjects to increase their contributions at a level higher than before the vote. Wilcoxon
175
Note: In blue we highlighted the average individual contributions to local public goods and in red
the average individual contributions to global public goods. We consider all periods taken together
(represented in dark blue and red), the periods before the vote (represented by middle blue and red),
and for the periods after the vote (represented by light blue and red). Numbers indicate mean values.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Figure 4.4: Average Individual Contributions by Types of Goods, Treatment, and Block of
Periods
tests (W, hereafter) at the global group level confirm that, in all the treatments, the mean
individual contributions (both to local and public goods) before the vote and in the last 12
periods after the vote are significantly different (W tests local goods: Cent-NI p = 0.0037;
Decent-NI p = 0.0029; Cent-I p = 0.0076; Decent-I p = 0.0060. W tests global goods: Cent-NI
p = 0.0180; Decent-NI p = 0.01117; Cent-I p = 0.01117; Decent-I p = 0.0077).
Figure 4.5 shows the evolution in average individuals contributions across the 36 periods,
separately for the two orders in which the experiments took place. In shades of red, it shows
average individual contributions when the experiment started with both types of public goods.
In this environment, subjects initially contribute more to local public goods, and there is a
large restart effect in Period 13, when subjects were faced only with local public goods. In that
environment, we observe a large restart effect after the vote, but only in cases where subjects
actually seceded (dashed line). Cooperation persists a few periods until breaking down in the
last periods. In blue and black, Figure 4.5 shows the results for the other ordering of the
experiment. Here, subjects initially contribute large amounts to local public goods in the first
12 periods, even more than those who also had public goods available, but we do not observe a
restart effect at Period 13. While contributions to the global goods initially surpass those to the
local goods, the pattern is reversed after a few periods. In that environment, a secession induces
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a similar important restart effect for contributions to the local goods (dashed line), although
cooperation is less persistent. For both orderings, contributions to global goods follow a similar
pattern in Periods 25 to 36.
Figure 4.5: Average Individual Contributions Across All Treatments, for Both Experimental
Ordering (by Period)
Figure 4.5 shows one result is common to both orderings of the experiment, in almost every
period:
Result 4.1.B. Subjects contribute more to local goods.
4.4.2 The Effect of the Treatments on Contributions
Table 4.2 compares contributions across treatments. First, it displays the average contributions
to each category of public good over each sequence of 12 periods. It also displays the average
percentage of maximum efficiency reached in each global group for each category of public good,
for the three parts of the experiment (12-period block).
Table 4.2 shows that contributions differ mostly between the two extreme cases: decentral-
isation with local identity, and centralisation without local identity (Decent-I vs. Cent-NI).
Indeed, two-tailed Mann-Whitney7 tests—MW, hereafter—comparing these two treatments in-
dicate that contributions to the local goods are higher in the first 12 periods in the Decent-I
7An independent observation corresponds to the contributions of each global group averaged over each se-
quence of 12 periods.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics on Contributions, by Treatment and Block of Periods
Variables Periods Cent-NI Decent-NI Cent-I Decent-I
Contributions to local public goods 1-12 22.79 (9.77) 28.69 (9.11) 26.23 (7.67) 31.02 (3.93)**
12-36 19.93 (10.82) 18.98 (10.93) 20.85 (12.09) 24.20 (10.59)
25-36 (secession) 17.36 (8.81) 9.49 (2.82) 21.28 (6.09) 24.07 (8.10)
25-36 (no secession) 9.93 (3.45) 13.69 (5.90) 13.06 (6.53) 17.14 (5.92)**
Contributions to global public goods 1-12 15.92 (3.43) 10.06 (4.69) 15.04 (4.79) 10.53 (5.34)
12-36 8.38 (5.28) 7.97 (5.85)* 13.63 (4.84)* 7.95 (1.89)
25-36 (no secession) 6.62 (3.81) 7.01 (4.42) 9.12 (4.39) 6.34 (4.15)
Average percentage of maximimum 1-12 37.98 47.82 43.71 44.84**
efficiency reached inb local 12-36 33.22 31.64 34.75 36.77
public goods (%) 25-36 (secession) 28.93 15.81 35.46 33.12
25-36 (no secession) 16.55 22.81 21.8 23.31**
Average percentage of maximimum 1-12 8.84 5.59 8.35 7.35
efficiency reached inb global 12-36 4.65 4.42 7.57 4.53
public goods (%) 25-36 (no secession) 3.67 3.89 5.06 3.59
Numbers indicate mean values. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The significance levels of two-tailed Mann–Whitney tests are
represented by ***, **, and *, with p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.10, respectively, in which we compare each treatment to the Cent-NoID
treatment. Each bloc of 12 periods gives only one independent observation for each global group.
treatment (MW p = 0.0377), as well as in the last block of the game when no secession took
place (MW p = 0.0172).
When administering the Decentralisation or Identity treatment alone, we only obtain sig-
nificant differences on contributions to global public goods in periods 13 to 24. For the Decen-
tralisation treatment alone, the difference is significant at the 10% level (MW test, p = 0.0547),
similarly for the Identity treatment alone (MW p = 0.0782).
The last two sections of Table 4.2 describe the average percentage of maximum efficiency
reached for each type of public goods. Notably, it shows that efficiency for local goods is
higher in the Decent-I treatment (decentralisation with local identities) than in the Cent-NoID
treatment, at least for the first and last 12 periods (without a secession).
To further analyse the determinants of contributions, Table 4.3 presents the estimations
from OLS models using random effects on our panel of 144 local groups, with standard errors
clustered at the local level (local groups are fixed throughout the session). The data only
includes contributions in periods 1 to 24, before the vote. Moreover, it only includes periods in
which both types of goods are available to the subjects.
In all the models our variables of interest are the dummy variables indicating the admin-
istration of the Decentralization and Identity treatments. We are also interested in the effect
of the previous contributions of fellow group members. In addition, we control for the order in
which parts one and two were played by adding a supplementary dummy that takes one when
the experimental secession started with three local public goods. We also add a time trend and
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control for various individual characteristics (age, gender and the wealth level).
In the first and second columns of Table 4.3, the dependent variables are individual contri-
butions to the local and global public good, respectively. In the third column, the dependent
variable is the difference between the contributions to the local good and those to the global
good (i.e., the individual’s bias towards the local goods).
Table 4.3: Determinants of Individual Contributions to Local and Global Goods, and of the
Difference Between Contributions to Each Type
Contributions to Contributions to Difference Between
Local Goods Global Goods Local and Global
Decentralisation 3.2187** -1.8997 4.9801**
(1.64) (1.52) (2.04)
Local Identity 0.3943 1.4654 -1.0561
(1.47) (1.44) (1.69)
Interaction Effect 1.9789 -0.9133 2.8345
(2.18) (1.98) (2.54)
Start with 3 Local Goods -7.1442*** -2.7897*** -4.2385***
(1.30) (1.03) (1.46)
Contributions by others 0.2147*** -0.0213* 0.2428***
to Local Goods (lagged) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Contributions by others 0.0019 0.0329*** -0.0330***
to global goods (lagged) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Period -0.4137*** -0.9090*** 0.4785***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.16)
Age 0.0304 0.2448*** -0.2155*
(0.10) (0.07) (0.12)
Gender 1.4869 1.7623** -0.2712
(1.06) (0.87) (1.22)
Wealth Level -0.4204 -0.3816* -0.0331
(0.27) (0.22) (0.29)
Constant 14.3151*** 11.6228*** 2.7646
(3.21) (2.68) (4.01)
N 4752 4752 4752
R2 0.339 0.149 0.208
χ2 570.4*** 357.7*** 301.4***
Clustered standard deviations in parentheses. Significance levels: *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), and *
(p<0.10).
Estimations only include periods in which subjects had to contribute to both types of goods.
The first column shows that the Decentralization treatment increases individual contribu-
tions to local goods, but the second column shows that this treatment has no effect on contribu-
tions to global goods. Put differently, when faced with two local goods, subjects increase their
contributions to that good, but the opposite is not true: when faced with two global goods,
subjects do not increase their contributions to those goods. Finally, the third column shows
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that decentralization increases contributions to the local good relative to the global good. We
can summarise the results as such:
Result 4.2.A. The Decentralisation treatment increases contributions to local goods, but has
no effect on contributions to global goods.
The contributions of fellow group members also affect contributions to public goods. In
particular, the third column shows that as members of an individual’s local group contribute
more to the local good, that subject then contributes relatively more to the local good. Con-
versely, as members of an individual’s global group contribute more to the global good, he or
she contributes relatively more to the global good.
The time trend has a negative effect indicating that individual contributions declined over
time, as expected. However, the time trend positively affects the relative contribution to the
local goods, indicating that as time advances, individuals contribute relatively more to the local
goods. The order in which parts one and two are played significantly affects contributions to
both types of public goods.
Table 4.4: Marginal Effects of the Decentralisation Treatment, at Both Values of the Identity Dimen-
sion
Contributions to Contributions to Difference Between
Local Goods Global Goods Local and Global
M.E. of Decentralisation under:
Reinforced Local Identity 5.1976*** -2.8130** 7.8146***
(1.53) (1.52) (1.70)
No Reinforcement of Local Identity 3.2187** -1.8997 4.9801**
(1.64) (1.28) (2.04)
χ2 (Wald test: equality of coefficients) 0.07 1.03 0.39
Standard deviations in parentheses. Significance levels: *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), and * (p<0.10).
Our regressions included interaction effects between the two treatments, to test whether the
increased saliency of local identities affected the effect of the Decentralisation treatment. Table
4.3 shows that the interaction term is not significant. Table 4.4 shows that the marginal effects
of the Decentralisation treatment are amplified by the reinforcement of local identity. However,
Wald tests indicate that the differences in the coefficients are not statistically significant. This
result, along with those of Table 4.3, are summarised as follows:
Result 4.2.B. The Identity treatment has no effect on individual contributions.
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4.4.3 The Effect of the Treatment on Votes for Secessions
We turn now to the analysis of the subjects’ votes, taking place before the third part of the
experiment. First, note that 159 subjects voted for secession, or 36.8 per cent of all subjects.
These votes translated into secessions in 16 global groups.8
Table 4.5: Determinants of Votes for Secession (Probit Coefficients and Marginal Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit M.E. Probit M.E. Probit M.E.
Decentralisation -0.3062 -0.1361*** -0.3124 -0.1375*** -0.2969 -0.1279***
(0.19) (0.04) (0.19) (0.04) (0.19) (0.04)
Local Identity 0.0618 -0.0252 0.0646 -0.0246 0.0747 -0.0170
(0.21) (0.04) (0.21) (0.04) (0.21) (0.04)
Interaction Effect -0.2867 -0.2892 -0.2608
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
Start with 3 Local Goods 1.0214*** 0.3105*** 1.0297*** 0.3110*** 1.0088*** 0.3018***
(0.16) (0.04) (0.16) (0.04) (0.16) (0.04)
Average Individual Contributions 0.0038 0.0012 0.0075 0.0023 0.0134* 0.0040*
to Local Goods (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Average Individual Contributions 0.0080 0.0024 0.0022 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000
to Global Goods (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Average Profits, Local Goods 0.0126 0.0038
(0.01) (0.00)
Average Profits, Global Goods -0.0656*** -0.0200***
(0.02) (0.01)
Average contributions
from local group members to:
All Public Goods 0.0080** 0.0024**
(0.00) (0.00)
Local Public Goods 0.0019 0.0006
(0.00) (0.00)
Global Public Goods 0.0182*** 0.0054***
(0.01) (0.00)
Average contributions -0.0078*** -0.0023*** -0.0107*** -0.0032***
from global group members (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age -0.0032 -0.0010 -0.0035 -0.0010 -0.0023 -0.0007
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Female 0.5685*** 0.1728*** 0.5758*** 0.1739*** 0.5757*** 0.1722***
(0.14) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04)
Wealth Level 0.0291 0.0088 0.0299 0.0090 0.0332 0.0099
(0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
Constant -1.1054*** -1.1218*** -1.0561**
(0.40) (0.41) (0.41)
N 432 432 432
Pseudo-R2 0.182 0.187 0.197
χ2 90.1 90.4 89.4
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), and * (p<0.10).
We estimate Probit models in which the dependent variable takes value 1 if an individual
voted in favour of secession, i.e. in favour of three local public goods, and 0 otherwise.
8Our voting rule (double majority) did not allow for secession by only one local group in any given global
group.
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Our variables of interest are the dummy variables for each treatment dimension (Decentral-
ization and Identity). We also include variables for the ordering of the experimental sessions
(equal to 1 when it started with three local public goods), as well as for the individual’s contribu-
tions and average profits from each type of good. We also control for individual characteristics
(age, gender and wealth level).
Table 4.5 presents the results of the regressions, as well as marginal effects. The difference
between the three models is the variable used to control for the degree of cooperation in the
different groups. First, in all models, we wee that the Decentralization treatment decreases the
probability that subjects vote for secession by about 13 per cent. This result is significant at
the 1% level.
Result 4.3.A. The Decentralisation treatment decreases the probability of a secession vote.
The Identity treatment, however, does not affect the outcome of the vote.
Result 4.3.B. The Identity treatment has no effect on the probability of a secession vote.
Furthermore, there is no indication of a significant interaction effect between the two treat-
ment dimensions. Table 4.6 shows the estimated marginal effects of the Decentralisation treat-
ment at both values of the Identity dimension.
Table 4.6: Marginal Effects of the Decentralisation Treatment on Votes for Secession, at Both
Values of the Identity Dimension
Vote for Secession
M.E. of Decentralisation under:
Reinforced Local Identity -0.1677***
(0.06)
No Reinforcement of Local Identity -0.0881
(0.06)
χ2 (Wald test: equality of coefficients) 0.13
Standard deviations in parentheses. Significance levels: *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), and * (p<0.10).
The marginal effect is only significant under the reinforced local identity, indicating that
decentralisation affects votes only when the local groups’ identities are made more salient.
However, a Wald test finds no significant difference between the values of the marginal effects.
We summarise the results on the Identity dimension as follows:
Result 4.3.C. The Identity treatment does not modify the marginal effect of the Decentralisa-
tion treatment on secession votes.
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Regarding the control variables, we first find that subjects are more likely to vote for secession
when the experiment starts with with three local public goods. Second, individual contributions
have no effect on vote behaviour. Finally, among the demographic variables, gender affects
voting behaviour. Namely, women vote more frequently in favour of secession. However, age
and wealth level have no effect on the vote.
4.4.4 The Effect of Group Contributions to Secession Votes
The average profits from public goods also affect the votes for secession. In particular, Table 4.5
(Columns 1 and 2) shows that when subjects receive higher profits from the global public goods,
the probability that they vote for secession is lower. The marginal effects of Column 2 indicate
that for each additional unit of experimental currency in profit, the probability decreases by
about 2 per cent. The average profits from global goods, over the 432 individuals, is of 10.1 units
with a standard deviation of 5.0 units. Therefore, the coefficient is also economically significant
(a reduction of 10 percentage points in the probability of a secession vote for an increase of
one standard deviation in global profits). We do not find a significant effect for profits from
local goods. Since larger profits from global goods indicate that the global group was more
cooperative, this result suggests that a vote for secessions is less likely when the global group
is cooperative.
We can also analyse contributions of others directly, instead of summarising them through
average profits. Columns 3 to 6 of Table 4.5 presents the result of this analysis. We always
include the contributions of other members of the global group to global public goods. Columns
3 and 4 show the result when including contributions from other local group members to all
public goods, while Columns 5 and 6 include contributions from other local group members to
both types of goods, but disaggregated.9
First, we see that higher contributions from global group members lead to a lower probability
of a secession vote. Specifically, when global group members contribute an additional unit, the
probability of a secession vote decreases by between 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points. An increase
of one standard deviation in this variable (45.43 units) would decrease the probability of a
secession vote by between 10.4 and 14.5 percentage points.
Second, we see that contributions from local group members have the opposite effect (Columns
1 and 2). Moreover, contributions to global goods from local group members increase the prob-
9Subjects had access to this information during the experiment.
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ability of a secession vote. Indeed, Column 4 shows that an increase of one unit in contributions
from local group members to global goods increase the probability of a secession vote by about
0.54 percentage points. An increase of one standard deviation in this variable (16.16 units)
would increase the probability of a secession vote by 8.73 percentage points. This effect is
somewhat lower than contributions from the global group. We can summarise the results as
such:
Result 4.4. The probability of a secession vote is increased when local group members contribute
more, but decreased when global group members contribute more.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
The question that motivates this chapter is whether devolving some responsibilities to regional
governments in countries facing regional separatist movements could avoid a divide of the coun-
try. The literature does not give a clear-cut answer on the effectiveness of decentralisation as a
device to quell separatist movements. Our contribution lies in the design of an original experi-
ment that uses a public good game with multiple public goods played in different settings that
capture some real-world features. We focus on the effects of a decentralised provision of public
goods as well as of local group identities on the probability of votes for secession, corresponding
in our design to a choice by subjects to only interact with members of their local, smaller group.
First, our results indicate that the Decentralisation treatment, where subjects have more
goods with which to interact with local group members, increases the contributions to local
public goods. This result is in line with the results of Bernasconi et al. (2009), who show
that when faced with multiple identical public goods, subjects contribute more than faced with
a single good. However, the treatment has no effect on contributions to global public goods,
which goes against the results of Bernasconi et al. (2009). Overall, these results do indicate
that our experiment created institutions that induced different contribution behaviour by the
subjects. While a more realistic setting would probably capture the preference matching aspect
of decentralised public goods provision, our institutions reflect, to some level, the fact that local
goods are “closer” to voters, and more easily monitored.
Second, we find that the Decentralisation treatment decreases the probability of votes for
secession. Notably, this result is net of the effect of fellow group member contributions. Indeed,
since under that treatment, contributions to the local goods are higher, we could expect more
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votes for secessions if subjects choose the public goods to which others contribute the most.
However, net of that effect, we still find that decentralisation reduces the likelihood that subjects
vote for secession. Therefore, even under the relatively simplistic institutions imposed by the
restrictions of the laboratory, subjects choose to secede less often when they are allowed to
interact with a smaller group for a larger number of public goods in the experiment. This effect
might be capturing how decentralisation diminishes the effects of grievances from local group
members towards the members of the larger group.
Third, we do not find any effect from the Identity treatment, in which we reinforced the
saliency of the local group identity. This result is in contradiction with our initial hypotheses.
Moreover, the Identity treatment has no impact on the effect of the Decentralisation treatment;
the interaction effects are insignificant.
However, it is worth noting that by not including any data from the sessions in which local
identity was reinforced, our results on the Decentralisation treatment would be much weaker,
or even disappear. Therefore, we believe that local identity might play a role that we were not
able to uncover in our data.
One shortcoming of our Identity treatment is how local group identities were reinforced
symmetrically. Indeed, the treatment was the same for each local group in the session. This
might translate real-world settings such as ex-Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, or Belgium, for
example, where there is a mosaic of different ethnic groups. However, secessionist movements
frequently appear where one relatively small group is against the remainder of the national
community, such as in Canada, Spain, or the United Kingdom,10 for example. It might be
interesting, then, to consider an experiment where we strongly reinforce local identity in one of
the local groups, but not in the others.
We are aware that the experimental design reported here is a simplification of real-world
separatist movements. Nevertheless, we believe that it captures some features of these move-
ments and decentralisation. First, local groups and public goods capture how supplying public
goods closer to the contributing voters (subjects) increases the confidence of voters that their
interests are better represented. This, however, comes at the cost of efficiency, since global
public goods can benefit from economies of scale. Second, the reinforcement of local identities
capture the importance of ethnic and minority identities in secessionist movements. Future re-
10Note, however, that the United Kingdom was composed of several regions with specific identities and seces-
sionist groups in the past. Indeed, Ireland achieved independence in 1921.
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search extensions could consider enriching the experimental design by, for instance, introducing
regional disparities in endowment to simulate the presence of natural resources or differences
in income distributions. Future research could also consider refinements on the institutions, by
using mechanisms other than voluntary contributions, for example.
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Appendix
4.A Instructions (translated from French)
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The following instructions are for the Baseline treatment. We add the instructions that are 
specific to the Decentralization and Identity treatments in italics into brackets. The instructions 
for the sessions where we control for the order effect are identical to these instructions we only 
invert part 1 and part 2. The questionnaire used to form the groups in the Identity treatment 
is presented at the end of the instructions.  
General information 
We thank you for participating in this experiment in economics. Your payoffs depend 
on your decisions. It is therefore important that you read the following instructions 
carefully. 
Instructions are distributed for your personal use. We thank you for not 
communicating with other participants during the experiment.  
During the experiment, we will not talk about Euros but about ECU (Experimental 
Currency Units). All payoffs will be calculated in ECU. At the end of the experiment, 
the total number of ECU that you earned will be converted into Euros at the following 
conversion rate: 
100 ECU = 0.45 Euro 
In addition to this amount, you will receive a show up fee of 5 Euros. All payments 
will be made in private and in cash in a separate room. Other participants will never 
know the amount of your payoffs in this experiment. 
Groups’ formation 
Before the start of the first part, the computer program will form randomly groups 
composed of 9 people. Each group of 9 people is composed of three sub-groups of 3 
people. 
A group of 9 people is called “global group” and a sub-group of 3 people a “local 
group”. A global group thus comprises three local groups, A, B and C. 
[Additional instructions for the Identity treatment: 
Each local group of 3 people within a global group is formed according to the 
proximity of the answers given in a questionnaire that will appear on your screen. The 
questionnaire consists of four proposals. For each of them, we ask you to tell if you: 
− Strongly disagree 
− Disagree 
− Agree 
− Strongly agree 
Once the questionnaire is completed by each participant the computer program will 
use an algorithm to form the local groups according to the proximity of the answers 
given to these different proposals. 
Thus, you will be paired in your local group with two other people in the overall group 
of 9 that expressed the nearest opinion to yours. You will not know at any time the 
detailed answers of the other participants; likewise, no one will know the details of 
your answers. 
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The two other local groups are composed of participants whose views are less similar 
to yours but the name of the local group (A, B, C) is independent of the distance with 
the opinions of your local group (for example, if you are in Group A, the members of 
group C are not necessarily further from your opinions than the members of group B). 
To sum up, each group of 9 people is composed of three sub-groups of 3 people. 
Groups of 9 people are randomly formed while the sub-groups of 3 are formed using 
the algorithm. ] 
Thus, you will be at the same time a member of a local group with 2 other people and 
a member of a global group that includes your local group and the 6 members of the 
two other local groups. 
The following table illustrates the composition of a global group and its local groups. 
Global group Local group A Local group B Local group C 
participant 1 
participant 2 
participant 3 
participant 4 
participant 5 
participant 6 
participant 7 
participant 8 
participant 9 
participant 1 
participant 2 
participant 3 
 
 
 
participant 4 
participant 5 
participant 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
participant 7 
participant 8 
participant 9 
For example, one participant is a member of both the global group and the local group 
A. 
The composition of each group will remain the same throughout the experiment. 
You will remain paired with the same co-participants in your local group and in your 
global group in all parts of the experiment. You will never know the identity of your 
co-participants and your co-participants will never know your identity. All decisions 
are anonymous. 
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Part 1 
 
The first part consists of 12 periods during which you may allocate ECU between 
multiple accounts. Your payoff in this section is the sum of your earnings in each 
period. 
Description of each period 
At the beginning of each period, each participant receives 60 ECU. We call this sum 
the “endowment”. You have to decide how to allocate this endowment between your 
private account and several public accounts. 
You have the choice to allocate the ECU in three public accounts: two global public 
accounts and one local public account. [This sentence is replaced by the following in the 
Decentralization treatment: You have the choice to allocate the ECU in three public 
accounts: one global public account and two local public accounts.] 
− The 9 members of the global group may allocate ECU to the global public 
account G1 and to the global public account G2. The amount of a global public 
account is the sum of the ECU allocated by you and the other 8 members of the 
global group to this account. 
− Only the 3 members of your local group may allocate ECU to your local public 
account. The amount of your local public account is the sum of the ECU 
allocated by you and the two other members of your local group to this account. 
Members of the two other local groups to which you do not belong also have their own 
local public account. The local group A can allocate ECU to the local public account A, 
the local group B may allocate ECU to the local public account B, and the local group 
C may allocate ECU to the local public account C. 
 
Thus, you have to decide how much of your 60 ECU you keep on your private account 
and how much ECU you allocate to: 
- The global public account G1 (between 0 and 60 ECU) 
- The global public account G2 (between 0 and 60 ECU) [In the Decentralization treatment 
this is replaced by: Your local public account (A, B or C) (between 0 and 60 ECU).] 
- Your local public account (A, B or C) (between 0 and 60 ECU). 
You must enter a value in each box on your screen. The difference between your 
endowment 60 ECU and the sum of ECU allocated to each public account remains on 
your private account. The sum of your ECU allocated to these accounts, public and 
private, may not exceed 60 ECU. 
You will make your decisions as in the screen shown in Figure 1. The consequences of 
your decisions are explained in detail on the next page. 
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Figure 1. Example of a decision screen  
 
 
Once all group members have decided the amount they allocate to the three public 
accounts, you are informed of: 
− The total amount allocated to each global public accounts by the 9 members of 
the global group (including your allocation) [In the Decentralization treatment this 
is replaced by: The total amount allocated to the global public account by the 9 
members of the global group (including your allocation).] 
− The total amount allocated to each global public accounts by the 3 members of 
your local group (including your allocation) [In the Decentralization treatment 
this is replaced by: The total amount allocated to the global public account by 
the 3 members of your local group.] 
− The total amount allocated to your local public account by the 3 members of 
your local group (including your allocation). [In the Decentralization treatment 
this is replaced by: The total amount allocated to your local public accounts by 
the 3 members of your local group (including your allocation).] 
Your screen will also remind you the amount of your allocation to the global public 
accounts and the local public account and the amount held on your private account. 
[This sentence is replaced by the following in the Decentralization treatment: Your screen 
will also remind you the amount of your allocation to the global public account and 
to the local public accounts and the amount held on your private account.] It also 
shows your gain in that period. You are not informed of the amounts allocated to 
local public accounts by the two other local groups. 
Figure 2 reproduces the feedback screen at the end of a period. 
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 Figure 2. Example of the feedback screen displayed at the end of a period. 
 
Calculation of your payoff 
The revenue drawn from a public account is different depending on whether it is a 
global public account or a local public account: 
− The revenue drawn from each global public account represents 20% of the 
sum of the 9 individual allocations to this global public account, [This sentence 
is replaced by the following in the Decentralization treatment: The revenue drawn 
from the global public account represents 20% of the sum of the 9 individual 
allocations to the global public account, ] 
− The revenue drawn from the local public account represents 50% of the sum of 
the three individual allocations to the local public account. [This sentence is 
replaced by the following in the Decentralization treatment: The revenue drawn 
from each local public account represents 50% of the sum of the three 
individual allocations to this local public account.] 
Your payoff at each period is calculated using the following formula (if you have 
difficulty understanding these formulas do not hesitate to ask questions): 
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Payoff in a period   =    Your endowment in ECU  
                        - Your allocation to the two global public accounts and the local public account 
                               + 20 % of the total number of ECU allocated to the global public account G1 
                               + 20 % of the total number of ECU allocated to the global public account G2 [In the 
Decentralization treatment this sentence is replaced by:  
                               + 50% of the total number of ECU allocated to your local public account (A, B or C)] 
                               + 50% of the total number of ECU allocated to your local public account (A, B or C) 
 
This formula shows that your payoff at the end of a period consists of two parts: 
 
1) of the ECU that you have kept for yourself (namely your endowment - your 
allocation to the public accounts) 
2) of the sum of the total revenues from both global public accounts and your local 
public account. [This sentence is replaced by the following in the Decentralization 
treatment: of the sum of the total revenues from the global public account and your 
both local public accounts.] 
 
Here are some examples. 
 
Example 1 
Suppose that the sum of the allocations of the 3 members of a local group to their local 
public account is 90 ECU. Suppose also that the sum of the allocations of the 9 members 
of the global group is 70 ECU to the global public account 1 and 300 ECU to the global 
public account 2. In this case, the revenue from public accounts is: 
50% (90) + 20% (70) + 20% (300) = 45 + 14 + 60 = 119 ECU 
[This example is replaced by the following in the Decentralization treatment: Suppose that 
the sum of the allocations of the 3 members of a local group is 90 ECU to their local 
public account 1 and 70 ECU to their local public account 2. Suppose also that the sum 
of the allocations of the 9 members of the global group is 300 ECU to the global public 
account. In this case, the revenue from public accounts is: 
50% (90) + 50% (70) + 20% (300) = 45 + 35 + 60 = 140 ECU] 
 
Example 2 
Suppose that the sum of the allocations of the 3 members of a local group to their local 
public account is 60 ECU. Suppose also that the sum of the allocations of the 9 members 
of the global group is 90 ECU to the global public account 1 and 50 ECU to the global 
public account 2. In this case, the revenue from public accounts is: 
50% (60) + 20% (90) + 20% (50) = 30 + 18 + 10 = 58 ECU. 
[This example is replaced by the following in the Decentralization treatment: Suppose that 
the sum of the allocations of the 3 members of a local group is 60 ECU to their local 
public account 1 and 90 ECU to their local public account 2. Suppose also that the sum 
193
of the allocations of the 9 members of the global group is 50 ECU to the global public 
account. In this case, the revenue from public accounts is: 
50% (60) + 50% (90) + 20% (50) = 30 + 45 + 10 = 85 ECU.] 
 
You always have the option to keep the ECU on your private account or to allocate 
them to a public account. Each ECU you keep on your private account increases your 
payoff in the current period by 1 ECU. 
 
If you allocate 1 ECU to a public account, the total allocation of this public account 
increases by 1 ECU. In this case, your revenue increases by 50% × 1 = 0.5 ECU if it is a 
local public account and 20% × 1 = 0.2 ECU if it is a global public account. Your 
allocation to a public account also increases the revenue of other members: 
− If it is a local public account, the revenue of the two other members of your local 
group will also be increased by 0.5 ECU each. So, the total revenue of your local 
group from your local public account will be increased by 3 × 0.5 = 1.5 ECU. 
− If it is a global public account, the revenue of the eight other members of the 
global group will also be increased by 0.2 ECU each. So, the total revenue of the 
global group from the global public account is increased by 9 × 0.2 = 1.8 ECU. 
 
Similarly, your income increases for each ECU allocated to a global public account by 
the other members of the group and for each ECU allocated to your local public 
account by the other members of your local group. For each ECU allocated by another 
member of your local group or global group, you win 0.5 and 0.2 ECU respectively. 
However, your income is not affected by the ECU allocated by members of other local 
groups to their local public account. 
 
To sum up: 
 
- You receive an endowment. 
- You decide of your allocation to two global public accounts and one local public 
account. [This sentence is replaced by the following in the Decentralization treatment: You 
decide of your allocation to one global public account and two local public accounts.] 
- You are informed of the amount of allocation to each global public account and 
local public account associated with your local group and your payoff. [This sentence 
is replaced by the following in the Decentralization treatment: You are informed of the 
amount of allocation to the global public account and to each local public account 
associated with your local group and your payoff.] 
 
At the end of each period, a new period starts automatically. You receive a new 
endowment 60 ECU. 
* * * 
Please read again these instructions. If you have any question, raise your hand and we 
will answer to your questions in private. Thank you to fill out the understanding 
questionnaire that has been distributed. We will come to you to check your answers in 
private. 
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Part 2  
(distributed after completion of Part 1 and the questionnaire) 
The second part consists of 12 periods. Your payoff in this section is the sum of your 
earnings in each period. The composition of your local group and your global group 
is the same as in the previous part, but in this part you will only interact with the other 
two members of your local group. 
 
Description of each period 
 
The second part is similar to the first part: at the beginning of each period, each 
participant receives 60 ECU and has to decide how to allocate this endowment 
between his private account and three public accounts. 
 
The only difference with the previous part is that the three public accounts are now 
three local public accounts. 
 
Only three members of your local group may allocate ECU to your local public 
accounts. The amount of the local public accounts is the sum of the ECU allocated by 
you and the two other members of your local group to these accounts. 
 
Members of the two other local groups to which you do not belong also have their own 
local public accounts. The local group A may allocate ECU to the local public accounts 
A1, A2 and A3; the local group B may allocate ECU to the local public accounts B1, B2 
and B3; and the local group C may allocate ECU to the local public accounts C1, C2 
and C3. 
 
Thus, you need to decide how much of your 60 ECU you keep on your private account 
and how much you allocate to: 
- Your local public account 1 (A, B or C) (between 0 and 60 ECU) 
- Your local public account 2 (A, B or C) (between 0 and 60 ECU) 
- Your local public account 3 (A, B or C) (between 0 and 60 ECU) 
 
You must enter a value in each box displayed on your screen. The difference between 
your endowment 60 and the sum of the ECU allocated to each public account remains 
on your private account. The sum of all your ECU allocated to these accounts, public 
and private, may not exceed 60 ECU. 
 
Once all group members have decided the amount they allocate to these three public 
accounts, you are informed of the total amount allocated to each of the three local 
public accounts by the 3 members of your local group (including your allocation). 
Your screen will also remind you the amount of your allocation to each local public 
account and the amount held on your private account. It also shows your payoff in 
that period. You are not informed of the amounts allocated to local public accounts by 
the two other local groups. 
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Calculation of your payoff 
The revenue drawn from each local public account represents 50% of the sum of the 3 
individual allocations to this local public account. 
Your payoff at each period is calculated using the following formula: 
Payoff in a period   =    Your endowment in ECU  
                        - Your allocation to the three local public accounts 
                               + 50% of the total number of ECU allocated to your local public account (A, B or C) 
                               + 50% of the total number of ECU allocated to your local public account (A, B or C)  
                               + 50% of the total number of ECU allocated to your local public account (A, B or C) 
 
 
This formula shows that your payoff at the end of a period consists of two parts: 
 
1) of the ECU that you have kept for yourself (namely your endowment - your 
allocation to the public accounts) 
2) of the sum of the total revenues from your local public accounts. 
 
As previously, each ECU you keep on your private account increases your earning in 
the current period by 1 ECU. If you allocate 1 ECU to a local public account, the total 
allocation of this public account increases by 1 ECU. In this case, your revenue 
increases by 50% × 1 = 0.5 ECU. The revenue of two other members of your local group 
will also be increased by 0.5 ECU each. Thus, the total revenue of the local group from 
the local public account will be increased by 3 × 0.5 = 1.5 ECU. 
 
Similarly, your income increases by 0.5 ECU for each ECU allocated to a local public 
account by other members of your local group. However, your income is not affected 
by the ECU allocated by members of other local groups to their local public accounts. 
 
At the end of each period, a new period starts automatically. You will receive a new 
endowment of 60 ECU. 
* * * 
Please read again these instructions. If you have any question, raise your hand and we 
will answer to your questions in private. 
Part 3  
(distributed after completion of Part 2) 
 
The third part consists of 12 periods. Your payoff in this section is the sum of your 
earnings in each period. The composition of your local group and your global group 
is the same as in the previous parts. 
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Choice of the available public accounts 
 
Before the start of the first period, you have to vote to select the nature of the public 
accounts that will be available for the next 12 periods. You will vote only once in this 
part. 
You can choose between two options: 
− An option with a local public account and two global public accounts (as in 
part 1) [This sentence is replaced by the following in the Decentralization treatment: 
An option with two local public accounts and one global public account (as in 
part 1).] 
− An option with three local public accounts (as in Part 2). 
If the option with a local public account and two global public accounts is selected 
[This sentence is replaced by the following in the Decentralization treatment: If the option 
with two local public accounts and one global public account is selected], you will 
interact at the same time with the 2 other members of your local group and with the 
members of the other two local groups (i.e. with 8 other people). 
If the option with three local public accounts is selected, you will only interact with 
the two other members of your local group. 
 
Once all the members have voted, the computer program calculates the majority choice 
in each of the three local groups. The option that will be applied to the next 12 periods 
of the game is the one that was chosen by a majority of three local groups within your 
global group of 9 people. 
Before the start of the first period, you are informed of the outcome of the vote in your 
local group and of the majority choice in the global group. You are not informed about 
the details of the votes in your local group nor in other groups. 
 
Description of each period 
You receive 60 ECU at the beginning of the period. According to the majority vote, you 
can allocate the ECU of your endowment either between your private account, a local 
public account and two global public accounts (according to the rules of Part 1) [This 
sentence is replaced by the following in the Decentralization treatment: you can allocate the 
ECU of your endowment either between your private account, two local public 
accounts and one global public account (according to the rules of Part 1)] or between 
your private account and three local public accounts (according to the rules of Part 2). 
* * * 
Please read again these instructions. If you have any question, raise your hand and we 
will answer to your questions in private. 
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Questionnaire for the groups’ formation 
 
Please read each statement very carefully and evaluate how much you agree or 
disagree with each one of them. 
 
For each statement, give your answer by checking the box that best describes your 
opinion. 
 
You can only choose one answer from the following options: 
 
1. Strongly disagree; 
2. Disagree; 
3. Agreement; 
4. Strongly agree. 
 
Statement 1: I enjoy visiting museums of contemporary art. 
Statement 2: Surrogate motherhood should be authorized. 
Statement 3: I am willing to consume genetically modified food. 
Statement 4: I love practicing sports. 
 
The rest of the instructions is similar to the other treatments.  
 
198
Conclusion
This thesis investigated two issues pertaining to fiscal decentralisation: fiscal competition, and
the choice of jurisdiction borders. The first two chapters studied a specific type of fiscal com-
petition: bidding wars between regional governments to attract new investment from firms.
Moreover, they analysed how these bidding wars affect the firm’s structure, thus putting the
spotlight on the strategic choices of the firm, and not only of governments. The last two chap-
ters analysed the decision of voters to secede from a larger jurisdiction, first empirically and
then using experimental methods.
Chapter 1 studied the strategic choice by a firm of how to allocate her production across
multiple sites when these plants are allocated through a bidding war between many regional
governments. We build a model in which the firm chooses how much to invest in each estab-
lishment, and then uses a multi-unit auction to “sell” them to regional governments. The latter
have private benefits from hosting the firm on their territory, which are private information.
The main results of Chapter 1 are as follows. First, I find that equilibrium subsidies will
depend on the firm’s choice of capital amounts to invest. In particular, when she chooses
asymmetric plants, she is able to increase her total subsidies. This increase is due to the infra-
marginal competition between the last two regions remaining in the bidding war. Second, I
show that this bidding behaviour affects the optimal amounts of investment of the firm. More
specifically, I find that she always chooses to differentiate her establishments. Therefore, the
firm can strategically modify her allocation of investment across many plants to benefits from
larger subsidies.
I then compare this result to a situation without a bidding war, in which the firm simply
chooses two locations for the plants randomly. I find that under some conditions on the produc-
tion function of the firm, total investment and total subsidies are always higher under a bidding
war.
From a normative point of view, we describe the optimal mechanism to maximise the firm’s
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total profits. We find that this optimal mechanism, defined by an allocation and a payment rules,
can be implemented by the open ascending auction. Moreover, we find that this mechanism is
socially efficient, as an uninformed social planner would choose identical allocation and payment
rules. Finally, we solve for a more general optimal mechanism, in which the firm does not
commit to investment amount before the auction takes place. We find that in expected value,
the solution to this problem is identical to the one in the restricted model, with commitment.
The model in Chapter 2 departs from the one in the first chapter by considering an additional
trade-off not present in the first chapter, or in the previous literature. In particular, we explore
how the requirement for regions to make investment in public infrastructure before participating
in the bidding war can reduce the incentive for the firm to differentiate the two plants. The
argument is the following. When allocation plants through a bidding war, the firm differentiates
her establishments, thus concentrating more production in one plant. In turn, this concentration
increases the size of one plant, and thus the infrastructure needed to host it. Consequently,
some regions decide not to invest in the necessary infrastructure, and do not take part in the
bidding war. Finally, this reduced competition for the firm’s investment potentially reduces the
subsidies.
The main results of Chapter 2 are as follows. First, I show that by choosing to concentrate
a large share of investment in one plant, the firm risks driving all regions out of the bidding
war. Indeed, since the infrastructure cost is sunk and paid even when they lose the bidding
war, when it is too large, many regions are better off only participating in the bidding for the
small establishment. Second, I show that this feature of the competition has implications on
the firm’s choice of differentiation. Indeed, when entry costs are important enough, even a firm
that would usually be better off concentrating all production in a single plant would choose to
split in two establishments. More generally, these infrastructure costs moderate the tendency
of the firm to put more production in one of the establishments, thus moving closer to identical
plants.
Overall, the conclusions of the first two chapters are especially relevant in a world expe-
riencing a trend of increased decentralisation. Indeed, both OECD and developing countries
are seeing an increase in the number of sub-national jurisdictions. As highlighted in the thesis,
this increase in the number of governments could amplify fiscal competition at the local level.
Bidding wars for firms are an important source of fiscal competition between local governments,
as illustrated by the amount of fiscal incentives granted to firms every year in the United States.
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Furthermore, since these bidding wars are often for investments by multi-establishment firms,
it is important to understand whether such firms can act strategically and allocate investment
across sites in a way that increases total subsidies. The main implication of the first two chap-
ters in this thesis is that indeed, firms can manipulate the bidding wars to increase subsidies.
However, I also show that even with this distortion, it is usually still better, from a social welfare
point of view, to allow these bidding wars since they allow the regions who value the firm the
most to host the plants.
The last two chapters study the voters’ endogenous decision of jurisdiction borders. In
Chapter 3, I explore this question at a local level, reflecting the trend in which central gov-
ernments, in recent decades, have modified borders of municipalities, promising cost savings
and higher efficiency. Examples include municipal mergers in Finland, Japan, and Canada, as
well as the push towards more collaboration amongst French municipalities. I use data from a
specific example, in the Canadian province of Quebec, where voters were given the opportunity
to vote whether they approved or opposed municipal mergers that were imposed a few years
before by the central government. This particular event provides an original and unique dataset
of public consultations on secessions in 213 municipalities, which I combine with a rich dataset
on socio-economic characteristics for every municipality from the Canadian Census.
The main objective of Chapter 3 is to understand the motivations behind the opposition to
municipal mergers. The economic literature on endogenous borders often emphasises a trade-off
between economies of scale and heterogeneity of preferences (see, e.g., Alesina and Spolaore,
1997). Larger jurisdictions can more efficiently provide public goods, but there might be a better
match between the preferences of voters and the public good in smaller jurisdictions. Alesina,
Baqir, and Hoxby (2004) put forth another reason for the disapproval of large jurisdictions
by voters: voters inherently dislike living in a jurisdiction with people different from them.
Chapter 3 suggests that these two explanations are relevant in the voters’ disapproval of large
jurisdictions.
The main results are as follows. First, differences in income and language between a town
and the other towns in the merger are important drivers of the secession decision. Second, while
greater income differences does lead to more secessions, I find that this effect is not identical at
different levels of language differences. In particular, when voters are mixed mostly with others
of the same ethnic group (i.e., low language differences), they tolerate differences in income:
income differences have no, or only a small effect on the probability of a secession. However,
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when the language differences are larger, differences in income greatly affect the probability of
a secession. These results suggest that when deciding to secede, voters do not only care about
the match between their preferences for the public goods and the public goods provided, but
also directly care about the ethnic identity of the voters in their jurisdiction. In other words,
voters prefer ethnically homogeneous municipalities.
In conclusion, Chapter 3 shows that ethnic identities do matter in the voters’ decision to se-
cede. While Chapter 3 considers linguistic groups, since they are important in Quebec’s context,
different dimensions of identities could matter in other regions. In particular, identity questions
could be of importance to explain the secessionist movements in Scotland and Catalonia. More
concretely, another lesson of Chapter 3 is that if governments care about the potential long-term
benefits of ethnic diversity in local jurisdictions (as suggested by Putnam (2007) and Ottaviano
and Peri (2005)), they should impose mergers and commit to a policy of not allowing further
changes.
Chapter 4 approaches the question of endogenous borders from a more national point of
view. The main objective of Chapter 4 is to investigate, using experimental methods, the link
between decentralisation and secessionist groups. When central governments are confronted
with a secessionist threat in one or more regions, they might devolve some power or competences
to the regional entity, in the hope that the decentralization of power will accommodate regional
demands and thereby quell the separatist movement. However, while decentralisation might
allow an overall mix of public goods closer to the voters’ preferences, it might also provide
more resources to the secessionist movement, thus making them more organised and possibly
stronger.
Given the difficulty to find causal estimates with observed data, Chapter 4 instead ap-
proaches the question with experimental methods. Briefly, our experiment consists of multiple
public goods at two different levels: local and global. Each subject is part of one local group
(with two other subjects), and of a global group (composed of three local groups). The experi-
ment considers two dimensions of treatment: decentralisation and local identity. First, for the
decentralisation dimension, we vary the number of each type of public goods. In the Centrali-
sation treatments, subjects are faced with two global public goods and one local public good,
while in the Decentralisation treatments they are faced with the opposite: one global public
good and two local public goods. Second, for the identity dimension, we reinforce local identities
in half of the sessions.
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The results of Chapter 4 concern both the results of the vote and the level of contributions by
subjects. First, it finds that the Decentralization treatment strongly decreases the probability
that subjects vote for secession, although reinforced local identities have no effect on the votes.
Second, the results also show that the Decentralization treatment increases contributions to
the local public goods. However, the Identity treatment does not affect the level of individual
contributions. To conclude, the results suggest that central governments could actually weaken
secessionist movements by devolving some responsibilities to regional governments.
This question has had a relatively high profile in recent years at a national level, especially
following the vote of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, but also due to the
debates in Scotland and Catalonia, for example. While the implementation of decentralisation
in this experiment is obviously very simplified, it does capture some of the real-world features
of decentralisation (e.g., less free-riding in local groups, more efficiency in global goods). More-
over, the second treatment dimension is related to the the findings of Chapter 3 on the link
between ethnic identity and the probability of a secession. Given the importance of ethnicity
in many secessionist movements around the world, the experiment introduces the same concept
to investigate whether the creation of a local shared identity modifies the outcome of the vote,
and whether it modifies the effect of the Decentralisation treatment. Indeed, in the real world,
decentralisation might be more or less efficient at stopping secessionist movements depending
on the strength of the ethnic identity of the region (as argued by Ezgi, 2009). While we do not
find any effect of reinforced identity, future research should consider better ways to implement
this treatment, such as creating local identities of asymmetrical strengths.
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